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Abstract  
 
 
Using primary material, much of which has been overlooked up to now, this thesis 
argues that the Iskra newspaper and its organisational appendages were conceived by 
Lenin and his closest collaborators in a pragmatic attempt to strike a balance between 
the theoretically authoritative and revolutionary, yet inactive Osvobozhdenie Truda 
and the more active, but reformist and theoretically unclear Rabochee Delo grouping. 
As such, Iskra does not appear to have been the product of a detailed plan conceived 
in Siberian exile, as is often thought. Nor did it represent the extreme left wing of the 
Russian social-democratic movement of the time, a place occupied by Osvobozhdenie 
Truda. Iskra and its supporting organisations formed a faction of a broader party, the 
RSDLP, whose institutions it aimed to rebuild and to which it aimed to give 
ideological leadership broadly in sympathy with the basic views of Plekhanov, though 
differing with him in terms of tactics. Starting from a position of weakness both in the 
emigration and inside Russia, Lenin at first sought an alliance with the ‗Economists‘ 
of Rabochee Delo rather than a policy of open factional struggle, which was at this 
stage (1900-01) advocated by Plekhanov. Only when serious vacillations in the 
Rabochee Delo line started to emerge in the spring of 1901 did Lenin break with this 
tactic, in despair of any useful co-operation with the politically unstable followers of 
the economist journal. From the end of 1901an open struggle for the support of the 
RSDLP local committees inside Russia began, in which the Economists were unable 
to martial support, whilst Iskra, owing to its network of full-time ‗agents‘ and their 
assistance, eventually won a dominant position. On this basis, plans were laid for a 
Second Congress of the RSDLP that reveal a distinctly democratic and pluralist 
conception of party organisation on the part of Lenin, A conception which does not 
square with his dictatorial reputation. Accordingly, this thesis argues that the Second 
Congress was a credible, if not perfect representation of rank and file opinion within 
the RSDLP at the time and that the split within the Iskra faction that took place at this 
meeting owes more to pre-existing tensions with the Russian Iskra organisation rather 
than any unreasonable behaviour on the part of Lenin. Specifically, individual agents 
showed signs of weariness in relation to Lenin‘s policy of factional struggle prior to 
the Second Congress. For this reason they sought, but failed to find compromise at the 
congress with the Bund and the economists, and as such provoked a split with the 
supporters of Lenin within Iskra. As such, it was actually an inopportune search for 
compromise which appears to have provoked the split within Iskra, rather than 
dictatorial or intolerant practices on the part of Lenin. The supporters of Martov 
assumed that the Bund and the supporters of economism could be appeased, but this 
was not in fact the case. 
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Notes on Names, Texts and Dates 
 
 
 Every individual who appears in this study is referred to by his or her best 
known pseudonym even though, in the documents we have studied, they are referred 
to using a variety of different aliases. We are grateful to Brian Pearce's index of cadre 
names which can be found in his translation of the Minutes of the Second RSDLP 
Congress, the footnotes and endnotes in the Leninskii Sbornik, and Krupskaya's 
Memories of Lenin for help in linking pseudonyms to definite individuals. As a result 
we can draw attention to the fact that he following individuals who appear in this 
study are widely known by the following alternative names: 
 
 
Name in the Study     Alternative Names 
 
VP Akimov      VP Makhnovetz [real name] 
EM Alexandrova     Stein [at the Second Congress] 
LO Dan LO Kantsel-Tsederbaum 
[maiden name] 
T Dan       FI Dan 
RS Halberstadt     Fischer [Second Congress] 
VN Krokhmal   Fomin [Second Congress] 
PA Krasikov      Pavlovich, Ignat, Pankrat  
EE Levin       A Egorov 
Iu O Martov      L Martov  
AS Martynov      AS Pikker [real name] 
AN Potresov      Starover  
DB Riazanov      DB Goldendach, N Riazanov 
AM Stopani      Lange [Second Congress] 
 
  
  Apart from this, we cannot refrain from the observation that some of 
documents we cite are written in non-standard Russian, a fact which has generated a 
protest from a native Russian speaker who proofread the draft. Unfortunately, many 
of her painstaking corrections to the citations were in fact modifications of the 
original text, which the present writer was unable to accept for quite obvious reasons. 
The only modifications we have made to any text is the use of the modern Russian 
spelling in place of the one in existence prior to the orthographic reform of 1917, 
which is due to the limitations of modern keyboards, and the sparing use of ellipsis  
 
 All place names are the official names ones in use at the time and no offence 
to cultural, political or linguistic sensitivities is intended when we refer to Białystok 
as 'Belostock', Dnipropetrovsk as 'Ekaterinoslav', or the northern capital of Russia as 
'St Petersburg'. For clarity, we always use the Gregorian and not the Julian calendar, 
even though both are used in the documents upon which this study is based. 
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Chapter One: Historiographical and Historical Context 
 
 The subject of Lenin‘s Iskra is one familiar to the widest of audiences, yet to 
date it has been subject to only a few detailed studies, all of which leave space for a 
new contribution.
1
 The present thesis aims to show that Iskra was a faction within the 
broader political party, the Russian Social-Democratic and Labour Party (RSDLP), 
rather than simply a political newspaper. It acknowledges that Iskra involved a quite 
extensive group of individuals united by a common set of political ideas who worked 
in co-operation to maximise the influence of these ideas within the broader party, 
using a variety of methods, not just journalism and theoretical argument, in a context 
where partisans of opposing views organised in a similar fashion. The half-dozen 
individuals who made up the theoretical leadership of Iskra are well known: many, 
but not all have received biographical treatment in the past.
2
 By contrast, the factional 
apparatus of Iskra considered as a whole has yet to receive much attention: just a few 
definite aspects of it have so far received consideration by historians. The first of 
these is the intensely practical work of Iskra's corps of underground agents that 
distributed literature and promoted the faction's influence inside Russia. In the Soviet 
Union, this network was indeed the subject of scholarship focusing on the methods of 
transporting literature, funds and personnel in an illegal environment, with specific 
attention being given to the movements of definite individuals and their contributions 
                                                        
1
    The main studies dedicated to this area do not appear to have gone beyond article length and in any 
case date back several decades: A Wildman, 'Lenin's Battle with Kustarnichestvo: The Iskra 
Organisation in Russia', Slavic Review 23: 3 (Sep., 1964) 479-503; GM Deich, 'Voprosy konspirativnoi 
tekhniki 'Iskry' v pis'makh VI Lenina 1900-03gg', Voprosy Istorii (1969: 9) 49-66; Ia P Volin, 
'Leninskaia 'Iskra' i podgotovka vtorogo s''ezda RSDRP', Vtoroi s’’ezd RSDRP i mestnye partiinye 
organisatsii Rossii (Perm: Permskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1973); and E Ia Olkhovskii, ‗VI Lenin vo 
glave ‗Iskry‘‘, Istoriia SSSR (1974: 6) 21-36. Of these, the works of Wildman and Volin appear to 
contain serious factual errors, a circumstance which perhaps explains Wildman's failure to include the 
material from his article in his later and better known The Making of a Workers' Revolution: Russian 
Social-Democracy 1891-1903 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). Sections of KN 
Tarnovskii Revolutionaia mysl', revolutionnoe delo (Moscow: Mysl', 1983) are also useful as an 
overview though, as we shall see later, there are some significant 'white spots' in this account. Possibly 
more useful are HJ Tobias, 'The Bund and Lenin until 1903', Russian Review 20: 4 (Oct., 1961) 344-
357 and HJ Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).  
2
    These works are discussed below, in the second section of this chapter. 
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to the cause of Soviet Communism.
3
 A second aspect to have already received 
treatment is the written work of Lenin and Plekhanov during the Iskra period, 
including the RSDLP programme and some of the main polemical exchanges: these 
have in fact received widespread attention. The history of Osvobozhdenie Truda's 
organisational relations has also attracted some interest, though studies on this theme 
have not yet included a reliable account of how this group fitted into the broader Iskra 
apparatus.
4
 The Iskra faction as a whole appears to have consisted in a number of 
interlocking circles and institutions: the Iskra newspaper with its editorial board of 
six, later seven individuals; the theoretical journal Zaria produced by this same 
collective; the corps of underground agents often referred to as the 'Russian Iskra 
organisation' and a succession of émigré circles dedicated to the support of these 
enterprises. The last of these included not only Osvobozhdenie Truda, but also 'The 
Revolutionary Organisation ''Sotsial-Demokrat''', the Foreign Committee of Iskra, and 
the League of Revolutionary Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. All these 
organisations appear to have been limbs of the same factional grouping at the head of 
which stood the Iskra-Zaria editorial board on the one hand, and the Samara-based 
'bureau' of the Russian Iskra organisation on the other. Thus it seems that the task of 
providing a comprehensive history of the Iskra faction is still a long way from 
completion and that the present study can only partially fill the gap which exists. 
 
 A closely related problem is the way in which scholarship has accounted for 
the ideas and activity of the factional opponents of Iskra inside the RSDLP, the 
understanding of which inevitably colours attitudes towards the Iskra faction. In 
Soviet studies, the anti-Iskra components of the RSDLP such as the Bund, the 
Economists and, later, the Mensheviks, were generally ignored.5 In the west, work to 
                                                        
3
    PN Pospelov et al, Vladimir Il’ich Lenin: biografiia (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo 
politicheskovo literatury 1963) 69-74; GM Deich, 'Voprosy konspirativnoi tekhniki 'Iskry'', 49-66; E Ia 
Olkhovskii, ‗VI Lenin vo glave ‗Iskry‘‘, 21-36 
4    Perhaps the most detailed account of Iskra-Osvobozhdenie Truda relations to date is to be found in 
SH Baron, Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963) 209-
37, but many of the factual claims of this section are challenged by the present study. 
5
  One exception, clearly based on limited access to the documents of these factions appears to be: Ch 
Panavas, Bor’ba bolshevikov protiv opportunisticheckoi teorii i politiki Bunda (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
Mysl', 1973) 
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date has viewed the factional struggle within the RSDLP essentially from an anti-
Iskra perspective, and the result has been a tendency to recriminate with, rather than 
to explain Iskra's behaviour, whilst vindicating that of the anti-Iskra factions.
6
 This 
itself is appears to be the consequence of the lack of a reliable account of Iskra's basic 
theoretical and organisations positions, along with a failure to fully appreciate that 
during the so-called 'Iskra period', a struggle for power was taking place within the 
RSDLP driven by incompatible reformist and revolutionary conceptions of social-
democracy.
7
 Indeed, previous English language studies appear to have blurred this 
important ideological distinction, thus presenting the factional struggle as an 
unprincipled 'squabble' rather than a conflict which can be explained rationally, as the 
result of serious political differences. Not only that, Soviet scholars who 
acknowledged the ideological character of the conflict do not appear to have had 
access to the documents of RSDLP organisations such as the Union of Russian 
Social-Democrats Abroad ('Union Abroad'), the (Jewish) Bund and the Union of 
Southern Committees and Organisations ('Southern Union'). Consequently, leading 
post-Soviet Russian scholarship still appears to show limited interest in these same 
organisations.
8
 For these reasons, the present study aims to lead the discussion away 
from previous western interpretations by studying the programmatic and 
organisational views of the opposing RSDLP factions and by showing how, in an 
attempt to promote one or other of these contrasting sets of principles, each side 
evolved political tactics suitable for an intra-party struggle, the soundness of which 
were tested in opposing attempts to secure the leadership of the party. As such it seeks 
to explain the defeat of the Bund and the Economists at the hands of Iskra in a way 
                                                        
6    A list of such works would include those by Tobias already cited, along with J Frankel, 
'Economism: A Heresy Exploited', Slavic Review 22: 2 (Jun., 1963) 263-84 and J Frankel, 'The 
Polarisation of Russian Marxism 1883-1903', in Vladimir Akimov on the Dilemmas of Russian 
Marxism, ed. J Frankel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) 1-98 
7    This idea is clearly rejected by Frankel in the works cited in the previous note and, more recently, in 
LT Lih, Lenin Rediscovered: What Is To Be Done? in Context (Leiden & Boston: Brill 2006) 279-83 
8    See e.g. O Nazarov interviewing CV Tiutiukin, 'Bol'sheviki nachinaiot i vyigrivaiot', Literaturnaia 
Gazeta, ''Portfel''', 32 (5935) (6-12 Aug., 2003) 15. In this remarkable interview given by the editor of 
Otechestvennaia Istoriia on the centenary of the Second Congress of the RSDLP, the latter quite 
alarmingly does not once mention the role of the Bund in the creation of the 'Bolshevik' party, nor its 
departure from the aforementioned at this Second Congress.  
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somewhat different from previous English-language histories of Lenin, Bolshevism or 
other aspects of the Russian social-democracy, hardly any of which have given a 
genuinely detailed account of this process. The almost ubiquitous view among such 
works is neatly summarised by Harding, who argues that Iskra: 
 
  indulged in intrigue, they rigged conferences and congresses to their own advantage, above 
all they used their newspaper as the main weapon in their struggle. In short they used every trick in 
their considerable repertoire of political wiles to re-establish their pre-eminence.
9
 
  
 This explanation of Iskra's success in terms of its use of the dark political arts 
does not acknowledge the political weaknesses and mistakes of the anti-Iskra 
groupings within the RSDLP, which often made the recourse to unfair or rough 
methods unnecessary on the part of Iskra in the pursuit of their goals. The present 
study will examine these weaknesses as well as the differences of principle which 
separated the contending factions, showing that the conflicts during the 1899-1903 
should not be understood as 'squabbles' that focused on questions of individual status 
and power. It will argue that they involved a clash between clearly articulated, but 
opposing political viewpoints. The study does not aim to criticise any particular point 
of view in the contest, but will does draw attention to the way in which certain 
political choices and methods of the anti-Iskra groups failed to serve the agendas of 
these groups. It will also demonstrate that Lenin was in fact not simply an aggressive 
polemicist during the Iskra period, so much as a master deal-making politician with a 
strongly legalistic frame of mind, a keen understanding of how to mobilise support 
with a political party for his ideas, and a clear strategy. It will therefore show that the 
struggle between Iskra, the Economists and the Bund was a rationally-conducted, rule 
governed process rather than a breakdown of some pre-existing political unity and, as 
such, a morbid phenomenon. 
 
 We are not therefore primarily concerned with the contents of the Iskra 
newspaper, even though a study of these is much overdue and would do much to 
support the contention that Lenin was not simply an intemperate polemicist. Nor is 
                                                        
9
    N Harding, Lenin’s Political Thought, Volume One: Theory and Practice in the Democratic 
Revolution (London & Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1977) 179 
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there any intention to detach Iskra from its context or to view it in isolation. Rather, 
the aim is to trace the development from its origins of the Iskra faction, from the 
circumstances of the newspaper's conception during the summer of 1900 through to 
the final establishment of its supporting circles and networks as discrete 
organisational entities during the winter of 1901-2. This development appears not to 
be the product of a pre-conceived plan on the part of Lenin, as is widely believed, so 
much as a response to circumstances, specifically a failure to find agreement with the 
'Economists' of the Union Abroad on a range of issues. Indeed, it is for precisely this 
reason that it is impossible to study Iskra in isolation from its opponents. The second 
part of the study will show how, in the wake of these disagreements, a factional 
struggle broke out between Iskra and its Economist and Bundist opponents, this 
section giving particular attention to the methods Iskra used to achieve dominance 
within a series of RSDLP institutions. As such, the study is not primarily concerned 
with polemical exchange, except where it is necessary to show these debates had a 
clear influence on party-organisational relations, so much as the practical methods of 
struggle Lenin and his co-thinkers employed. For this reason, there will be no 
consideration, as perhaps might be expected, of documents such as the 'Protest' 
against Kuskova's Credo, 'Where To Begin?' or What Is To Be Done? which have in 
any case been sufficiently discussed in many previous studies. There will however be 
a detailed analysis of the precise context in which these documents appeared that will 
hopefully challenge some of the current preconceptions concerning them.         
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i) 1899-1903 in the Context of Russian Social-Democratic History and Theory 
 
 The general history of Russian Marxism and social-democracy is a subject 
which has scarcely been ignored to date. It organisational and theoretical origins 
through a dialogue between Russian revolutionaries on the one hand, and Marx and 
Engels on the other have been traced with remarkable clarity and completeness by 
Eaton
10
 and Wada,
11
 whilst certain episodes in this process have been studied in detail 
by Shanin.
12
 Eaton shows how Engels took an early interest in the potential for a 
Russian revolutionary movement, beginning to learn the Russian language as early as 
1852, Marx joining him in this endeavour during the winter of 1869-70.
13
 Eaton 
shows how the first contact of Marx and Engels with Russia came through Bakunin 
and that, following the disagreement between the Marxists and the Bakuninists in the 
International Working Men's Association, Marx began to correspond with Russian 
individuals and circles he believed capable of forming the nucleus of a democratic 
revolutionary party. During this period, Wada shows how Marx and Engels displayed 
scepticism towards the utopian socialism of the Narodnik tradition, rejecting the idea 
that the structure of the village commune illustrated an innate tendency of Slavic 
nations towards socialism, and the assumption that capitalist economic development 
would not occur in these places.
14
 To expose these theories, it seems that Marx and 
Engels deliberately sought out the works of Russian economists, such as Flerovskii
15
 
and Ziber,
16
 who were themselves not especially linked to the revolutionary 
movement. However, as has been noted in one recent article, it is one-sided to suggest 
                                                        
10    H Eaton, 'Marx and the Russians', Journal of the History of Ideas 41: 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1980) 89-112  
11    H Wada, 'Marx, Marxism and the Agrarian Question: II Marx and Revolutionary Russia', History 
Workshop 12 (Autumn, 1981) 129-150  
12    Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and the Peripheries of Capitalism, ed. T Shanin (London: 
Routledge, 1983) 
13    H Eaton, 'Marx and the Russians', 108  
14    H Wada, 'Agrarian Question', 131-2 
15
    Ibid 133 
16    H Eaton, 'Marx and the Russians', 89, 104-5, 108; EA Grigor‘eva, 'Y istokov teori i praktiki 
rossiskikh 'marksistov' ', Voprosy Istorii (2004: 7) 78; JD White, ‗Nikolai Sieber: The First Russian 
Marxist‘, Revolutionary Russia 22 : 1 (Jun 2009) 1-20 
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that any of these figures were the first Russian 'Marxists'.
17
 Both Grigor'eva and Eaton 
expose the limitations of this view by showing that Marx and Engels were also 
consistently interested in establishing connections with Russian revolutionary circles 
which were actually active in the country, and were not simply made up of émigrés. 
Of particular interest to them appear to have been the Narodnaia Volia organisation,
18
 
generally viewed simply as a terrorist group, but in fact, as Shanin shows, possessed 
of a fully worked out political programme and strategy that incorporated 'agitation' 
tactics among all groups of society its members believed capable of rebelling against 
the autocracy.
19
  Whilst there is nothing in the documents Shanin presents to indicate 
that Narodnaia Volia adopted a rounded-out Marxist view of society, the parallels 
between these documents and the later programmatic statements of Osvobozhdenie 
Truda on the one hand, and the Russian Social-Democratic and Labour Party 
(RSDLP) on the other, are too great to ignore, especially when we consider the 
'democratic' sections of these later documents.
20
 These connections are especially 
intriguing in the light of Eaton's article, which shows how Marx was persuaded to 
write pamphlets and articles for the Narodnaia Volia organisation through his contact 
with the activist Morozov, whose arrest whilst smuggling these works into Russia 
prevented them ever appearing in print. In the light of this evidence it seems clear that 
Marx and Engels were seeking to combine the economic theories of individuals such 
as Ziber with the revolutionary strategy of Narodnaia Volia and that his apparent 
failure to achieve this fusion points to the absence of a credible group of 'Marxists' in 
Russia during Marx's lifetime. 
 
 The picture of Marx and Engels's early contacts with Russia is thus one of 
both scholarly interest and revolutionary activism, involving different sets of 
individuals, neither of which, given their isolation from the other can fairly be 
considered 'Russian Marxists'. Neither group emphasised the significance of the urban 
working class, which was indeed at this stage in its infancy in Russia, in theoretical or 
                                                        
17    EA Grigor‘eva, 'Teori i praktiki', 77-94 
18    H Eaton, 'Marx and the Russians', 104; H Wada, 'Agrarian Question', 141, 147 
19
    T Shanin, Late Marx, 207-12, 223-321  
20    GV Plekhanov, Sochineniia (Moscow & Leningrad, 1924-7) ii 357-62; 1903: Second Ordinary 
Congress of the RSDLP: Complete Text of the Minutes, translated by B Pearce (London: New Park, 
1978) 3-9 
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practical terms. Nonetheless, it was during the Narodnaia Volia period that the first 
exclusively workers' revolutionary organisation appeared in Russia, a surviving 
document of which has been published by Harding and Taylor.
21
 Naturally, this early 
example of a Russian workers' organisation does not express a conventionally Marxist 
view of the development of Russia, in so far as it shares the Narodnaia Volia notion 
that a constituent assembly would be able to reorganise economic relations in society 
more or less at will, whilst placing great emphasis on co-operatives rather than large-
scale common ownership and planning.
22
 Harding and Taylor's work shows that this 
type of thinking - clear in relation to democratic aims of the revolution, yet 
underdeveloped in terms of its conception of a transition to socialism - persisted 
among the small groups orientating towards Marxist thought which existed during the 
1880s.
23
 The most theoretically developed of these, Osvobozhdenie Truda, appears to 
have been met with relative indifference on the part of Marx and Engels owing to its 
émigré status.
24
 However, the annihilation of Narodnaia Volia appears to have 
exposed Marx and Engels's support for the latter's assassination campaign as over-
optimistic. In the wake of Narodnaia Volia's defeat, there was clearly a gradual 
increase in the status of Osvobozhdenie Truda, which took place for a number of 
reasons. First of all, and in contrast to some recent discussions of early Russian 
Marxist thought, the four surviving members of the group had played a serious role in 
Russia's populist underground.
25
 All had previously been involved in the Zemlia i 
Volia organisation and were therefore able to give advice to the younger generation 
on organisational questions.
26
 As Baron notes, the group's much noted inactivity and 
                                                        
21    Marxism in Russia: Key Documents 1879-1906, trans R Taylor, ed. N Harding (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983) 41-4 
22    T Shanin,  Late Marx 231-2; R Taylor & N Harding, Key Documents 42 
23    R Taylor & N Harding, Key Documents 74-80 
24    H Wada, 'Agrarian Question', 141-2 
25    M Donald, Marxism and Revolution: Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900-24 (Yale, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993) 2-3; P Iu Savel‘ev, 'GV Plekhanov i zagranichnyi 
soiuz russkikh sotsial-demokratov',  Istoricheskii Arkhiv (2006: 6) 51-9 
26    S Kucherov, 'The Case of Vera Zasulich', Russian Review 11: 2 (Apr., 1952) 86-96; SH Baron, 
'Plekhanov and the Origins of Russian Marxism', Russian Review 13: 1 (Jan., 1954) 38-51; SH Baron, 
Plekhanov, viii, 17-19; B A Engel & CN Rosenthal, Five Sisters: Women Against the Tsar, (London: 
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isolation from Russia in fact stemmed partially from the extradition of Deutsch from 
Germany, from where he had been trying to smuggle illegal literature into Russia, to 
stand trial in a Russian court. As a result of this he received an indefinite sentence of 
Siberian exile on account of previous involvement in terrorist conspiracy.
27
  Apart 
from Deutsch, Zasulich was also a well-known figure, one of the few would-be 
assassins from the Russian terrorist tradition to escape a similar fate by virtue of 
receiving a jury trial.
28
 As well as this, she was one of the few surviving 
revolutionaries to have corresponded with Marx and to have sought discussion with 
him, not only on the question of revolutionary tactics, but also on questions relating to 
Russia's economic development.
29
 
 
 For these reasons, it seems that Marx's initial assessment of Osvobozhdenie 
Truda seems less than fair when applied to the changed circumstances of the 1880s 
and 1890s. If the latter's tactical rejection of terrorist assassinations during the split 
within Zemlia i Volia ensured that Chernyi Peredel, the initial name for the Plekhanov 
group, suffered an earlier practical defeat than that of the terrorists in the form of their 
withdrawal from the Russian arena of struggle,
30
 the defeat of the latter was ultimately 
more profound, in so far as it involved the complete destruction of its leadership in the 
period following the assassination of the tsar.
31
 The Plekhanovites lived to fight 
another day, and as a result were able to set themselves the task of developing Marx's 
own thoughts on Russia's social and economic development, in many respects 
challenging them, whilst at the same time retaining at least a minimum connection 
with the underground circles that re-established themselves inside Russia.
32
 
Theoretically, there was a recognition on the part of Plekhanov that there was simply 
no question of Russia avoiding capitalist development completely,
33
 a question on 
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which Marx, in his exchanges with Zasulich had been ambiguous.
34
 Connected to this 
question, it seems that both Marx and Engels held the perspective that a Russian 
revolution was imminent.
35
 They believed that such an upheaval would spark 
sympathetic, socialist revolutions in the west, the character of which would as a 
matter of course shape post-revolutionary Russia‘s development.36 They had, clearly, 
erred on the side of optimism in this respect. Accordingly, Plekhanov described a 
more pessimistic perspective which did not count on immediate revolution, but which 
speculated instead on the common economic consequences of a either a revolution or 
period of political calm: the development of an urban working class and the partial 
depopulation of the village commune.
37
 It seems that this more patient outlook has at 
times been represented as the view that Plekhanov had a very inflexible view of 
history, which stated that Russian was still to pass through a lengthy capitalist phase 
of economic development.
38
 However, a study of the early programmatic statements 
of Osvobozhdenie Truda, one of which receives closer attention in the next chapter, 
indicates that this was not the case.
39
 Programmatically, the organisation appears to 
have attempted the balancing act of removing all barriers to poor peasants' departure 
from the village commune whilst at the same time defending the interests of the great 
majority who initially chose to stay. This contradiction was to be resolved by 
demanding an end to the intervention of the state bureaucracy in village affairs, as 
well as a laissez-faire economic policy designed to promote larger scale agriculture on 
the one hand, and the development of state supported rural co-operatives on the 
other.
40
 This clearly represented a break with the earlier utopian socialist tradition in 
Russia, whose thought tended towards the preservation of village relations in fairly 
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traditional forms. In contrast to this view, Plekhanov certainly did argue in favour of 
the unleashing of capitalist economic forces, which he believed was capable, far more 
than any revolutionary conspiracy, of dragging post-reform Russia into the modern 
era. However, as Walicki has correctly noted, Plekhanov never developed a precise 
notion of how long this capitalist period would last and the presence of a pre-formed 
workers' socialist movement at the very beginning of this process suggested that 
capitalist development might well be shorter than in the west.
41
 Equally, there is 
nothing in Plekhanov's writing to suggest that this capitalist development would 
automatically correspond to a period of constitutional 'bourgeois government', as has 
sometimes been suggested: clearly he takes the view that capitalism will develop 
regardless of the class character of the government and in spite of any government's 
attempt - be this government revolutionary socialist or tsarist - to change existing 
social relations by decree.
42
 Thus it seems that Plekhanov's conception of a new 
capitalist Russia was predicated less on a grand theory of history than on a reaction to 
the failures of the populists' revolutionary hopes. Recognising before all others that 
Narodnaia Volia voluntarism had perhaps destroyed hopes of revolution for a 
generation, he began to imagine alternative paths to socialism in a backward country.  
 
 The extent of Osvobozhdenie Truda's practical connections with underground 
circles inside Russia are sometimes under-estimated, but as Akimov,
43
 Baron
44
 and 
most recently Savel‘ev45 have shown, the Plekhanov group made repeated attempts to 
establish links with sympathising groups both in Russia and in the emigration. The 
documents published by Harding and Taylor
46
 rather confirm the general view that the 
circles active in Russia during the 1880s, such as the Blagoev and Brusnev groups 
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represented something of an ideological half-way house between populism and 
Plekhanovism, one result of which was that Osvobozhdenie Truda remained a highly 
exclusive circle. Nonetheless, there is evidence that it collaborated with other self-
defining social-democratic groups operating inside Russia.
47
 It seems the Plekhanov 
group thus acquired a periphery of ideologically inconsistent émigré and Russian 
supporters during the eighties and nineties: Akimov claims there were Marxist circles 
operating in as many as nine Russian cities at the beginning of the latter decade.
48
 
Lenin appears to have completed his political apprenticeship among these groups, and 
this fledgling movement appears to have been reorganised on his initiative following a 
meeting with Axelrod in 1895.
49
 With this change, the 'Union of Russian Social-
Democrats Abroad' was created, the main responsibility of which was the production 
and transportation into Russia of the journal Rabotnik and its newspaper like 
supplement, Listok Rabotnika, both of which were edited by Osvobozhdenie Truda.
50
 
In the years preceding this meeting, the social-democratic movement inside Russia 
appears to have grown quite dramatically, with student concern over the famine crisis 
of 1891-2 providing it with an educated cadre, around which were quickly gathered 
circles of workers for the purpose of theoretical instruction.
51
 With the appearance of 
Lenin and others on the scene, the character of this social-democratic work changed to 
some extent. Instead of attending 'a clandestine school'
52
 at the city's Technology 
Institute which catered as much for their general education as their social and political 
concerns, St Petersburg workers participating in circles were from this point on 
encouraged to agitate for strike action and political protest within their workplaces.
53
 
This tactical turn coincided with an ever more restive mood among mill and port 
workers in the northern capital, the result of which was a protracted strike wave 
during the mid 1890s.
54
 To cater for this new militancy, Lenin initiated a newspaper 
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for the St Petersburg movement which sought to expose the politics of the 
government as well as economic questions, though the copy was seized before the 
first issue was circulated, along with Lenin and many of his collaborators.
55
 Thus, a 
pro-Plekhanov element appeared to be very active inside Russia during the mid-
1890s, even if its ambitions were thwarted by the police. As such, the picture often 
presented of Osvobozhdenie Truda being isolated from Russia, whilst partially true, is 
one sided, and does not take into account the actual links which were established 
despite remarkable difficulties.  
 
  The arrest of Lenin and his collaborators did not put an end to these links. 
Akimov
56
 shows how, in the wake of the police raid, a de-politicised labour 
movement trend polemically termed 'Economism' came to dominate in St Petersburg, 
a trend which in fact remained visible throughout the period studied in the present 
thesis. However, he also acknowledges that, in the leadership vacuum created by the 
St Petersburg arrests, Kiev appears to have become the most active local organisation 
in promoting the cause of an explicitly anti-autocratic and revolutionary social-
democratic labour movement in the tradition of Osvobozhdenie Truda.
57
 The result of 
the efforts of the Kiev 'Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class' 
appears to have been, first of all, the creation of the newspaper Rabochaia Gazeta, 
two issues of which were apparently distributed around the eastern Ukrainian region, 
the success of which seems to have inspired the foundation of the Russian Social-
Democratic and Labour Party.
58
 The fact that this new party's structures were 
strangled at birth is sufficiently well-known, but the paradoxical circumstances of its 
creation have been given less attention. First of all, there is the question of its clearly 
left-wing, politicised manifesto which in some respects - notably in its view that the 
working class would have to lead Russia's democratic revolution - appears to 
represent a radicalisation of Plekhanovite ideas. Earlier statements from 
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Osvobozhdenie Truda were ambiguous on the question of which section of society 
would actually lead the revolutionary fight with Tsarism, and clearly the confidence 
of the initial RSDLP statement can be traced to the labour struggles of the preceding 
years.
59
 Unfortunately for the party's founders, the strike wave appeared to have been 
dying down at the moment the manifesto was issued. Not only that, neither 
Osvobozhdenie Truda nor most of their closest allies in St Petersburg were actually 
involved in the production of this statement, though Taylor and Harding appear to 
provide concrete proof that Axelrod was in fact communicating with the Kiev group 
behind the foundation of the RSDLP.
60
 Thus, whilst armed with a militant and fairly 
authoritative founding document, not to mention a constitution negotiated by 
representatives of its seven supporting organisations, the RSDLP had patchy practical 
links with the main theoreticians and leaders who had inspired Russian social-
democracy in the previous decade and a half.
61
 If the group around Rabochaia Gazeta 
momentarily appeared to be filling that void, the utter annihilation of this newspaper 
and its organisation meant that the opening period the 'party' was largely devoid of 
prominent individuals either loyal or even particularly sympathetic to Plekhanov's 
views. In other words, the so-called 'economist' trend appears to have come to the fore 
in the first period of the party's existence, despite the ultra-Plekhanovite stance of the 
party's founding documents. It seems that this paradox does much to explain the 
conflict between the Plekhanov loyalists and their opponents that forms the focus of 
the present study.  
 
 In an attempt to provide a backcloth to the thesis, we have shown how the 
Osvobozhdenie Truda organisation was crucial to the theoretical development of 
Russian social-democracy and that it also played a practical role. However, in the 
light of some recent literature on the subject, the question of the Russian movement's 
relations to the German social-democratic party must also be raised, even if what has 
been said so far strongly indicates a unique, authentically Russian line of development 
on the part of the former, rather than deference to German leadership.
62
 In relation to 
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this alleged link to Germany, it is important to note Osvobozhdenie Truda's 
participation in the founding congress of the Second International in 1889. Baron 
shows how this integration of the group into international social-democracy 
represented a significant triumph for the group over its Narodnik rivals, and that it 
may have precipitated a certain revision on the part of Engels to his previous attitudes 
towards the group.
63
 However, the Plekhanovites' participation in the International 
does not appear to have generated any noticeable change in their orientation towards 
Russia. Their policy of trying to establish connections with various underground 
circles continued, only during the nineties it appears to have obtained greater success 
owing to the developments in Russian society just discussed. It should therefore be 
fairly clear that, whilst it is hard to deny the authority in general terms of German 
social-democrats such as Engels, Liebknecht, Kautsky, Luxembourg and Bebel on the 
Russian movement, attempts to portray Lenin as a 'Kautskyite' or an 'Erfurtian' seem 
to reflect vast oversights relative to the early history of Russian social-democracy 
described here, even before some of the obvious political differences between 
Kautsky and Lenin are taken into account. Merely noting instances in which Lenin 
acknowledges a theoretical debt to Kautsky, or the fact that Neue Zeit was circulated 
and read by the underground circles in Russia simply cannot substitute for a 
thoroughgoing study of this history which actually confirms the traditional viewpoint 
of Russian scholarship that Plekhanov was the first pioneer of Russian Marxist 
thought, regardless of the contretemps with Marx and Engels, and that the earliest 
social-democratic organisations in Russia sought to obtain links with Osvobozhdenie 
Truda in the search for theoretical clarity. There appears to be no evidence that 
Kautsky or any other German leader sought to intervene in the Russian movement in a 
manner calculated to bypass, or otherwise undermine the authority of Osvobozhdenie 
Truda who were, on the contrary, recognised by the International as the official 
representatives of Russian social-democracy in the international arena.    
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 The present thesis is an attempt the study the means by which Lenin sought to 
re-establish the practical pre-eminence of the revolutionary, Plekhanovite variety of 
Russian social-democracy within a party dominated by the Economists. In the work of 
Donald in particular, this struggle has been linked to Bernstein's attack on the Erfurt 
programme within the German party, thus once again raising the idea that Russian 
social-democracy was in effect being guided from Germany during its early history.
64
 
It is certainly true that the overthrow of Osvobozhdenie Truda leadership at the First 
Congress of the Union Abroad appears to have taken place more or less 
simultaneously with Bernstein's challenge to 'orthodoxy' at the German party's 
Stuttgart Congress of 1898. However, to imagine that the Russian Economists were 
simply copying their German colleagues in this endeavour again utterly under-
estimates the Russian roots of this challenge to Plekhanovism. In particular, there is 
the question of Russian 'legal Marxism', popular among students and to be found in 
thick academic journals which, whilst defending Marx's economic theories, had 
nothing to say on the latter's political doctrines.
65
 Whilst it is true that, in the wake of 
Bernstein's revisionist arguments Russian legal Marxists such as Struve took a much 
more critical approach to Marxist economics, and in doing so clearly followed 
Bernstein, there is no evidence that the Russian social-democracy was ever seriously 
influenced by this departure.
66
 Certain individuals connected to the Union of Russian 
Social-Democrats Abroad did attempt a Bernsteinian criticism of Marxism but, as 
shall be shown in the second chapter of this study, they were quickly disowned, not 
only by the followers of Plekhanov, but also by the main 'Economist' leaders. Struve, 
Prokopovich and the other Russian 'revisionists' subsequently formed the Cadet party. 
For these reasons it is hard to accept Baron's suggestion that 'Economism' was simply 
a Russian variant of German 'revisionism'.
67
 The present study will show that the 
former had a clearly anti-theoretical, 'pragmatic' stance, possibly owing to the 
significant number of Bundists connected to the trend, whereas German revisionism 
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represented a direct ideological attack on Marxism. There is also the crucial problem 
that Economism seems to have appeared in Russian much earlier than Bernsteinian 
'revisionism' did in Germany. Akimov and Egorov show quite clearly that, more than 
anything else, the strike wave of the mid-nineties appears to have raised the profile of 
Economist views.
68
 It is of course true that anti-Marxist trends had been present in the 
German labour movement from the very beginning, and that these pre-Bernstein 
trends could potentially have had an effect on the Russian movement.
69
 However, it 
appears that no historian to date has attempted to demonstrate this, partially because 
the 'legal Marxist' tendency in Russia seems to represent a much more credible source 
of the anti-revolutionary trends in the Russian social-democratic movement.  
   
 
ii) Historiographical Trends in the Study of Lenin and the RSDLP 
 
 In reviewing previous contributions to the history of Lenin, it is perhaps 
customary to start by noting the sheer volume of research activity which has been 
directed towards this subject, whilst at the same time drawing attention to the political 
motivations and dubious reliability of a significant amount of it. There is really little 
to add to these complaints beyond re-emphasising the point that 'polemic' and 
'political bias' are not the natural monopoly of Soviet scholarship.
70
 Perhaps it is more 
pertinent to observe that in the post-Soviet period, the very idea of investigating the 
factual details of Lenin's political activity appears to have fallen out of fashion, 
yielding a situation where one recent attempt to write a classic political history of the 
Russian social-democratic movement was described as both 'odd' and 'comical' by one 
reviewer, owing to the strong disagreements it generates.
71
 This perception of the 
study of Lenin and early Russian social-democracy is less than helpful given the fact 
that work on the publication and translation of Russian social-democratic documents 
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is ongoing, and as such will probably still have an effect on conclusions drawn in the 
past. For this reason, new contributions to the study of Lenin need not be regarded 
simply as 'reinterpretations' of a body of pre-existing primary evidence if they do not 
include the publication of new, 'previously unseen' documents drawn from the 
archives. This view meets with two significant problems. On the one hand, as the next 
section of this study will show, new data is still being collected, published and 
translated, and some of this will inevitably force the revision of some previous 
generalisations concerning Russian social-democracy. On the other, and perhaps more 
significantly still, there is the problem that primary data is not only assembled in 
fashion that ensures that a reliable store of it increases over time, as appears to be the 
case with most historical subjects. There is also the problem of the clear suppression, 
marginalisation and outright destruction of evidence for political reasons.
72
 Not only 
this, it appears that immense political and institutional pressures may be applied to 
scholars in this area that might discourage them from making full use of the available 
material.
73
 For these reasons, in the following literature review it seems necessary to 
examine not only the best of the secondary accounts of early Russian social-
democracy, but also to provide a brief summary of the main developments in the 
publication and use of primary evidence, in so far as the former is clearly limited and 
shaped by the development of the latter. On this basis it will be possible to define as 
precisely as possible the documents used in the current study which are absent from 
previous ones, even though the present work is in no sense the product of an 
investigation into unpublished material. Equally, it will provide useful leads should 
anybody wish to develop or challenge the findings of the present study. 
 
 The publication of documents concerning the early history of the RSDLP, 
Iskra and Lenin's involvement in it could be said to date from the events of 1905-7, 
beginning shortly after Lenin's initiation of a new 'Bolshevik' newspaper, Vpered and 
the winding up of the 'Menshevik' Iskra with the onset of these revolutionary events. 
With the change in external political circumstances and a corresponding alteration of 
arrangements within the RSDLP itself, it became possible to view the entire 'Iskra 
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period' of 1900-1903 and the subsequent period of factional strife between the 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks up to the Fourth ‗Unity‘ Congress as completed phases in 
the party's history. Thus we find the 1908 collection of Lenin's writings Twelve Years, 
which included his polemic contributions against the Narodniks, Liberals and 
Economists dating back to the mid 1890s,
74
 not to mention the collection Iskra za Dva 
Goda, a Menshevik compilation of articles from the period in which they controlled 
the newspaper.
75
 The Lenin compendium is perhaps best known for the statement, 
noted by Harding,
76
 that What Is To Be Done? must be considered 'in connection with 
the concrete historical situation of a definite period long since passed in our party'.
77
 
Whilst, in one context, this might be used against the argument that Lenin, during the 
Iskra period, formed 'a party of a new type', a staple argument of Stalinist histories, it 
also serves as concrete evidence that Lenin was at this stage consciously trying to 
produce, if not a historical monograph, at least a collection of historical documents 
with no immediate relevance to current politics and, as such, one of the first 
contributions to the historiography of this subject. Such collections appear to have had 
a didactic purpose, the aim of them being to raise and extend the political 
consciousness of Bolshevik activists through an awareness of how their faction had 
developed over time, and how it had been shaped by the experience of past conflicts. 
This type of work was therefore much imitated after the October revolution, with the 
issue of what is today known as the 'first edition' of Lenin's Collected Works.
78
 
Similar projects were realised in relation to Plekhanov and Trotsky
79
 during the 
1920s. From 1924 these were accompanied by a project whose history lasted almost 
as long as that of the Soviet Union itself: the Leninskii Sbornik,
80
 which included 
correspondence and drafts from Lenin's personal archive as well as material written 
by his closest colleagues. Indeed, it is through this source that a significant number of 
documents never incorporated into later editions of Lenin's Collected Works can be 
                                                        
74    VI Lenin, Collected Works xiii, 94-113   
75    Iskra za Dva Goda: Sbornik Statei iz Iskry (St Petersburg: Saltykov, 1906) 
76    N Harding, Lenin's Political Thought, Volume One 161 
77    VI Lenin, Collected Works, xiii 100  
78
    VI Lenin, Sobranie Sochinenii (Moscow, 1920-26) 
79    GV Plekhanov, Sochineniia (Moscow & Leningrad, 1924-7); LD Trotsky, Sochineniia  (Moscow 
& Leningrad, 1924-7); LD Trotsky, Kak vooruzhalas' revolustiia (Moscow 1923-5)  
80    Leninskii Sbornik (Moscow & Leningrad, 1924-85) 
  
 
 
26 
 
accessed by the inquisitive historian. In relation to the present study, letters exchanged 
between Lenin and Krupskaya on the one hand, and the Russian network of Iskra 
agents on the other,
81
 and a section of the correspondence exchanged between 
members of the editorial boards of Iskra and Zaria are of particular importance.
82
 
Other sections of the latter can be found in the published letters of Axelrod and 
Plekhanov, two volumes of which appeared in 1928,
83
 and the Menshevik-published 
volume of Martov-Axelrod correspondence.
84
 During this same period, the journals 
Proletarskaia Revolutsiia, Katorga i Ssylka and Krasnyi Arkhiv were also published, 
which provided a broader survey of the Russian revolutionary movement. These 
contributed a large amount of testimony from memoirists which offers valuable 
insight into the life of the pre-revolutionary underground, as well as leaflets, 
manifestos, police and newspaper reports.
85
  
 
 Whilst the primary material published during the 1920s is vast, equally large 
gaps remain that were scarcely filled by the four subsequent editions of Lenin‘s 
Collected Works, the last of which incorporates some of the material previously 
released in the Sbornik,
86
 and the limited, piecemeal publication of new documents 
during the Khrushchev, perestroika and post-Soviet periods. In relation to these three 
'liberalisations', it is necessary to note that for a whole period, historians and archivists 
in the Soviet Union was subject to severe political pressure and persecution which 
somewhat constricted their output.
87
 As for the first of the three ‗liberalisations‘ just 
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noted, the re-publication of the minutes of the Second Congress proves to be of 
particular significance to our study.
88
 However, the authoritative publication of the 
second period, Izvestiia TsK reveals next to nothing on Lenin‘s early political 
activity.
89
 The perestroika era discussion of this period seems to be confined to a 
belated admission that, whilst Soviet historians had a habit of dating the history of 
‗Bolshevism‘ and thus the Communist Party from 1903, any serious study of the early 
years of its formation had to reckon with the five years from 1898-1903, during which 
revolutionary Marxists played something of a minority opposition role in a broader 
party, the foundation of which had little to do with Lenin.
90
 As Davies admits, 
perestroika in fact came very late to the historical profession,
91
 one effect of this being 
that it was not until 1990 that a historical journal is prepared to publish excerpts from 
the work of such a significant figure as Trotsky.
92
 The Soviet Union was thus already 
past history well before it became possible to raise the question of other, more minor 
players in the early development of the RSDLP such as the Bund and the Economist 
journals Rabochee Delo and  Rabochaia Mysl'. This is despite the fact that a text so 
prominent as What Is To Be Done? is simply littered with references to such 
publications and the organisations which supported them. Fortunately, partial and in 
some case complete serials of these publications can still be found.
93
 Despite this, 
general awareness of the existence of these documents, still less familiarity with them, 
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is fairly low. The translation and re-publication work on the writings of opponents and 
colleagues of Lenin after the fashion of Taylor, Harding, and Frankel has partially 
rectified this problem, and the sheer volume of this type material requires further 
contributions such as these.
94
 Similarly, the series of interviews conducted with 
former revolutionary activists by Haimson et al appears to aid our understanding of 
the practical activity of various political opponents and less well-known sympathisers 
of Lenin.
95
  
 
  The post-Soviet period has not been without certain positive developments in 
the field of archive-based publication and commentary, mainly in the Russian 
language. The emergence of a Martov and a Potresov Izbrannoe certainly represents a 
step forward,
96
 as do the contents of the journal Istoricheskii Arkhiv in general.
97
  
Apart from these, we should note Urilov‘s presentation of the correspondence of 
Potresov and Martov,
98
 which unfortunately does not provide a great deal of material 
relevant to the present study but which certainly takes forward the study of 
Menshevism in general. The same can be said of Nenarokov‘s study of one particular 
letter between Axelrod and Martov from the twenties.
99
 Despite these contributions, 
one cannot but sense that the much-anticipated opening of the Soviet archives has 
yielded little new material in relation to the early period of RSDLP history, 
particularly in comparison with the Khrushchev era. In fairness it should perhaps be 
recognised that many historians of Russia probably felt that there were more 
important issues to address: the civil war, collectivisation, ‗dekulakisation‘, the 
purges, the mass deportations probably concern both the historical profession and the 
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reading public rather more than the altogether less emotive subject of the present 
thesis.
100
  
 
 On the basis of the documents so far highlighted, a vast number of scholarly 
monographs have been produced outlining the entire career of Lenin, with relatively 
few dedicated to a critical analysis of particular episodes in Lenin's political 
development. This 'biographical' prejudice often produces a relative disregard for the 
political context in which Lenin operated, the emphasis being on his own personal 
activity and ideas. Consequently, the thinking and activities of what Lih recently 
referred to as 'Lenin's significant others'
101
 and their concrete relations to Iskra and 
Lenin have consequently been unduly ignored to date, a now ubiquitous problem 
which actually seems to have its root in the rise of Stalinism. This seems clear when 
we consider one of the earliest accounts of Bolshevik-Communist historical 
development to go beyond the republication of documents, Zinoviev's Lectures on the 
History of the Bolshevik Party.
102
 Whilst a number objections have been justifiably 
raised against this work as a whole,
103
 it does at least attempt to present to the main 
ideas of the opponents of Bolshevism, such as the Cadets and the Social-
Revolutionaries in a serious fashion, whilst seeking to show how Bolshevik ideas and 
organisational structures evolved and were clarified as a result of clashes with these 
political tendencies, and as a result of definite historical events.
104
 The gradual 
emergence of a Bolshevik 'party' out of the RSDLP, and the equally gradual 
emergence of the RSDLP out of diverse previously existing social-democratic 
formations is thus recognised.
105
 Zinoviev's conclusion is that it is very hard to define 
when then 'Bolshevik party' was actually founded.
106
 By contrast, as Fedorin showed 
during the perestroika period, this type of 'dialectical' open mindedness concerning 
the history of Russian social-democracy came to an end in 1928, at which point it was 
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decided to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 'Bolshevik Party' despite the 
fact that the Lenin trend was in no sense a separate 'party' from the Mensheviks as a 
result of the Second Congress.
107
 On the basis of this new convention, an idea 
appeared which raised Lenin's status to that of founder of a 'party', something which is 
not really correct. Of particular importance in this connection is the notion that the 
Second Congress of the RSDLP was in fact its 'founding' congress owing to the 
meagre practical successes of the First Congress. Krupskaya states precisely this idea 
in her Memories of Lenin
108
 but it was in fact firmly rejected at the time by Iskra 
adherents and 'Economists' alike: in fact only the Jewish Bund put forward the 
argument that the 1903 congress was a founding congress.
109
 Developing this notion 
of Lenin as the founder of all things social-democratic, with its corresponding 
reduction of all other social-democratic forces to nought, we find in even the most 
sophisticated post-Lenin Soviet histories the idea that Lenin also conceived the very 
idea of the Iskra newspaper and its supporting faction in Siberian exile.
110
 In this view 
it was not the reaction to a definite set of political problems faced by Lenin, so much 
as the product of a pre-conceived plan that largely disregarded external circumstances. 
This view is challenged in the second chapter of the study.     
 
 One cannot deny that there is a political motivation to the treatment of Lenin 
we have just described, even if it is beyond the remit of the study to discuss it in 
detail. We merely note in passing the way in which, on the basis of an acquired 
indifference to all things relating to the Bund, Economism and Menshevism, the 
fanciful attribution of all opposition to Lenin to Trotsky
111
 became possible in Soviet 
literature, something contradicted by any serious study of the relevant primary 
documents. What is perhaps more interesting is the way in which historians of Lenin 
in the west have followed the lead given by their Soviet counterparts, despite the 
occasionally strenuous protests that historians in the two contending political systems 
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had absolutely nothing of value to say to one another.
112
 In fact, the number of 
English language Lenin historians revealing a credible level of familiarity with the 
documents of the Bund, Rabochee Delo, the Mensheviks and so on is remarkably 
small in comparison to the numbers who have attempted studies of Lenin without 
taking into account these political groupings. Whilst such documents do receive a far 
more serious treatment on the part of those primarily interested in the opposition to 
Lenin, the latter inevitably treat Iskra in a fairly cursory manner, the result being that 
hardly any historian to date has properly studied the relations between Lenin and his 
faction on the one hand, and his ideological opponents on the other, with the 
conscious intention of representing the contrasting political logic of the opposing 
sides in a remotely even handed fashion. Tobias, in so many ways a remarkable 
historian of the Bund, simply defers to the controversial judgement of Wolfe when it 
comes to a discussion of the internal politics of Iskra,
113
 whilst the treatment of Iskra 
by Baron, Getzler, Frankel and Ascher is hostile, appearing to reiterate without 
critical scrutiny the opinions of the main subjects of these studies as if their polemical 
arguments were statements of established fact. As such, they too suffer from the 
problem inherent in writing biographies of Russian social-democratic leaders: these 
scarcely produce an all-sided understanding of the development of the RSDLP itself. 
Therefore from the perspective of the present study it is unfortunate that certain 
leading historians currently active in the Russian Federation have so self-consciously 
imitated the aforementioned category of writers, producing biographies of their own 
on Martov and Plekhanov.
114
 Where the RSDLP has been the focus of attention in 
contemporary Russia, it has usually been equated mainly with the Menshevik faction 
to the exclusion of the Bolsheviks, in a strange mirror image of normal practices in 
the Soviet era.
115
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  Among those small group of writers in the west who have dedicated 
themselves to studying the relation between Lenin and the diverse structures and 
organisations within the RSDLP we should draw particular attention to the work of 
Keep.
116
  Keep's work would at first glance appear to set the standard for enquiries 
into the early history of the RSDLP along with those of Pipes
117
 and Carter-
Elwood,
118
 which account for the periods immediately preceding and following the 
one dealt with in the current thesis. More than any other, Keep's monograph attempts 
to analyse relations within the RSDLP using many of the documents that form the 
basis of the current study, whilst at the same time aiming to draw general conclusions 
from these sources.
119
 It certainly seems to represent a step forward from the thorough 
and broad-ranging, though essentially descriptive work of Schapiro on Communist 
Party history.
120
 Unfortunately, much like Wolfe's before him, much of Keep's work is 
abrasively judgemental in its tone and his treatment of the primary evidence at his 
command are in no sense vindicated by the present study. Keep's main thesis 
concerning the period we are studying appears to be that Lenin initiated an aggressive 
campaign to 'take over' the RSDLP and to reshape and impose on it authoritarian and 
restrictive organisational principles
121
 that would undermine its connections with the 
broader labour movement
122
 in favour of more 'conspiratorial' methods. The 
membership of the party was to be entire 'professional',
123
 a situation only frustrated 
by Lenin's defeat in the period following the Second Congress. Much of this analysis 
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appears to be rooted in the Menshevik polemics of the post-Second Congress period, 
which were later given a questionable veneer of historiographical respectability by 
social-democratic activists-turned historians such as Theodor Dan.
124
 This apparent 
influence even extends to the loaded language of some passages in Keep's work.
125
 In 
the present study we shall show that he simply ignores the dominant position 
occupied within the RSDLP by a Bund-Economist bloc at the time Iskra was created, 
a bloc which was trying to consolidate a leading position in the RSDLP using similar 
tactics to Lenin: the organisation of a sovereign RSDLP congress in which their own 
supporters would have a majority, which would then appoint an official RSDLP 
leadership. Unfortunately, Keep's emotive language and his selective and distorted 
use of the evidence at his disposal
126
 is in no sense an isolated incident in the works of 
the cold war period. Moreover, this feature persists in some more recent studies. The 
lack of countervailing pressure from Soviet or socialist scholarship permits an entirely 
hostile tone to permeate at least one recent biography of Lenin.
127
   
  
 One remarkable feature of Soviet scholarship generally is the level of detail it 
provides concerning the Russian Iskra organisation, the network of 'agents' operating 
in Russia as opposed to the newspaper distributed by them. Of particular note in this 
respect are the work of Pospelov et al,
128
 Deich,
129
 Olkhovskii
130
 and Tarnovskii.
131
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In particular, the details of the physical movements of agents, their pseudonyms, 
codes and addresses are fascinating and a careful study of these works utterly exposes 
the limitations of those who refuse point-blank to engage with Soviet literature. This 
method of refusing to read or discuss works written by an author of a differing 
ideological position to oneself has in fact denied, and continues to deny to English-
language scholarship a vast amount of useful information, resulting in a great number 
of works which deal primarily with Lenin's ideas and main polemical exchanges, 
without giving any consideration for his more 'practical' activities.
132
 This said, there 
are certain falsehoods to be found in this group of Soviet studies, including the 
'airbrushing' of personalities such as Struve,
133
 Trotsky
134
 and Parvus
135
 from certain 
incidents in the Pospelov work. Parvus is at one point replaced by the more politically 
'harmless' Clara Zetkin in this work, presumably on the grounds that Parvus was later 
associated with the 'German gold' thesis, variants of which originated during the July 
days and which was later resurrected by Volkogonov.
136
 Similarly, we find a 
distortion in Olkhovskii‘s article of the facts of Martov's account of Iskra's origin, the 
author attempting, possibly under editorial or institutional pressure, to use Martov's 
testimony to show that Lenin had the original idea for Iskra during his stay at 
Shushenskoe.
137
 In fact, as shall be shown in the third chapter of the present study, 
Martov's account strongly indicates that the idea of Iskra was not conceived until the 
spring of 1900, after the failure of the Smolensk congress attempt. In a related 
counterfactual statement, Tarnovskii denies that Lenin was ever prepared to accept the 
editorship of Rabochaia Gazeta, when documents exist proving beyond any 
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reasonable doubt that he was.
138
 Apart from these incidents, we have to recognise that 
these Soviet accounts are essentially descriptive and do not venture to analyse or 
critically engage with Lenin's tactical thinking, or to develop general conclusions 
concerning his method of political struggle.    
 
 The post-Soviet era has produced a few studies focusing on the period 
addressed by this thesis, though none of them have addressed the organisational 
politics of the RSDLP in any depth, at best focusing on some of the general 
theoretical notions of the contending factions. In the English language, two significant 
works of this period would appear to be those of Donald and Lih, to be considered 
along with articles by Mayer.
139
 All these studies support the idea that Lenin was 
primarily influenced by Kautsky during the Iskra period and accordingly give little 
consideration to the role of either Osvobozhdenie Truda or the RSDLP in shaping 
Lenin's most well-known polemical exchanges of the period. It is no doubt for this 
reason that they also say little on the organisational strategy Lenin was developing 
during period 1899-1903. In the case of Mayer and Donald, this leads to the idea that 
Lenin's notion, stated most clearly in What Is To Be Done?, of social-democratic 
consciousness being introduced to the working class 'from without' was a new 
departure within Russian social-democracy,
140
 whilst Lih develops the argument by 
tracing this apparently distinctive conception back to Marx and Engels via Kautsky, 
rather than Osvobozhdenie Truda.
141
 The results of these new departures are, 
unfortunately, less than satisfactory, in so far as there is simply a silence in them 
concerning the native revolutionary tradition within Russia. Mayer, Donald and Lih 
do not so much as deny the influence of Plekhanov and other Russian figures on 
Lenin: they do not even appear to have considered this angle even though, as has 
already been shown, there has already been a significant amount of research carried 
out into the activity, the ideas and the organisation of Osvobozhdenie Truda and its 
various Russian satellites. Sadly, their oversight appears to be crucial. Several of the 
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Taylor-Harding documents clearly show that, contrary to Mayer's claim, 
Osvobozhdenie Truda shared the view of Lenin that the initial bearers of socialist 
consciousness in Russia would be individual members of the intelligentsia. 
Specifically, for a whole period, Osvobozhdenie Truda appears to have believed that 
committed socialist intelligents should have had the aim of recruiting individual 
workers with the aim of offering them a general education whilst at the same time 
teaching them revolutionary theories.
142
 Moreover, these ideas clearly predate the 
well-known expression of similar views by Kautsky. The intended result was to have 
been a 'worker-intelligentsia', to use the words of Axelrod, who would form the 
authentic leadership of a future working class party.
143
 In this sense, Mayer's notion 
that Lenin's theory of socialist consciousness coming to the working class 'from 
without' was a new departure in Russian social-democracy appears to be clearly false. 
 
 Donald appears to base her argument that Lenin was primarily influenced by 
Kautsky mainly on the apparently wide circulation of the latter's Neue Zeit among 
Russian social-democrats.
144
 Whilst it appears to be true that Kautsky was viewed as a 
social-democratic authority by Lenin, to the extent that his words are infrequently 
cited in various programmatic drafts, and of course in What Is To Be Done?, the same 
could be said for a number of other leading social-democratic figures. With this type 
of reasoning from citations we could easily draw the conclusion that even the leading 
Menshevik Martov was a significant influence on Lenin, if one of Urilov's articles is 
to be believed.
145
 Naturally, Plekhanov is more commonly viewed as Lenin's 
intellectual mentor, but it seems that Donald does not wish to discuss or even to 
acknowledge his influence, seemingly in defiance of a mountain of evidence. This 
could be because, as Gluckstein points out, her work deals almost exclusively with 
theoretical questions and has little to say on practical-organisational matters.
146
 More 
problematically still, and in defiance of the evidence presented by Baron and Savel'ev, 
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Donald insists that Osvobozhdenie Truda more or less shared her preferences, 
refusing to engage in practical work during their long exile. Whilst all would 
acknowledge that the Plekhanov group's efforts were not crowned with great 
successes, her assertion that the Plekhanovites were only interested in recruiting 
intellectuals does not bear critical examination, especially when we consider the 
activity of the local ‗Unions of Struggle‘ inside Russia and the input of Lenin. 
Krupskaya's memoirs show that Lenin personally supervised workers' propaganda 
circles during his period of activity in the St Petersburg movement, and that notable 
worker-activists such as Babushkin were recruited at this time.
147
 A further problem 
for Donald's thesis of 'Kautskian influence' over Lenin is that, as she acknowledges, 
Plekhanov and Kautsky had a clear disagreement on the way to deal with the 
revisionist challenge to Marxism posed by Bernstein. She clearly shows that 
Plekhanov took a much more intransigent stance than Kautsky was prepared to 
accept, also pointing out that it was figures on the German 'left', such as Luxembourg 
and Parvus who eventually pressured Kautsky into making a stand at all against an 
individual who was also his close friend.
148
 Even a cursory examination of his own 
work during this period shows that, in relation to manifestations of Russian 
'revisionism' such as the Credo of Prokopovich and Kuskova, Lenin was plainly 
hostile, which poses the question of whether Donald, whilst noticing certain points in 
common between the views of Kautsky and Lenin, has failed to identify important 
differences. Perhaps the most important, in the long term, was Lenin's unique 
commitment to organising factions within the broader social-democratic party, a habit 
he may well have learned from Plekhanov, which Kautsky clearly sought to avoid in 
favour of consensus and compromise.      
  
 Lih's examination of Economist literature is clearly the most detailed to date, 
even if a treatment of the organisational politics underpinning these documents is 
absent. Clearly seeking to develop the work of Mayer and Donald, Lih argues that 
there is a common series of assumptions rooted mainly in the Erfurt programme 
which unites Lenin and a significant proportion of the economists, specifically 
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Rabochee Delo.
149
 Consequently, for all his protests against a perceived academic 
consensus concerning Lenin,
150
 his conclusion that the dispute between the Iskra 
supporters and Rabochee Delo was an unprincipled 'feud' does not seem to represent a 
great departure from the type of work he criticises.
151
 In essence, like Donald, Lih 
identifies only features which Lenin and his 'significant others' share in common 
whilst paying little attention to the ideological issues that divide them. Some, but not 
all of the Erfurt documents are particularly useful to Lih in pursuing this type of 
argument, as they blur the dividing line between reformist and revolutionary versions 
of social-democracy. For example, neither the programme nor Kautsky's commentary 
on it makes reference to the method of obtaining political power, something which in 
fact produced a rebuke from Engels at the time, who protested that the main demands 
of the programme were entirely compatible with the existing political order in 
Germany.
152
 Against this, Engels appears to have urged a reconsideration of Marx's 
criticisms of the earlier Gotha programme, in which the transition from capitalism to 
communism is described in clear detail.
153
 The absence of any reference to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, which Engels argues should take the form of a 
centralised democratic republic, is an explicit point of difference between Kautsky 
and Engels.
154
 Consequently, Lih's attempt to turn Lenin into a follower of Kautsky 
appears to rest on extremely selective use of material from the German party. 
Whatever the case, the overall thesis seems to require further investigation of German 
social-democratic history. The Erfurt congress and its programme represented the 
transition of German social-democracy from a 'semi-illegal' position in which the 
open propagation of its main ideas were viewed as seditious and was punished 
accordingly as a result of Bismarck‘s 'Exceptional Law' against the social-democrats, 
to one of legality.
155
 The success of known social-democrats at elections to state 
institutions such as the Reichstag, not to mention the difficulty of keeping foreign-
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published social-democratic literature out of Germany defeated this law in what was 
in effect a mass campaign of civil disobedience.
156
 The victory of this campaign posed 
the question of how the party should relate to its new legal status, and whether 
'revolutionary' illegal activity of any kind was still necessary. Clearly Engels took the 
view that it was, whilst Kautsky, presumably in an attempt to appease the right wing 
of the party was evasive. Such debates of course had minimum relevance to Russia, in 
so far as there was no question of 'legal activity' for the workers' movement beyond 
the Zubatov movement, which was regarded by all social-democrats as disingenuous. 
'Erfurtian' debates could only emerge following the revolution of 1905-7, after which 
the presence of a parliament (duma) and the limited toleration of labour movement 
activity posed once again the question of whether the social-democrats, by adapting 
their programme could become an entirely legal political formation.  
 
  With the discussion of Lenin being so large and wide-ranging, it might at first 
glance seem impossible to produce something new. The next section shows that this is 
not the case, and that a series of fairly ubiquitous oversights in previous work actually 
requires a re-examination of the vast amount of available material related to Lenin 
and the RSDLP. In studying the past historiography of Lenin, it seems clear that many 
of the most interesting new departures in the discussion have been driven by an 
engagement with documents whose existence has been known about often for many 
decades, but which have been ignored owing to the sheer volume of information 
available for study or for political reasons, rather than the discovery or publication of 
new documents from the archives. Very simply, the sheer amount of the latter type of 
material allows the conclusion that past treatments of it are far from complete, even 
before the political pressures of the past and present are taken into account. As such, 
there is plenty of 'mileage' in the study of Lenin yet. The continued publication of 
sources remains but part of this process, the other being a careful reading of discrete 
parts of what has already been published, but scarcely studied, in an attempt to make 
sense of Lenin's life activity.  
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 iii) How the thesis develops previous work 
 
 The aim of this thesis is to present a history of the Iskra faction of the RSDLP 
between the years 1899-1903. This faction included among its personnel the Marxist 
theoreticians and leaders Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, Zasulich, whose lives have 
previously been studied by Baron,
157
 Ascher,
158
 Getzler
159
 and Bergman
160
 
respectively, not to mention Potresov, who awaits his biographer,
161
 and Lenin. 
Alongside these well-known figures we find Trotsky, a figure who has received no 
little amount of attention to date from historians, Lydia Dan, from whom Haimson 
extracted remarkable testimony in his 1987 series of interviews,
162
 the memoirists 
Piatnitskii
163
 and Bobrovskaia
164
 and a number of individuals, such as I I Radchenko, 
Nogin, Krasin, Krasikov and Krzhizhanovskii, who went onto carry out significant 
functions in the early Soviet state. The Iskra group is also noteworthy for the 
significant number of women activists it attracted, including members of Lenin's 
immediate family, recently the subject of investigation by Turton,
165
 not to mention 
Alexandrova, Halberstadt, Knipovich, Krzhizhanovskaia, LI Radchenko, IG 
Smidovich and Stassova, most of whom have yet to receive sufficient attention from 
historians. 
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  Despite this remarkable concentration of personalities, each of whom is 
worthy of study in their own right, to date there does not appear to have been 
published a history of the Iskra faction viewed as an organisation that was driven by 
definite political principles. Whilst it is true that the political activity of Lenin has 
certainly not been ignored between the dates that limit this study, and that his general 
ideas have been the subject of much discussion, the work discussed above has focused 
to an unusual degree on the main polemical articles of Lenin such as Where To 
Begin? and What Is To Be Done?, and Lenin‘s combative political attitude towards 
the organised opponents of Iskra within the RSDLP, such as the Bund, the Union 
Abroad and the Southern Union. On the one hand, this can produce what are quite 
clearly histories of ideas, which either more or less consciously steer clear of the 
question of organisational politics, as is the case with Harding,
166
 or which engage in 
a rather one-sided manner with this area by rehearsing Menshevik and Economist 
criticism of Lenin and Iskra, whilst failing to sufficiently acknowledge that these 
criticisms are in no sense statements of fact.
167
 Alternatively, we can find quite 
authoritative, but essentially descriptive works demonstrating familiarity with a 
significant number - but by no means all - the documents that form the basis of the 
current study.
168
 That is to say, the facts of the factional drama we are to discuss are 
recorded fairly faithfully - though there are some gaps - but any attempt to identify 
and evaluate the strategic thinking of significant figures such as Lenin, Martov, 
Krichevskii of the Union Abroad or Liber of the Bund, is avoided. The present study 
aims to contribute such an understanding to this field, showing that, contrary to the 
widespread view that the clashes between Iskra and its opponents were nothing but a 
'squabble', an unprincipled struggle for status, these clashes were in fact the product of 
conflicting but well-established political principles and strategies. In contrast to those 
previous works which, on the basis of precisely this assumption condemn one side or 
the other, the present one will aim to first of all attempt to identify the different 
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political principles underpinning each group, only then showing how each sought to 
get the better of the other by means of manoeuvres, alliance-building, hegemonic 
strategies and the like.       
 
 It is true that the organisational politics of the early Russian social-democracy 
have been covered in some detail in the fairly distant past by Baron, Frankel, Ascher 
and Tobias in a degree of detail that is scarcely matched by more recent discussions of 
this question. Moreover, recent Russian historians of Menshevism such as Urilov are 
quite frank in acknowledging their debt to this generation of western scholars.
169
 
Their particular strength appears to be the early history of the Union of Russian 
Social-Democrats, which appears to have been a loosely organised pre-party 
formation uniting Osvobozhdenie Truda with a number of study circles operating in 
large Russian cities, and not the Iskra faction. Nonetheless, we find in the work of 
Ascher the conception, important from the perspective of this study, that within the 
Social-Democratic Union, the Plekhanovites were challenged not only by 
'Economists' possessed of a gradualist strategy, assuming that working class 
consciousness proceeded stepwise and that revolutionary slogans could be 'too 
advanced' for a working class audience, but also an explicitly 'revisionist' tendency, in 
other words a conscious attack on the  ideas of Marx and Engels, ideas concerning 
which the 'Economists' were largely ignorant or indifferent.
170
 This analytical 
distinction is confirmed and developed in the present study of Iskra's politics. 
Specifically, it can be shown that whilst Lenin was always directly hostile to 
'revisionists' such as Kuskova and Prokopovich, he was initially open to the idea of 
alliances with the Economists of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad.  
Baron has noted the latter feature of Lenin's thinking in his study of the clash between 
Lenin and Plekhanov during the summer of 1900, recorded by the former in the 
unpublished account How The Spark Was Nearly Extinguished.
171
 However, in 
making the correct observation that Plekhanov's initial hostility to Lenin was based on 
his much more confrontational attitude to the Union Abroad and the Bund, Baron 
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pays altogether too little attention to an actual meeting between Lenin and these 
forces in February 1900, an account of which is central to the second chapter of the 
present work. Whilst briefly acknowledging this meeting's existence, Baron seem to 
have forgotten about the section of Martov's unpublished manuscript that accounts for 
Lenin's willingness to accept the post of editor of a revived Rabochaia Gazeta at a 
planned, but unsuccessfully organised Second Congress of the RSDLP, which was to 
have been held in April of 1900.
172
 This overlooked event is significant, in so far as it 
proves more or less beyond doubt that Lenin did not conceive of Iskra in Siberian 
exile. Other aspects of the document also reveal remarkably democratic sensibilities 
on the part of Lenin, which we will also have cause to discuss in the next chapter. 
Apart from this, no previous study seems to have acknowledged the way in which the 
Economists repeatedly attempted to recruit the group around Lenin in an attempt to 
draw him away from the Plekhanov circle. Lenin's refusal to trade the editorship of 
Rabochaia Gazeta for links with Osvobozhdenie Truda in fact speaks volumes for his 
attachment to the latter, a factor which once again calls into question parts of those 
recent studies which try to emphasise a supposed relation between Lenin and Kautsky 
at Plekhanov‘s expense. We reject this interpretation, partially on the strength of a 
further document presented in the next chapter, which we believe has not been studied 
at all to date, and which illustrates to what degree Kautsky was in fact the guiding 
theoretical light rather more of Rabochee Delo than Iskra.
173
     
  
 The full implications of Ascher's analysis of the ideological diversity existing 
within the RSDLP remain to be developed. Specifically, Ascher asserts that 
Economism and revisionism were finished as political trends by 1900, the time Iskra 
began its struggle with them.
174
 This argument has since been echoed by Lih,
175
 but in 
the light of the documents under discussion in this study it does not appear 
compelling. Ascher admits that the pamphlet On Agitation, with its description of 
gradualist tactics, is a key document of Economism, a view we show in our study to 
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be held by both Plekhanov and the Union Abroad leader Akimov.
176
 Yet this very 
same gradualism we find in Krichevskii‘s article in the seventh issue of Rabochee 
Delo, published in August of 1900 and in Martynov's lengthy contribution to the 
debate on the party programme at the Second Congress.
177
 Consequently it is a matter 
of some regret that Lih, in his recent study, whilst giving a detailed account of 
Krichevskii's article, should try to argue that these views were identical to those 
advocated by Iskra, drawing the conclusion that Iskra's opposition to the Union 
Abroad and Rabochee Delo was spurious in ideological terms.
178
 Lih can only do this 
by excluding Osvobozhdenie Truda from his study, and in an attempt to set straight 
what appears to be a mistake, we have introduced a direct comparison between the 
programmatic statements of the Plekhanovites and Rabochee Delo, the latter of which 
also does not appear to have received any attention from historians.
179
   
  
Having shown in our second chapter that Economism is 'real' and not a 
politically expedient fantasy on the part of the Iskra leadership as Lih and others 
claim, and that there are three main ideological trends in the social-democracy of the 
Iskra period, in addition to the Jewish nationalism of the Bund, our task is then to 
examine the evolving relations between Iskra, its opponents and the RSDLP as a 
whole. This implicitly leads to a new challenge to many previous studies, through the 
way the study draws a distinction between the Iskra faction and the RSDLP. Those 
who focus excessively on What Is To Be Done?, indeed using it as a starting point for 
their investigations into this period, have a tendency to assume that the 'organisation 
of revolutionaries' to which Lenin refers in this pamphlet equates to 'the party' and 
that this institution was to be staffed primarily by ‗professional revolutionaries‘.180  A 
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serious investigation of the documents of the period shows that this cannot have been 
the case. Professional revolutionaries who did not work for a living in the 
conventional sense were indeed a central part of the Russia and émigré Iskra 
networks, though the present study suggests that even among these, several prominent 
figures such as Plekhanov, Axelrod, Potresov and, in all probability, the 
Krzhizhanovskies had non-political sources of income. The founding document of the 
Russian Iskra organisation from January 1902 indicates the creation of an Iskra 
central committee of sixteen individuals who were to locate themselves at various 
points around Russia, and to oversee a process of winning over pre-existing social-
democratic 'committees' - the leading local bodies of the RSDLP - to Iskra ideas and 
their absorption into the Russian Iskra organisation.
181
 However, Piatnitskii‘s memoir 
makes it quite clear that around each of these central committee agents existed a 
periphery of volunteers, one of whom was Piatnitskii himself, who helped the agent in 
the work of transporting and storing illegal literature.
182
 As such, even the Iskra 
faction was not exclusively made up of professionals: it contained a recognised rank 
and file membership. When we then consider that Iskra was but one part of an 
RSDLP also containing the Bund, the Union of Southern Committees, and that fully 
twenty six local organisations sent delegates to the party's Second Congress, we can 
see that the traditional western estimate of Lenin's conception of party organisation 
must be wildly inaccurate. We know that behind each local committee there must 
have also been a significant rank and file membership, which leads us to the 
conclusion that thousands of individuals must have considered themselves RSDLP 
members at this stage, owing to their participation in local networks of social-
democratic organisation headed by the local 'committee'. To argue that Lenin was 
attempting to reduce this membership to a group of a couple of dozen clearly shows a 
lack of perspective, yet this view does not appear to have been questioned in any 
recent literature on the subject in either the English or the Russian language.     
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 The fact of Iskra's existence as a component part of a larger party is made 
clear in the second and third chapter of this study. However, this is not the only new 
conception it intends to bring to the field. These chapters also draw out the democratic 
aspects of Lenin‘s organisational method and his willingness not only to fight, but 
also to co-operate with ideological opponents within the labour movement on specific 
projects in a tactic that would later be known in the Trotskyist tradition as the ‗united 
front‘. The specific project this study is concerned with is, naturally, the 
reconstruction of the RSDLP, which had been smashed the day after its founding 
congress and whose component organisations had failed to re-establish its central 
institutions following this setback. The main documents which show this nuanced 
strategy include a private letter from Lenin to Krupskaya which shows that it was only 
after Lenin met with Osvobozhdenie Truda and argued with Plekhanov that he began 
to conceive of the Union Abroad as a stronghold of Economism.
183
 Despite this clear 
change of opinion, which Baron rather unaccountably dates prior to the meeting with 
Plekhanov,
184
 Lenin did not simply seek out direct, polemical confrontation with the 
Economists, so much as a organisational fusion between the Plekhanovites and their 
émigré followers in the ‗Revolutionary Organisation Sotsial-Demokrat‘ on the one 
hand and the Union Abroad on the other, the result being a united ‗Foreign 
Committee of the RSDLP‘ committed to Plekhanovite ideas. Indeed, the main 
polemical exchange and ultimate split which put an end to this period, following the 
failed Zurich 'unity‘ conference of October 1901 appears to have been the result not 
so much of the Economism of the Union Abroad, so much as the political 
inconsistency of the main émigré organisations, which made it difficult to form long-
term joint projects. For this reason, Service‘s remark that Where To Begin? was a 
typical Iskra article for this period is inaccurate,
185
 just as is the view that Where To 
Begin? is essentially a draft for What Is To Be Done?:
186
 this argument is based on a 
selective quotation from Lenin‘s Preface to the later pamphlet which turns a blind eye 
to all attempts on the part of Iskra to build a united organisation with the Economists 
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in the period between these two works.
187
     
 
 Lenin‘s democratic credentials are championed by Trotskyists and historians 
from the ‗revisionist‘ school of historiography. These trends will probably find their 
arguments reinforced by the discussion of a document in the fourth chapter which 
should really be familiar to all historians of the period, not least because it appears in 
the Fifth Edition of Lenin‘s Collected Works.188 This is the letter sent by Lenin to the 
Belostock conference of March 1902 in which he appeals to the Economists not to 
convert the meeting into a Second RSDLP Congress, whilst at the same time outlining 
a much more inclusive, consensual and seemingly democratic method of convening 
the sovereign institution of the party. The fate of this document, indeed of the 
Belostock meeting itself within Russian and English language historiography is itself 
a curiosity, in so far as it was apparently delivered to the meeting by Theodor Dan, at 
that time an Iskra agent but later a Menshevik historian of the Russian Social-
Democratic movement.
189
 In his own historical work, Dan is strangely quiet about the 
letter, the delivery of which actually led to his subsequent arrest in Moscow.
190
 This 
could be because its content rather jars with his own assertions concerning Lenin‘s 
antipathy to internal party democracy and his alleged preference for introducing a 
‗state of siege‘ into the RSDLP, much in line with the Menshevik arguments in the 
period following the Second Congress.
191
 Indeed, the general enthusiasm for this view 
of Lenin has led to some quite eccentric opinions as to the preparatory work towards 
the Second Congress, despite the fact that all its main details can be gleaned from the 
minutes of the meeting and the Collected Works. Volin‘s article published for the 
seventieth anniversary of the Congress stands out in this respect, the author seeming 
to rely on uncorroborated police intelligence reports of dubious accuracy
192
 whilst 
paying no attention to Lenin‘s personal correspondence.193 Probably the best of the 
Soviet accounts of this meeting, that of Tarnovskii, has nothing to say on the letter's 
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content
194
 and the same can be said of the generally conscientious Tobias who, whilst 
discussing the circumstances of the meeting in sufficient detail is silent on the content 
of a letter, the existence of which he must have been aware.
195
 Whilst it is perhaps 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss why the omission of such a significant piece 
of evidence should be so widespread, one cannot help but speculate that documents 
showing Lenin supporting a pluralist, multi-tendency party led with the consent of its 
component organisations did not fit the politically stereotyped view of him developed 
in both the capitalist and Stalinist parts of the world, and that the legacy of this 
political influence remains today.   
 
 In fact, it seems that this forgotten document exercised as much influence as 
What Is To Be Done? over the pre-Second Congress period in the RSDLP in so far as 
it described in detail a strategy for party reunification on an inclusive basis which, in 
all its main features was actually realised by the organising committee, an ad hoc 
party institution created at Lenin's suggestion by the Belostock meeting. The 
existence of the organising committee is recognised in some English language and 
Soviet histories, but its character and history has not been considered in any level of 
detail.
196
 Keep's brief account of its existence remains the most complete and accurate 
to date, and there is clearly room for its development.
197
 In particular, the fourth 
chapter of the study puts the case, rejected out of hand by Keep, that the second 
attempt to create an organising committee - the first having been broken up by the 
police - also accepted the decisions of the Belostock conference and an inter-factional 
agreement between Iskra, the Bund, the Southern Union and the Union of Russian 
Social-Democrats Abroad as its guiding principles. As such, it challenges Keep's 
claim that the Pskov meeting represented nothing more than a crude factional 
takeover of the congress organising process by Iskra. In fact, Lenin's letter to the 
Belostock meeting shows that it was he who first introduced the very idea of an 
organising committee, as an alternative to hastily organised party meetings involving 
                                                        
194    KN Tarnovskii, Revolutsionaia mysl', revolutsionnoe delo 185 
195
    HJ Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia 182-4  
196    We acknowledge, but at the same time reject the eccentric account of Volin, whose claims are in 
no way supported by the documentary evidence on which the current study is based.  
197    JLH Keep, The Rise of Social-Democracy in Russia 109-110 
  
 
 
49 
 
very few representatives from local social-democratic organisations. Its overall 
purpose was therefore not simply to play for time whilst Iskra gathered its forces, but 
to extend the participation of local organisations in the sovereign body of the RSDLP 
and to make the party congress more representative, whilst also making the actual 
process of organising it far more transparent. Thus, if Lenin clearly wanted to 
maximise Iskra influence on the organising committee charged with responsibility of 
producing an inclusive and legitimate congress, this was not his only imperative 
during the pre-Second Congress period. Other aims included the reconstruction of 
central RSDLP institutions so as to give them a far more solid basis in the local 
organisations, through which the party leadership could be held accountable; the 
development of a central committee with real links to the localities and capable of 
operating in illegal conditions; the publication of an ever more regular RSDLP 
newspaper; and the general recognition of an authoritative party programme. In other 
words, Lenin aimed at strengthening the RSDLP organisation in a number of ways 
that were only indirectly related to the question of which faction held the upper hand 
in the organising committee. Indeed, in all these projects, it seems that he consciously 
sought to involve representatives of opposing factions rather than to exclude them. 
 
 The study of the problems that beset the organising committee's work leads us 
to the main theme of our penultimate chapter, which deals with the final split in the 
Iskra organisation at the Second Congress. There have been numerous attempts to 
explain this division, most varieties of which are outlined by Urilov: the desire of 
Lenin to change the personal composition of the Iskra editorial board; a struggle over 
the composition of the central committee; and a disagreement over the degree to 
which the RSDLP should have been centralised are the motives he identifies.
198
 As 
well as these we note Getzler's idiosyncratic view that the romantic misfortunes of 
two Iskra agents played a key role in dividing the editorial board: Lenin's indifference 
to the matter apparently horrified his colleagues, who at this point discovered his 
fundamental 'amorality'.
199
 Happily, recourse to such lurid explanations is not 
necessary in the present study: this type of explanation is simply one of many which 
tries to locate the starting point of the split in the editorial board of the Iskra 
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newspaper rather than in the Russian network of Iskra agents. Other, similar 
explanations draw attention to the frequent tensions between Lenin and Plekhanov in 
relation to the RSDLP programme, for example, or alternatively to the latter's 
scepticism towards passages in What Is To Be Done? and his personal antipathy 
towards Trotsky. The obvious problem with them is that the most significant clashes 
inside the editorial board were between Lenin and Plekhanov, who actually sided with 
one another against the majority of the editorial board at the Second Congress. 
Another is that the main political differences between Plekhanov and Lenin do appear 
to have been resolved well in advance of the Congress.
200
 Tensions between Lenin 
and Martov, the leaders of the two Iskra subgroups at the meeting are actually quite 
hard to find in the months leading up to it. However, they are not entirely absent and 
once identified, can be shown to have a political rather than a personal character. It 
seems that what Martov and Lenin had in common was their greater involvement not 
only in the production of the Iskra newspaper, but also in the work of Iskra networks 
in Russia and western Europe, from which the rest of the editorial board appeared to 
have remained comparatively aloof. It seems that separate tactical lines emerged 
within these networks during the time of the post-Pskov setback, with a section of 
activists essentially seeking an end to the struggles with the Economists in the 
localities, whilst the new Iskra agents participating in the organising committee 
demanded an end to polemics on the part of Iskra with the Bund. It seems that Martov 
was persuaded to act as the spokesman for this more conciliatory line at the Second 
Congress, under the influence of some extremely disruptive rearguard actions on the 
part of the Bund and Union Abroad delegates. Fearing that the Congress would not 
complete its work, it seems that Martov, possibly in collaboration with others, 
consciously formulated a series of compromise formulae which would appease the 
anti-Iskra minority, thus preventing a split in the RSDLP. If this was the case, the 
attempt was unsuccessful, owing to the withdrawal of the Bund and Rabochee Delo 
delegates from the Second Congress part of the way through its proceedings, and as 
such it simply added to the split between the Iskra supporters on the one hand and the 
Bund and Union Abroad delegates on the other, a split within the Iskra camp.  
 
 The conclusion of the work is in part a restatement of the main findings of the 
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previous four chapters, followed by a brief characterisation of the main features of 
each of the prominent individuals, publications and organisations that feature in the 
study.  
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Chapter Two: Autumn 1899-Summer 1900: Ideology 
 
 By the end of the nineteenth century Russian social-democracy had 
established small sympathising groups in several western European cities.201 Together, 
these groups formed the Union of Russian Social Democrats Abroad which, at the 
party's First Congress in 1898, was named as the official RSDLP organisation for 
émigrés. It can be said with certainty that it was not a large association, comprising a 
mere twenty five individuals on 8th January 1900, and that it added a further ten the 
following day.202  The organisation was a consequence of Osvobozhdenie Truda's 
break with Russian populism in the early 1880s. This tiny group of Marxists 
connected to Plekhanov, having themselves sought refuge in Switzerland in the 
previous half decade, seem to have acquired circles of sympathisers inside Russia as 
early as 1885, which had access to illegal printing presses and which issued 
newspapers at irregular intervals.203 Politically, the members of these Russian groups 
were not consistent Marxists, and as a result it seems that some sort of division was 
recognised between Osvobozhdenie Truda and the Union.204 This distinction was not a 
split, so much as a recognition of the Plekhanov group as an allied, sympathetic yet 
separate entity which would provide a literary service to the broader Union. 
According to this understanding, the latter would not intervene in the internal matters 
of the émigré literary group, which would make its editorial decisions independent of 
its activist supporters, and would not be accountable to them.205 Thus a type of federal 
relationship was established between the two organisations, neither side of which 
could exert much influence over its opposite number. 
 
 There is no evidence that this original ‗Union of Russian Social Democrats‘ 
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was continuously active right up to the period studied in the present thesis. However, 
it is clear that a visit by Lenin and several other leading Russian activists to the 
Plekhanov group in 1895 laid the basis for a rejuvenated 'Union of Russian Social 
Democrats Abroad'.206 Following these negotiations, Osvobozhdenie Truda renewed 
its efforts to produce material for a Russian readership, in the form of the analytical 
journal Rabotnik, and a newspaper Listok Rabotnika,207 and it was probably as a result 
of this renewed activity that the Union was declared an official part of the RSDLP 
three years later. Lenin's intervention apparently also led to certain changes in its 
internal structure, the most important of which was that any member of a local 
committee of the RSDLP who found him or herself living abroad automatically 
became a member of the Union.208 This meant that whereas previously the 
organisation‘s literary activity had been carried out exclusively under the authority of 
Osvobozhdenie Truda, there was now pressure on the Plekhanov group to accept 
offers of collaboration from émigrés who did not share their views.209 Earlier, 
Osvobozhdnie Truda had tolerated politically nebulous followers to some degree, but 
after the change there appears to have been the expectation, if not the requirement that 
they co-operate with all émigrés who had played a significant role in the Russian 
social-democratic movement.210 This led to a fear on the part of the Plekhanovites that 
Union literature would lose its Marxist character owing to the influx of new members 
who did not share their world view, but who would have the right to be involved in 
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the Union‘s publishing work.211 As a result of these pressures Plekhanov, Axelrod and 
Zasulich resigned their literary responsibilities at the Union's First Congress, which 
was held in the autumn of 1898, owing to their now obvious status as a minority in the 
organisation.212 A period of internal conflict followed in which the more long-standing 
members, who generally followed Plekhanov, fell out with the newer members who 
had joined as a result of their activity in the RSDLP in Russia. The following April, a 
new journal Rabochee Delo appeared in the name of the Union Abroad, consolidating 
the position of the anti-Plekhanov trend.213 Osvobozhdenie Truda and its followers 
responded by applying for factional status inside the émigré organisation, apparently 
seeking a return to the old federal-style relations during the latter half of 1899.214 
Failing to find their demands satisfied, and after months of acrimony, they finally split 
from the Union Abroad in the spring of 1900, at the latter‘s Second Congress.215 
 
 The relation of all this to Lenin is that, despite his fairly clear Plekhanovite 
sympathies, he appears to have been viewed as a potential collaborator on journalistic 
projects by individuals linked to the dominant, anti-Plekhanov tendency in the Union 
Abroad.216 One consequence of this was that he was drawn into the conflict just 
described, seemingly against his will. The purpose of the next two chapters is to 
analyse Lenin‘s involvement in this little-studied drama, which dominated the 
political environment in which he conceived the idea of Iskra. In relation to it, the 
present study revolves around two main arguments. Firstly, the study aims to show 
that the existence of this conflict in the Union Abroad and the fact of Lenin‘s 
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participation in it disproves the widely held view that the latter emerged into western 
Europe in the spring of 1900 with a definite plan for the reconstruction of the 
leaderless RSDLP, involving the Iskra newspaper, its theoretical sibling Zaria, and its 
corps of underground agents who would smuggle these publications into Russia.217 
Whilst acknowledging that it is usually difficult to determine a historical figure's 
intentions unless they put their thoughts to paper, it seems highly unlikely that Lenin 
could have had such a pre-conceived and highly-developed plan in the context of such 
unstable political relations within the emigration. Our second argument relates to the 
fact this 'instability' consisted in Lenin's closest allies, Osvobozhdenie Truda, fighting 
an ideological battle with an apparently non-Marxist social-democratic trend in the 
Union Abroad, represented by Rabochee Delo. In this struggle Lenin was in principle 
on the side of the former and against the latter in the sense that he agreed with all the 
essentials of Plekhanov‘s political outlook. On the other hand it was the non-Marxists 
and not the Plekhanovites who appeared the more committed to the reconstruction and 
development of the RSDLP, and who had far closer links with the workers' movement 
in Russia.218 The question of whose side Lenin was actually on was therefore not 
entirely clear-cut. By conviction, he was with Osvobozhdenie Truda, yet his activist 
outlook, and his desire to link the theory of Marxism to the actual struggles of the 
working class appears to have drawn him towards the non-Marxists. The result 
appears to have been something of a compromise position on his part, albeit one 
leading more towards the Plekhanovites than Rabochee Delo. It seems that it was this 
compromising policy which actually produced the Iskra newspaper as an entity 
separate from Osvobozhdenie Truda, despite the fact that the latter contributed to the 
columns of the paper on a regular basis. On this basis Lenin could attempt to heal the 
split in the emigration, the purpose of this being to assert a claim on the part of the 
revolutionary Marxists to the RSDLP, which was currently in the hands of the 
Economists, rather than to resolve the ideological conflict between Plekhanov and 
Rabochee Delo. Only having manoeuvred the revolutionaries into the ranks of this 
broader party could Lenin then pursue a more aggressive strategy against the 
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Rabochee Delo reformists. 
 
These two arguments do not correspond to the division of this section of the 
study into two chapters. On the contrary, the present one aims to prove that there 
actually was a meaningful ideological distinction between Osvobohdeniye Truda and 
Rabochee Delo and to show that the latter attempted to manoeuvre against the former 
using Lenin as a pawn. It will show how Lenin and his allies in Russia rebelled 
against this treatment and struck a blow against Rabochee Delo on behalf of 
Osvobozhdenie Truda, an incident which offers convincing practical demonstration of 
Lenin's fundamental loyalties at this stage. In the light of the unavoidable conclusion 
that Lenin was at this stage a Plekhanovite who actively sought to overcome the 
influence of anti-Marxist thought in the social-democratic movement, the next task 
will be to examine how his tactical notions differed from, and were in fact far more 
effective than that of Plekhanov. This will be the theme of the next, and not the 
present chapter. 
  
 
       i) Two Contrasting Programmes 
 
 A useful starting point for any discussion of the background to Iskra is the 
posing of the question of what is to be understood by the concept 'Russian Marxism'. 
The beginning of an equally useful answer would be that some of the most clear and 
concise summaries of the Marxist world view, at least in relation to the period of 
history currently being studied, are to be found in the programmes of different social-
democratic parties and pre-party groupings.219 Much can be learned about the nature 
and function of this type of document from Engels's remarks on the programme 
drafted by Kautsky for the German social-democrats in 1891.220 For Engels a 
programme summarizes in the briefest possible way the theoretical positions and aims 
of the party. It does not attempt to explain or justify them, and it is not written in a 
way that is designed to immediately convince the layperson. For these reasons Engels 
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criticises Kautsky‘s efforts: 
 
In general it suffers from the attempt to combine two things that are uncombinable: a 
programme and a commentary on the programme as well. The fear that a short, pointed exposition 
would not be intelligible enough has caused explanations to be added, which make it verbose and 
drawn out. To my view the programme should be as short and precise as possible. No harm is done 
even if it contains the occasional foreign word, or a sentence whose full significance cannot be 
understood at first sight.221 
 
 This is because it is the basis for political education within the party and its 
contents should be discussed by workers, guided by theoretically competent teachers: 
 
Verbal exposition at meetings and written commentaries in the press take care 
of all that and the short, precise phrase, once understood, takes root in the memory, 
and becomes a slogan, a thing that never happens with verbose explanations. Too 
much should not be sacrificed for the sake of popularity, and the mental ability and 
educational level of our workers should not be underestimated. They have understood 
much more difficult things than the shortest, most concise programme can offer them; 
and if the period of the Anti-Socialist Law has made more difficult, and here and there 
even prevented the spreading of comprehensive knowledge among the masses joining 
the movement, now that our propagandist literature can again be kept and read 
without risking trouble, time lost under the old leadership shall soon be made up for222  
 
Seemingly the role of the teacher-propagandist is to lead doubters towards the 
appropriate theoretical conclusions, and clear up any misunderstandings with 
independent commentary and examples. In one sense, then, the programme can be 
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viewed as an educational curriculum for party members in which the basic tenets of 
the social-democratic world view and its aims are stated. However, and most 
fortunately for the present study, it also clearly provides answers the question 'what is 
Russian Marxism' quite convincingly in no more than a couple of dozen paragraphs, 
allowing us to avoid unnecessary speculation on this score. Bearing this in mind, the 
next stage of the study will be to examine the programmatic statements of the two 
sides in the disagreement within the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and 
try to identify the nature of their political positions and the differences in their 
political perspectives.  
 
 On the one hand there is Plekhanov's programme of Osvobozhdenie Truda.223 
It states that the aim of the group is to spread socialist ideas in Russia and to work 
towards the construction of a worker‘s socialist party.224 In then defines what it 
understands by a socialist outlook: support for the common ownership of the ‗means 
and products of production'.225 This type of arrangement it believes is not only 
possible on the basis of advanced technology, but necessary and inevitable, in the 
sense that it will solve all the main problems inherent in the current social system and 
permit the further development of humanity.226 These problems can be summarised as 
the class polarisation of society; the principle of competition, which exists between 
individuals and entire nations; and the state, the product of these antagonisms.227 
Common ownership, states the programme, will have the advantage of transforming 
all social and international relationships, so that producers will at last have real 
control over their products. It will represent an end to the rule of blind economic 
forces in society, with the effect that producers will for the first time in history be able 
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to play a part in ‗the direct management of all social matters‘.228 A workers‘ party 
must be formed in order to achieve this. It must set itself the aim of winning political 
power in Russia, and of adapting the principles of socialism to the country‘s unusually 
backward social conditions. This, according to the programme, does not represent an 
attempt to change these principles, which it regards as universally applicable given 
the international nature of the whole modern economy. On the contrary, Marxism 
states that in every country the workers will have to win dominance over the 
bourgeoisie in different ways, differences which take into account national 
peculiarities.229 Thus, in every country the socialist revolution will take a different 
form even if socialism itself will be an international system. In Russia, the workers 
must fight not only the bourgeoisie, but also survivals from pre-bourgeois social 
system, such as the remnants of landlordism and serfdom.230 Moreover, the Russian 
bourgeoisie is not as politically conscious as in the west, with the effect that an 
alternative force, the ‗socialist intelligentsia‘ has taken up the vanguard position 
against the autocracy.231 Having noted these special features, Plekhanov then defines 
the main practical task of these socialists as achieving a democratic constitution, 
whilst at the same time preparing the working class for participation in this future 
democratic political system.232 The preparation of the working class involves the 
creation of a ‗secret‘ workers political party based in the industrial centres, which will 
work out a ‗social and political programme‘ representing the aspirations and needs of 
workers in dialogue with the workers themselves.233 Therefore, the programme 
appeals to the socialist intelligentsia to go to the working class and to begin this work 
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of propagating socialist ideas.234 Those currently attached to the Narodnaia Volia 
organisation or working among the peasantry are not asked to surrender their views, 
in as much as their democratic aims are shared by the Marxists. However, Plekhanov 
demands that they supplement their anti-autocratic terror and rural campaigns with 
constructive work towards the creation of a new urban workers' socialist party.235  
 
 The opposing half of the dispute, the Programme of Rabochee Delo is not well 
drafted and is characterised by vague, contradictory and at times incomprehensible 
phrases, all of which makes a clear understanding of it quite difficult.236 In its own 
words, it is ‗based on the soil of international socialism‘.237 Its authors also observe 
that 'the principles of scientific socialism' only have a purpose if they are related to the 
‗concrete conditions of the social classes in Russia and the immediate demands of the 
Russian workers‘ movement at its current level of development‘.238 The need to 
consider the differing degrees of political development of workers in different 
localities is also explicitly stated.239 Because in Marx‘s view the emancipation of the 
working class must be carried out by the workers themselves, the Programme‘s 
authors declare that the Russian social-democrats must take the mass movement of 
industrial workers during the previous period as its starting point. It must convert this 
‗mass‘ movement into a ‗class‘ movement by putting forward demands which do not 
appeal to just one or several sections of the working class, but to the working class as 
a whole.240 Rabochee Delo states that working class unification along these lines is 
                                                        
234   Ibid., ii 360-1      
235   Ibid., ii 361-2    
236  Rabochee Delo 1 (April 1899), 1-7 
237  «…на почве международного социализма….» [ Ibid., 1] 
238  «Заграничный Союз Русских Социалдемократов действует на почве международного 
социализма, в идейном и практическом согласии с Российской Социалдемократической Рабочей 
Партии, часть которой он составляет. Эта деятельность может быть целесообразна лишь под 
условием, если она, во 1-х руководствуется не только общими принципами научного 
социализма, но и конкретным соотношением общественных классов в России и насущным 
потребностями русского рабочего движения. » [Ibid., 1] 
239   Ibid., 1 
240   Ibid., 2   
  
 
 
62 
 
taking place naturally, and that the social-democrats should intervene to speed it up.241 
It predicts that this emerging class movement will inevitably become politicised as a 
result of clashes with the police, events which will cause workers to ask questions 
about the nature of the state. With this process in mind, the programme states that ‗the 
political struggle of the working class is only a more developed, broad and effective 
form of economic struggle‘.242 Its authors thus seem to assume that the great majority 
of workers will develop political consciousness only through the experience of 
economic struggle. Arrests, police and military attacks on strikers, followed by exiles 
and trials will reveal the oppressive character of the state and will draw the attention 
of the greatest possible number of workers towards political problems.243 For these 
reasons, Rabochee Delo states that political agitation244 should begin with an emphasis 
on individual freedoms, such as freedom of association, freedom of the press and 
inviolability of the person, though how agitational work should be developed after 
this starting point is not made clear.245 From the context, one can guess that Rabochee 
Delo believes that workers who suffer state repression are radicalised, to the extent 
that they are taught in a very practical way that the entire state machine is opposed to 
their interests, and that it must therefore be replaced by some other arrangement. In 
terms of the overall goal of the labour movement, the programme states its support for 
the RSDLP manifesto and the aim of a socialist society, which is understood in 
accordance with a Marxist, as opposed to a populist definition of the term.246 
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Rabochee Delo thus registers its opposition to socialists who are not social-democrats; 
that it will critically evaluate their ideas without being uncomradely in its methods;247 
and that it will point out that non-socialist revolutionaries and opposition groups 
represent social forces other than the proletariat.248 In addition, towards the end of the 
programme there are also statements in support of the right of stateless nations to self-
determination and a statement in opposition to national and religious persecution, 
reflecting somewhat indirectly the democratic aspirations of the social-democracy 
and, one might reasonably guess its sympathy with the Jewish Bund.249  
 
 Comparing the two documents, it seems clear that Plekhanov‘s priority is to 
define his notion of socialism very clearly. A socialist society is characterised by 
common ownership of property and collective management in all social spheres. It 
proclaims the solidarity of all nations with one another. Only from this revolutionary 
starting point is the reader is brought back to the difficult realities of Russia, the main 
features of which are then enumerated. The final goal is articulated, the current 
situation is then described and finally, resolving the contradictions between the two, a 
strategy for reaching the goal is outlined. The strategy is to fight for a democratic 
constitution whilst building an underground socialist workers‘ party. Conversely, the 
starting point of the Rabochee Delo programme is very clearly the Russian strike 
wave of 1894-7: current affairs rather than the society of the future.250 Though this 
event is somewhat beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that social-
democrats found it possible to play an influential role in these strikes, but often did 
not have the opportunity to propagate a Marxist world view. Tactics revolved around 
helping workers formulate their immediate demands, which were not generally 
                                                        
247  Ibid., 6 « Что касается существующих в настоящее время других социалистических течений, 
то в своей пресс Союз будет оценивать критически их программы и тактики с 
социалдемократической точки зрения, строго воздерживаясь от резких, нетоварищеских 
приемов полемики...»    
248   Ibid., 5-6   
249   Ibid., 6   
250
   D Kol'tsov, ‗Rabochie v 1890-1904‘, in L Martov, P Maslov & A Potresov (editors) 
Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii, (The Hague: Europe Printing, 1968) 188-93; VP Akimov,‘A Short 
History‘, 237-54; R Taylor & N Harding, Key Documents, 15-219. Kol'tsov dates the wave from 1895-
8, but is clearly referring to the same movement. 
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incompatible with either capitalism or the autocracy.251 As a result there was a doubt 
on the part of the older generation of social-democrats as to whether, on its own, this 
type of activity was sufficient for a genuinely social-democratic movement which 
aimed in principle at the creation of an entirely different, socialist society.252  
 
For these reasons, Rabochee Delo‘s emphasis on the industrial movement does 
seem to indicate a rather superficial attachment to the ideas of socialism and 
democracy. Perhaps in an attempt to reinforce its commitment to these ideas, 
Rabochee Delo states its support for the 1898 Manifesto of the RSDLP which can 
appear to be a more definitely socialist basis for its actions.253 Yet this Manifesto was 
in no sense a statement of Marxist principles comparable to that of the Osvobozhdenie 
Truda programme. It begins with a summary of the class relations within Russia and 
the political consciousness of each class, and the relation of the contemporary 
situation in Russia to the broad sweep of European history.254 Clearly this analysis 
reflects certain Marxist assumptions, but nowhere is the basis of a Marxist world view 
articulated directly: nothing precise is said about the basic features of capitalism, 
independent of time or place, about the nature of socialism or the means of reaching 
this desired state. At best, the Manifesto states the main immediate task of the party, 
namely the fight for political freedom.255 It also points out that it is but a step towards 
a new struggle, this time with the bourgeoisie, for ‗socialism‘, but the character of this 
new type of society remains entirely unexplained.256 It seems that it is because of this 
fundamental vagueness that Rabochee Delo's prefers its political proposals to be 
defined by ‗the level of development of the workers‘ movement‘ rather than their 
                                                        
251  A Egorov, ‗Zarozhdenie politicheskikh partii i ikh deyatelnost'‘ 379: «(К) концу 90-х годов члены 
социал-демократических организаций все более сосредоточивали свое внимание на самом 
процессе повседневной экономической борьбы рабочих с хозяевами, упуская из поле зрения 
всю социал-политическую обстановку, в которой эта борьба происходила – все те другие 
общественные противоречия, которые, рано или поздно, должны были вовлечь в сферу своего 
действия и рабочие массы.» See also R Taylor & N Harding, Key Documents, 15-220 for documents 
relating to this period in Russian social-democratic history 
252  A Egorov, 'Zarozhdenie politicheskikh partii', 381 
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relation to the final goal of this movement. These proposals are thus clearly viewed as 
an expression of present day reality rather than part of a strategy leading to a goal. 
Consequently, one gets the sense that Rabochee Delo sees the strike movement as a 
rather more solid 'material' base for their political strategy than their grasp of 
‗abstract‘ Marxist principles could ever provide. Whatever the case, Rabochee Delo's 
immediate political demands are not ‗a democratic constitution‘, but a few key 
democratic rights that in themselves are not incompatible with continued monarchical 
rule, albeit in a somewhat less absolute manner. These are: the freedom of association, 
press and to strike, buttressed by a guarantees of the inviolability of the individual.257 
‗Full popular participation in the running of the state‘258 is supported as an overall 
‗aim‘, whereas for Plekhanov, the overall ‗aim‘ is a socialist society on an 
international scale. In Plekhanov‘s ‗final goal‘ the people ‗participate‘ in the 
management of all areas of society, economic and cultural, and there is no state 
whatsoever. Democracy, for him is a necessary means to this end, and this is why it is 
represented as an 'immediate demand'. To reject this 'immediate demand' as too 
ambitious is, of course, to implicitly reject the final goal for exactly the same reason. 
Yet this is precisely what Rabochee Delo appears to do, despite the fact that without 
democracy, any progress in the construction of a mass-membership workers' party 
would be extremely limited. 
 
  In so far as Rabochee Delo mentions the principles of Marxism, ‗scientific 
socialism‘, at all it is only to state that they must be compounded with ‗the demands 
of the workers‘ and yet more bizarrely, ‗the concrete social relations of the social 
classes in Russia.‘ The latter is an amazingly confused formulation, for it is 
impossible to imagine how a ‗scientific socialist‘ could establish these ‗concrete‘ 
relations of the classes except by applying the general principles of the Marxist 
methodology - however one chooses to define these - to the concrete case. If in 
general, one accepts that classes in society are defined in their relations to one another 
by their relations to the means of production, then surely the class structure of Russian 
society must be determined in exactly the same way. The challenge is then to identify 
the economic relations prevailing in Russia on the basis of empirical research, and 
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from this information, to establish the socio-economic character of its rich and poor.259 
More to the point, one wonders why Rabochee Delo raises the question of scientific 
socialism only to point out what it believes to be its limitations and, moreover, why it 
does this whilst failing to state any of the doctrine‘s basic ideas. One can reasonably 
assume, in the light of the history outlined above, that a difference of opinion with the 
Plekhanovites is being expressed, but this negative hint about Marxism is not 
developed in any detail. There is no explanation of how, for example, a struggle for a 
reduction in the working day without loss of pay could modify the belief that 
socialism consists in common ownership and a planned economy or that capitalism 
inevitably causes the polarisation of classes. The silence could be because these 
notions are absurd, and because they reflect a very weak attachment to political and 
sociological theories, which are not generally modified by such commonplace events 
as strikes. Equally, it could suggest a rather superficial familiarity with the ideas of 
Marx and Engels. Perhaps significantly, circumstantial evidence supporting the latter 
idea is not hard to find. In fact, a number of contemporary witnesses, Krupskaya, 
Lydia Dan, Martov and the former Iuzhny Rabochii editor Egorov all testify to this.260 
They all state that because of Tsarist censorship, the availability of Marxist literature 
was extremely limited among Russian activists at this time, with only the briefly-
legalised first volume of Capital being widely read. Even the Communist Manifesto 
was a rarity, and even after the revitalisation of the Union Abroad, the supply of 
illegal literature and authoritative Marxist opinion was extremely inconsistent.261 
Worse, within the universities during the 1890s, ‗Legal Marxism‘, the bowdlerized 
study of Marx carried out within the limits permitted by the censorship, had become 
something of a mass phenomenon, especially in the wake of the famine crisis of 1891-
2.262 
 
                                                        
259  In the view of Marx, a key part of this type of work was carried out by one N Flerovsky who, 
though not a revolutionary gave Marx the basic information necessary to formulate his position on the 
nature of Russian social relations [K Marx & F Engels Collected Works, xliii 422-5]. 
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 If the hypothesis that, for Rabochee Delo ‗scientific socialism‘ or ‗Marxism‘ 
equates precisely to Capital, Volume One and to nothing else is allowed, it is at least 
possible to make sense of what it writes in its programme. According to this 
interpretation, scientific socialism, in the view of Rabochee Delo, is one part of the 
economic theory of Marx alone, and not the whole complex of the political, 
economic, organisational and philosophical theories advanced by both Marx and 
Engels. Naturally, a political movement cannot survive on the basis of propagating 
such an economic theory alone, and in order to be applicable to Russia, the work in 
question would need to be supplemented and altered in several different ways. 
Capital, Volume One is based on an analysis of English conditions. In this first 
volume, the main focus is the relations of industrial workers to their employers: very 
little is said about other classes in society. By contrast, in Russia there was a large 
peasantry and the rural gentry to consider. This type of reasoning appears to explain 
the remark about the ‗concrete social relations of classes‘ and the desire of Rabochee 
Delo to supplement Marxism in different ways. The concept of parliamentary 
investigations into industrial conditions, Blue Books and Hansard - staple evidence in 
Capital, Volume One - would no doubt seem very alien to Russian situation, 
prompting Rabochee Delo‘s appeal to consider the working class in its ‗current state 
of development‘. Thus we are led to the likely conclusion that the basic ideological 
differences between the two tendencies in the Union Abroad were based on very 
different levels of familiarity with Marxist literature. Scientific socialism, for 
Rabochee Delo was an economic theory mainly applicable to England whereas 
Marxism for Plekhanov was a universal revolutionary doctrine.   
 
 
ii) Lenin and Rabochee Delo 
 
 If the argument just advanced is correct, it is correct to say that there was 
always potential for conflict between Rabochee Delo and the supporters of Plekhanov. 
It is hard to imagine how a group with a revolutionary, democratic and socialist 
conception of Marxism could long be obliged to co-exist with one for whom 
‗Marxism‘ was nothing more than the economic theory of Capital, a work which has 
very little to say on the theme of political action. Even though both might have 
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claimed to subscribe to some kind of ‗Marxist‘ viewpoint, two such groups would in 
reality have very little in common. As we noted earlier, such a conflict did indeed 
break out between the two sides in the spring of 1899, a conflict which dragged in the 
exiled Lenin and in which Rabochee Delo appears to have been the aggressor. It 
emerged in the following fashion. In the first issue of Rabochee Delo, as well as the 
programme we have just discussed, there was a review of Lenin‘s The Tasks of the 
Social Democrats, a pamphlet published with a foreword by the Osvobozhdenie Truda 
member PB Axelrod.263 The treatment this work receives from the anonymous 
reviewer is rather strange, in so far as the latter sees it as proof that within Russia 
there is no evidence of 'economic one-sidedness' among activists, a criticism made by 
Osvobozhdenie Truda of the social-democrats‘ intervention in the 1894-7 strike 
movement.264 This is on the grounds that Lenin identifies both political and economic 
propaganda and agitation as the essential ‗tasks‘ of the party.265 Consequently, the 
review is partially positive in tone: 
 
 Эта брошюра, написанная действовавшим в России за последние годы товарищем, 
оставляет крайне отрадное явление. Она свидетельствует о том, что наши российские товарищи 
переросли уже как предварительную ступень отвлеченной пропаганды социал-демократических 
принципов, так и дальнейшую ступень - процесс слияния кружкового социал-демократического 
течения с возникшим массовым движением рабочих. Нет ничего труднее и важнее для молодой 
партии, как сознательное и умелое применение своей программы к наличным условиям 
действительности, то есть, установление целесообразной тактики. 266 
 
 Indeed, the reviewer apparently sees Lenin‘s work as being entirely in keeping 
with the programmatic concerns of Rabochee Delo: the ‗adaptation‘ of the social 
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265  See note 188 
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democratic programme ‗towards the present conditions of activity‘. Lenin is thus 
presented, almost certainly without his consent, as a supporter of this new journal. 
Indeed, the reviewer makes this quite clear when he tries to use the contents of the 
brochure to attack the author of its preface, and through this target, the entire 
Osvobozhdenie Truda critique of ‗economic one-sidedness‘: 
 
 Повторяем: брошюра особенно ценна тем, что она нас знакомит из первых рук с 
действительным состоянием нашего движения, с его жизненной практикой. В этом отношения  
мы не можем согласиться с товарищем П. Аксельродом, который в своем предисловии 
склоняется к мысли, что «в общем движение наше ещѐ только стремится к той ступени 
развития, которая вполне соответствует тактической точки зрения автора». Впрочем, Аксельрод 
основывает свое мнение, единственно на «заявлениях более молодых товарищей, сравнительно 
недавно попавших заграницу», признавая в то же время, что новейшие издания наших русских  
товарищей и «Манифест» социалдемократического съезда в России вполне отражают взгляды, 
изложенные в брошюре.267  
 
 For Axelrod, Lenin‘s pamphlet is an idealised account of the social-
democratic movement, whereas for the reviewer it is an entirely objective piece of 
description. Axelrod believes the social-democrats are not necessarily taking part in 
widespread socialist and democratic agitation among the masses in the manner Lenin 
describes, whereas the reviewer contends that this is the case, and that Lenin's 
pamphlet offers convincing proof of this fact. If we take a look at the pamphlet itself, 
we can easily see that the reviewer's argument is not convincing.268 The first thing that 
the reader notices is that it was written in exile, towards the end of 1897, by which 
time Lenin had spent two years in the tsarist penal system. His familiarity with the 
state of the social-democratic committees at that stage can only have been weak. 
Arrests of leading local activists, a regular occurrence, could change not only the 
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personal composition of social-democratic committees and the editorial boards of 
their newspapers, but also their political stance.269 Moreover, it also becomes clear that 
the pamphlet has no intention of saying anything about the internal problems of the 
social-democratic movement, which is not the same thing as declaring that these 
problems do not exist. This is because the pamphlet is part of an ongoing polemic 
with two ‗social-revolutionary‘270 parties, Narodnaia Volia and Narodnoe Pravo, the 
latter of which also appears in Lenin‘s What the Friends of the People Are.271 Making 
reference to this earlier attempt to clarify his theoretical views in relation to these 
parties, Lenin proclaims the need to also clarify their practical differences. These 
amount to the fact that the ‗social-revolutionaries‘, whilst working among the urban 
proletariat like the social-democrats, confine themselves exclusively to democratic 
agitation and propaganda, without raising questions connected with class struggle, 
internationalism, or the prospect of a socialist society.272 From this alone it should be 
clear that Lenin's pamphlet is being used out of context by the reviewer. The Tasks of 
the Social Democrats is part of a debate with other political parties, a form of writing 
which inevitably ignores any internal differences which might exist in one of the 
opposing camps and which is in any case prone to the exaggeration of successes. In 
such a pamphlet it would not be appropriate to discuss any internal problems of the 
social-democratic party and this is why Lenin says nothing about the presence or 
absence of an ‗economic tendency‘. To read into this type of silence the opinion that 
such a tendency does not exist is presumptuous. It is all the more presumptuous in so 
far as the reviewer sets the view he attributes to Lenin against that of his 
                                                        
269  A Egorov, 'Zarozhdenie politicheskikh partii', 377-8. The most well-known example of an 
organisation changing its politics as a result of the arrest of its leadership would appear to be that of the 
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Osvobozhdenie Truda ally Axelrod, the same Axelrod who, presumably with Lenin's 
consent, wrote the foreword to the pamphlet. All this seems like a rather malicious 
attempt to sow discord in the ranks of the Plekhanovites, whilst at the same time 
trying to use Lenin as an unwilling puppet for Rabochee Delo views. It is for these 
reasons that we believe Lenin was actually provoked into involvement in the dispute 
within the Union Abroad, despite the quite popular view that he was the main 
aggressor.273 
 
    * * * * 
 
  
 The Credo of Kuskova, a sometime member of the Union Abroad who was also 
active in St Petersburg, is just another example of those texts which have received a 
lot of attention simply because Lenin directed criticism against them. It takes the form 
of a draft programme of the revisionists, the conscious critics of Marxism within 
Russian social-democracy, whose views must be distinguished from the merely 
theoretically undeveloped opinions to which Rabochee Delo officially subscribed. A 
reliable exposition of the Credo already exists and for this reason there is no need to 
rehearse its main arguments.274 Instead, on the basis of what has already been noted in 
relation to the first issue of Rabochee Delo we would like to challenge the view that 
Lenin‘s Protest against Kuskova, supported by the signatures of sixteen other Siberian 
exiles, and which appeared in the fourth issue of Rabochee Delo was simply a rather 
bullying attack on a private opinion. This is only an echo of the view taken by the 
editors of Rabochee Delo275 and it has been unthinkingly repeated on far too many 
occasions.276 It misses the point, utterly. The Protest is in reality a conscious response 
                                                        
273  BD Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, 145; L Shapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, 36-38; R Service, Lenin, A Political Life, Volume One 79; P Pomper, The Intelligentsia and 
Power, 57-8 
274  N Harding, Lenin's Political Thought 141-5 
275  Rabochee Delo No 4 (Autumn, 1899), 24: «Мы от души приветствуем этот решительный 
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on the part of Lenin to the previous distortion of his real views by Rabochee Delo, 
and to their intention of separating him and his allies within the Russian social 
democratic movement from Osvobozhdenie Truda. The very first line of the Protest 
contradicts this attempt. It is a declaration of factional loyalty: 
 
A tendency has been observed among Russian Social-Democrats recently to depart from the 
fundamental principles of Russian Social-Democracy that were proclaimed by its founders and 
foremost fighters, members of the ‗Emancipation of Labour‘ group.277 
  
  Given Rabochee Delo's political game-playing, it is hard to misunderstand the 
significance of this phrase. It indicates very clearly that Rabochee Delo‘s divide and 
conquer stratagem will not succeed. Just in case the point was lost on the editors, 
Lenin then cites Axelrod, the main victim of the reviewer's remarks in the first issue 
of the journal: 
 
The mere fact that it was possible for a programme like this to appear shows how well 
grounded were the fears expressed by one of the foremost champions of Russian Social-Democracy, P. 
B. Axelrod, when, at the end of 1897, he wrote of the possibility of the following prospect: ―The 
working-class movement keeps to the narrow but of purely economic conflicts between the workers 
and employers and, in itself, taken as a whole, is not of a political character, while in the struggle for 
political freedom the advanced strata of the proletariat follow the revolutionary circles and groups of 
the so-called intelligentsia‖ (Axelrod, Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats, 
Geneva, 1898, p. 19)
 278 
  
 For Lenin, Axelrod is correct to warn of the dangers of a challenge to 
Marxism within social-democracy. He dissociates himself from the perspective of 
Rabochee Delo that some kind of ‗economic one-sidedness‘ is not a serious problem, 
an opinion which, in a rather high-handed manner, Rabochee Delo tried to attribute to 
him. The unambiguous message is sent: for all Rabochee Delo's rather low 
insinuations, the Russian supporters of Osvobozhdenie Truda will not tolerate 
attempts to separate them from their émigré leaders. Kuskova's document, in this 
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sense, can be seen something of a pretext justifying this type of public statement and, 
if it is therefore possible to regard her work as the victim of 'collateral damage', in the 
sense that it was thus drawn into an argument between the two groups within the 
Union Abroad without her consent, then we must also note that exactly the same 
method had been previously employed by Rabochee Delo. Indeed, having tried to 
force a split among the supporters of Plekhanov by distorting the meaning of Lenin‘s 
The Tasks of the Social Democrats, the hapless Rabochee Delo as a result of Lenin's 
‗reply‘ found itself in a situation where it had to denounce Kuskova despite the fact 
that, as we shall see in the next section, it viewed her as a potential ally. Thus, whilst 
their own splitting tactic failed and was also dishonest, Lenin‘s reply succeeded whilst 
adopting the far more scrupulous method of requesting the publication of the Credo 
alongside his own criticism of it, so that readers could decide for themselves whether 
he was fairly representing the contents of the document.279  
 
 In its editorial commentary on the Protest, Rabochee Delo distances itself 
from the Credo, a fact which could be used to support the claim that the journal was 
essentially Marxist, for all its theoretical backwardness.280 However, this would be to 
take the statement that it ‗heartily welcomes the announcement of the Russian 
comrades‘ at face value, something not so easy to accept given the circumstances we 
have just described. Lenin‘s Protest involves an expression of solidarity with 
Osvobozhdenie Truda, the authority of which Rabochee Delo implicitly denied in its 
own programme and whose unity Rabochee Delo clearly sought to disrupt. This 
impression that this 'welcome' was disingenuous is only reinforced by Rabochee 
Delo‘s suggestion as to how the Credo problem should be resolved: by calling for an 
all-sided debate on the future programme of the RSDLP, and to solicit articles for 
publication in a separate pamphlet on the question.281 Intriguingly, this debate was to 
include contributions from Bernstein and Kautsky, though no reference is made to 
Plekhanov in Rabochee Delo‘s plan. In relation to this omission, it should not be 
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necessary to repeat the arguments made in the first chapter concerning Lih‘s work and 
the relative merits of Plekhanov and Kautsky as political authorities within Russian 
Marxism. Surely it is obvious from what we said earlier that Plekhanov‘s exclusion in 
favour of Kautksy, though in one sense a personal snub, also has a political character, 
strengthening the hand of reformism at the expense of Osvobozhdenie Truda's clearly 
revolutionary politics. This tendency is, of course, shown far more explicitly by 
Rabochee Delo‘s decision to invite Bernstein into the debate, despite the fact that he 
had recently been heavily defeated in his attempt to challenge the German social-
democratic programme.282 His views were therefore in no way representative of the 
German party and had the status of a private opinion, not dissimilar to that of 
Kuskova. The only conclusion to be drawn from this, is that an individual with no 
special knowledge of Russian conditions and whose views had no official status 
within international social-democracy should be given a greater say in the writing of 
the Russian programme than Russia‘s most well-known and competent Marxist 
theoretician. It was surely impossible for the Plekhanov supporters not to see this as a 
calculated exclusion, and an indication that, despite the previous words of sympathy, 
the struggle between the two tendencies in the Union Abroad would continue. 
 
 
 iii) A Secret Alliance is Exposed 
 
 Up to now, the study has only considered the public activity and declarations 
of the Rabochee Delo faction. From these activities the conclusion has been drawn 
that, for all their awkwardness in matters of theory, they represented something of an 
intermediate position between the revolutionary Marxism of Osvobozhdenie Truda 
and the outright challenge to Marxism represented by Kuskova. Taking into account 
this type of evidence alone, the view that the journal was clearly ‗anti-revisionist‘ in 
its ideological content can seem attractive. However this would be to ignore the fact 
that in Plekhanov‘s Vademecum for the Editors of Rabochee Delo, a work in which 
the author presents documentary evidence of clearly anti-Marxist views in the Russian 
social-democractic movement, the ‗Gospodin G‘ whose two letters make up the third 
item in the compilation is none other than ZM Kopel'zon, the administrative head of 
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the Union Abroad and probably Rabochee Delo's most significant practical 
organiser.283 Significantly, these letters were clearly written after the creation of the 
RSDLP and not 'many years previously' as Keep would have us believe.284 They 
therefore reveal a quite unusual picture, in which their author‘s views seem to be 
almost identical to those of Kuskova, an individual who in the Credo denied the 
possibility of building effective trade unions in Russia, let alone a workers‘ party,285 
and whose views were publicly repudiated in the fourth issue of the Union Abroad‘s 
official journal. Thus, in private the head of the Union Abroad also appears to reject 
the very idea of the RSDLP even though he is in public one of their most prominent 
members. This poses the question of what his views really are, a question which, 
given Kopel'zon‘s prominence, can also be reasonably asked of Rabochee Delo as a 
whole. A certain degree of support for some of the writings of Marx in the public 
programme of this tendency can be detected, but this in itself does not imply 
revolutionary politics, methods or aims. Adding to this ambiguity, there now appears 
to be the problem that the views expressed in the programme and the views Rabochee 
Delo supporters express in private appear to be two separate things. This leads to the 
conclusion that they are essentially a hypocritical and rather confused political 
grouping. This idea is particularly interesting from the point of view of our thesis 
because, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Kopel'zon whose letters appear in the 
Vademecum is the very same Kopel'zon who comes to negotiate with Lenin in 
February 1900, armed with plans for the reconstruction of the RSDLP and its 
newspaper Rabochaia Gazeta. In the light of Plekhanov‘s evidence, it seems that 
Lenin was on this occasion negotiating somewhat unwittingly with quite a complex, 
politically unstable character, and that Lenin‘s ignorance of this instability had 
significant consequences in terms of his relations with Plekhanov. Accordingly we 
must take a look at the Vademecum in order to fully understand the context of what is 
to follow. 
                                                        
283  This interpretation is supported by DB Riazanov, a contemporary member of the Union Abroad 
[GV Plekhanov Sochineniia, xii iv]. 
284  Ibid., xii 499-500; JLH Keep, The Rise of Social-Democracy in Russia, 58  
285
  R Taylor & N Harding, Key Documents, 252: 'Talk of an independent workers' party is nothing but 
the result of transplanting alien aims and alien achievements onto our soil.' Ibid., 253: 'For the Russian 
Marxist there is only one way out: participation in, i.e. assistance for, the economic struggle of the 
proletariat and participation in liberal opposition activity.' 
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  The form of Plekhanov‘s exposure is quite cryptic, in that it includes two 
letters by Kopel'zon, one of which describes the opinions of a comrade referred to as 
N.N.286 Given this N.N‘s. familiarity with Belgium and Russia, it is almost certain that 
his real name was SN Prokopovich, an individual very close to Kuskova.287 The M.M. 
who also features in the letters is therefore almost certainly Kuskova herself. This can 
be said because Prokopovich, a prominent though youthful figure on the anti-Marxist 
wing of the Russian social-democracy, was completing his studies in Brussels at 
around this time.288 In other words, behind these befogging initials, which were 
presumably used to fool the police, Plekhanov is here presenting the private opinions 
of the Union Abroad‘s leader on two outspoken critics of Marxism, one of whom was 
publicly condemned by Rabochee Delo in the autumn of 1899. The result does not 
present Kopel'zon, or the Rabochee Delo faction as a whole in an entirely positive 
light. In the first letter, Kopel'zon simply describes the opinions of N.N., ‗a man 
distinguished by his original thinking and ability to critically relate to all 
revolutionary traditions and opinions‘.289 The latter‘s views are solidly anti-
revolutionary. Marxism, for him, is unscientific in so far as it believes revolution is 
imminent: what the future will bring is not something that can be studied 
scientifically.290 The present day movement on the other hand can and should be 
studied so that the social-democracy can work out ‗realistic‘ goals for the working 
class. In the Russian context, this means a complete break with agitation for 
democracy and socialism. In their place, specific political demands must be made that 
aim to win piecemeal reform from the autocracy. Publicly advocating a new form of 
society or a new political system must stop.291 The idea of forming a revolutionary 
workers‘ party aiming at the overthrow of the autocracy is ‗senseless‘, as it is destined 
                                                        
286  GV Plekhanov Sochineniia, xii 494-99 
287   GV Plekhanov & PB Axelrod, Perepiska, i 175n From this it seems clear that these allies 
eventually married. In fact they may have already been married prior to the events in question. 
288  Ibid., i 175n, ii 1-43; GV Plekhanov Sochineniia, xii 495-6; VI Lenin Collected Works, iv 183-92 
289   «Он - человек выдающийся по своему оригинальному мышлению и умению критически 
относиться ко всяким революционным традициям и взглядам. » [GV Plekhanov Sochineniia, xii 
495] 
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to fail.292 Any discussion of the ideas of Marxism and socialism must be confined to 
propaganda circles attended only by intellectuals, and should not be discussed with 
workers.293 Demonstrations under autocratic conditions are impossible, and calling for 
them is premature.294 It is more logical to campaign on the immediate economic 
demands of the workers, even where these contradict democratic and socialist aims.295 
The letter then cites the example of a strike by male workers against the employment 
of women at a certain factory.296 It argues that such anti-progressive attitudes are 
common among workers and that the theoretical leadership is insufficiently aware of 
this problem.  
 
In the second letter, ‗Gospodin G‘ notes that attempts have been made, 
contrary to N.N.‘s advice, to create a revolutionary workers‘ party in Russia. His 
attitude towards it is rather scathing: 
 
 Что касается образования в России новой социал-демократической партии, то я могу 
сказать только, что она составилась из социалистов революционеров и рабочих революционеров 
носит яркий политический характер и более всего подходит к программе Аксельрода и 
Кольцова. Они ходят взять самодержавие на «ура». Во всяком случае как и Российская, так и 
новая Русская мало сил имеют и имели бы мало, даже если бы они соединились. Тем более, что 
в Питере и других местах остались группы, не желающие иметь с нашей дело в смысле 
организационном , считая nonsense'ом политиканство, не соответствующее действительному 
положению дел в России. Впрочем оговорюсь, все это - слухи, мало проверенные. Для меня 
ясно только одно, что создать в настоящее время партию и программу очень не трудно. Есть ли 
это шаг вперед - вопрос. Впрочем, посмотрим ...297 
                                                        
292   Ibid., xii 497 
293   Ibid., xii 497-8 
294   Ibid., xii 498 
295   Ibid., xii 498-9 
296   Ibid., xii 499 
297   Ibid., xii 499-500: 'As regards the formation in Russia of a new social democratic party, I can say 
only that it is made up of socialist revolutionaries and worker revolutionaries and that it carries a clear 
political character and that it mostly conforms to the programme of Axelrod and Kol'tsov. It wants to 
take on the autocracy ‗at the hurrah‘. At best, both in Great Russia and in the new frontier territories 
they have few forces and would have few even if they united.  Moreover, in Petersburg and other 
places there are still groups not wishing to have dealings with us in the organisational sense, regarding 
as nonsensical intrigue whatever does not correspond to the real situation in Russia. However, I note 
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 Kopel'zon then continues to recommend the views of Prokopovich: 
 
 Новый апостол остается мне мил по-прежнему. Его увлечения не так страшны, как это 
Вам издали кажется, и, по-моему, даже очень полезны для отрезвления «политиков» разного 
рода. Я убежден, что он в будущем принесет нам много пользы. У кого спрашивается, нет 
увлечений или теоретических крайностей?! Это все-таки не мешает работать вместе и ценить 
человека, как деятеля и человека искреннего.  
 
 Мы с ним немного расходимся в вопросах о необходимости выставления в программах 
организационного начала, в смысле организации всякого рода обществ.  
 
  Не отрицая этого в принципе, мы считаем, что он недостаточно знает условия жизни 
русского пролетариата. 
 
     Это есть такая же крайность, как выдвигание на первый план политической агитации и 
борьбы. Как то, так и другое есть плод теоретизирования, с одной стороны, а незнание условий 
жизни русского пролетариата - с другой. Во всем остальном у нас полное согласие, и это 
разногласие не помешает нам вместе работать...298 
 
 Unless these letters are complete fabrications, or someone can demonstrate 
that our belief that ‗Gospodin G‘ is Kopel'zon is mistaken, or can show that the ‗new 
apostle‘ of the second letter is not the same person as the N.N. of the first, it appears 
that Plekhanov has here quite effectively, and in defiance of one or two learned 
opinions on this matter, made the link between Rabochee Delo and the openly anti-
                                                                                                                                                               
that all this is rumour, little of it proven. For me it is clear only that to create at the current time a party 
and programme is not very difficult. Whether it is a step forward is a question. However, we will see.'  
298  Ibid., xii 500: 'The new apostle remains as good to me as before. His predilection is no so terrible as 
it seemed to you, and in my view is even very useful for sobering up the ‗politicals‘ of various sorts. I 
am convinced that in the future he will be useful to us. Who, ask yourself, doesn‘t have predilections or 
theoretical extremes? It doesn‘t prevent working together and valuing someone as an active and sincere 
person. We differ with him a little on the question of the necessity of introducing into programmes an 
organisational principle, in the sense of the organisation of all types of societies. Not denying this in 
principle, we consider that he doesn‘t know the conditions in which the Russian proletariat live 
sufficiently well. It is that very extremism that drove the first plan of political agitation and struggle. 
This, just like the other is the fruit of theory, on the one hand, and ignorance of the conditions of life of 
the Russian proletariat on the other. In all the rest we have complete agreement, and this difference 
does not stop us working together.'  
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Marxist tendency of Kuskova and Prokopovich.299 In private, Kopel'zon speaks openly 
about the ‗usefulness‘ of a revisionist as a counterweight against the revolutionary 
Marxists, whilst expressing the closest sympathy with the former group. Yet, when 
openly challenged about the existence of revisionism in the Russian social democracy, 
the revisionists themselves appear to have been dealt a fairly brutal kick from 
Rabochee Delo in the form of public dissociation from their views. Thus there appears 
to be a highly contradictory set of political characteristics among the group aligned to 
Rabochee Delo.  
 
 In the light of the information so far presented, it can be reasonably assumed 
that the following political situation actually obtained within the Union of Russian 
Social Democrats. The majority, supporters of Rabochee Delo, wanted to build an 
organisation tolerant of ideological strains ranging from the anti-Marxist to the 
revolutionary Marxist. They adopted an intermediate position, but essentially as a part 
of a manoeuvre. They believed that this position would give them power within the 
organisation, enabling them to defeat the more revolutionary elements by forming a 
secret bloc with the revisionists: thus the influence of the Plekhanovites could be 
blunted. However, this plan would only work if Rabochee Delo avoided offending a 
section of Plekhanov's supporters. Excessive public sympathies for the revisionists 
could alienate not only Plekhanov, who was clearly viewed as disposable, but also 
extremely ‗useful‘ people such as the group in Russia formed around Lenin. The latter 
were valued because of their superior energy and experience in the underground, and 
Rabochee Delo seemed to hope that this feature would ultimately cause them to break 
with the exclusively émigré Plekhanov group. Only thus is it possible to understand 
the bizarre spectacle of an individual proclaiming his ideological solidarity with 
someone who scorns the very idea of the RSDLP whilst remaining at the head of its 
émigré organisation. Consequently, when the Plekhanovites finally split from the 
Union Abroad, the latter inevitably became an organisation voicing exclusively non-
Marxist views. It was useless to put forward a compromise position when there was as 
only one and not two willing partners with whom they could collaborate.300 The first 
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significant result of this was a new attempt on the part of Rabochee Delo to state its 
political position. This took the form of a fairly classic statement of the ‗theory of 
stages‘, by this time acknowledged by both the Plekhanovites and certain supporters 
of Rabochee Delo as the hallmark of 'Economism', a definite non-Marxist trend which 
had for some time existed in the Russian social-democratic movement. An exposition 
of this theory appeared in the seventh issue of Rabochee Delo, and appeared to 
become the basis for the politics of the journal during the rest of its existence, with the 
exception of one brief but dramatic departure which we will have cause to discuss in 
the next chapter. As such, it is important to examine this article, in order to properly 
appreciate Lenin's attitude to Rabochee Delo, as later expressed in the policy of Iskra.   
 
 
iv) Economism 
 
 Because of its tendency towards manoeuvres and organisational politicking, it 
was well over a year after the publication of its initial programme that Rabochee Delo 
attempted to develop the implications of this rather ambiguous founding document. 
The broad ranging debate, involving the German theorists the journal had promised 
was not realised. The editors of the journal had commented on events and published 
polemics from different perspectives but had, beyond hints and nuances, refrained 
from publicly stating their own views.301 In August 1900 this changed with the 
appearance of the chief editor BI Krichevskii‘s own article on the relation between 
economics and politics in the social democratic movement.302 In it, he unequivocally 
declared that all social democrats supported the struggle for ‗political rights‘ on the 
part of the proletariat, but that there were differences on the best way to achieve 
them.303 For Krichevskii, the best way was economic struggle. Citing the first section 
of the Communist Manifesto, he claimed that the great majority of workers first 
become rebellious in the defence of their own immediate economic interests.304 
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Consequently, the first bonds of solidarity are always felt between workers at the 
same enterprise, and only after such bonds have first of all been established can trade 
or industrial unions be created.305 However, in autocratic Russia even the most limited 
strikes were against the law, and as a result workers found themselves opposing not 
only employers, but also the police. This inevitably caused them to associate political 
freedom, the freedom to organise, the freedom to make criticisms and to press 
demands on the employers and the government, with an effective defence of their own 
most basic interests.306 From this Krichevskii concluded that struggles for economic 
improvements in themselves radicalised workers, and that the main role of the social 
democrats was to assist this process by means of agitation. The result was a treatise on 
tactics. Krichevskii states that skilled agitators must correctly judge the moral level of 
the workers he is to address and adapt their slogans to the audience. The workers‘ 
consciousness passes through different definite ‗stages‘, akin to grades in a school and 
based almost exclusively on their past experience of strike struggles and clashes with 
the police.307 For this reason, different slogans are appropriate in different localities 
and even for workers in different enterprises. In an area where there is no tradition of 
labour organising, an agitator must focus on simple, unambitious slogans and 
demands, whereas in a more ‗battle hardened‘ area, a more militant stance should be 
adopted.308 In the former, relatively little need be said about politics and rights, in the 
latter this would be more appropriate, as workers would already have realised the 
importance of political freedom. 
 
                                                        
305   Ibid., No 7 3 
306   Ibid., No 7 10-13    
307  «Отсюда вытекает известная постепенность в агитационной деятельности наших 
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 Undoubtedly, Krichevskii's thesis was not in the least bit original. It was in all 
its main points a rehearsal of views stated a previous pamphlet, On Agitation, which 
was written by the Vilno activist AI Kremer, and published with the assistance of the 
future Iskra editor Martov.309 The original pamphlet was probably written in 1893, and 
apparently made its appearance in St Petersburg in hand written form during the 
following year. It had argued: 
 
 The task of the Social Democrats is to conduct agitation among the factory workers on the 
basis of existing petty needs and demands. The struggle aroused by such agitation will train the 
workers to defend their own interests, increase their courage, give them confidence in their strength, a 
consciousness of their need for unity, and ultimately it will place before them the more important 
questions which demand solutions. Having prepared the way for more serious struggle, the working 
class proceeds to the resolution of these vital questions, and agitation on the basis of these questions 
must have as its aim the formation of class consciousness. The class struggle in this more conscious 
form establishes the basis for political agitation, the aim of which will be to alter existing conditions of 
the working class. The subsequent programme of the Social Democrats is self-evident. 310 
 
 This is nothing but a more concise expression of the argument in Krichevskii‘s 
pamphlet. Significantly, both Akimov, a Rabochee Delo supporter, and Plekhanov 
associate this pamphlet with the ‗economic tendency‘ in Russian social democracy 
that was mentioned earlier. Akimov describes the effect On Agitation had on the 
social-democratic movement in the following way: 
 
 The necessary note had been struck. The period of ‗economic‘ agitation was launched in 
Petersburg. And the agitators who had raised no echo when they indicated the existing political and 
social order found not only the workers with whom they were in direct contact, but also the wide strata 
of the working class to which they had no direct access responded uniformly and boldly to their call to 
‗economic‘ warfare. 311 
 
 In the same way, Plekhanov writes, in Once Again, Socialism and Political 
Struggle: 
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 Как известно, экономическое направление с наибольшей яркостью выразилось у нас в 
«Рабочей Мысли», не раз высказывавшей совершенно «несуразные» суждение по 
политическим вопросам. Но я не стану говорить о «Рабочей Мысли» именно потому, что 
суждения еѐ публицистов часто бывают совершенно  «несуразны». Мне хочется заглянуть «в 
корень вещей» и решить, не были ли эти публицисты введены во искушение некоторыми 
взглядами, ещѐ недавно очень распространенными у нас и высказанными впервые серьезными и 
основательными людьми. С этой целью я остановлюсь на известной брошюре «Об агитации». 
312 
 
 Putting this evidence together, the unavoidable conclusion is that, for these 
writers at least, 'the economic tendency' did not imply a refusal to engage in politics, 
and has nothing to do with a de-politicised ‗trade unionism pure and simple‘, as has 
sometimes been suggested.313 There is no reason to believe that the latter idea acquired 
significant support within Russian social democracy at this time. On the contrary, it is 
a belief that political struggle emerges naturally from economic struggle, and that this 
natural process should not be unduly hurried by the social democrats. This conclusion 
has a few interesting consequences if we can assume that ‗the economic tendency‘, to 
which Plekhanov and Akimov refer is more or less the same thing as what is later 
referred to as 'Economism'. If this is the case, then Krichevskii‘s article of August 
1900 is also an unalloyed statement of 'Economist' views. This might seem like a 
pedantic point, or possibly something worse, given that we are appear to be attaching 
a label with undoubtedly negative connotations on a definite political group. 
However, in order to make sense of what follows, we believe this is necessary. More 
than one seemingly authoritative writer has denied the existence of a definite non-
Marxist trend with clear political positions and an organisational structure inside 
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Russian social democracy during the time when Iskra was brought into existence.314 
Krichevskii's article suggests the direct opposite. The significance of this is that we 
can argue that, in so far as Lenin and his allies occasionally wrote articles against the 
'Economists', he was fighting a definite opponent, and not a figment of his own 
imagination.  
 
 Unfortunately a detailed investigation of mass agitation tactics goes beyond 
the scope of our thesis, which is rather more concerned with the relations obtaining 
among different factions inside the RSDLP and the process of party reconstruction. 
However, it is hard to refrain, in finishing this chapter, from the observation that 
Krichevskii's ‗stagist‘ or 'Economist' position has very little to do with Marx and 
Engels's own political method. Despite Krichevskii‘s use of the Communist Manifesto 
in his article, his thesis was clearly not derived from a detailed study of this 
document. Marx and Engels do indeed point out that the development of capitalism 
forces workers to fight back using ever greater co-ordination, which ultimately leads 
to class consciousness and political struggle.315 However this cannot be translated into 
a thesis on party tactics which states that the attitude of the party‘s own activists 
should somehow mirror this gradual process. In fact, the tactical section of the 
Communist Manifesto is not in the first part,316 which Krichevskii cites, but the 
fourth.317 It deals all too briefly with the relations of the Communist League to definite 
parties and movements, all of which disappeared soon after the work was published. 
Nothing is said in this section that even approximates to ‗stagism‘, or to a preliminary 
phase of ‗purely economic‘ agitation: in fact nothing specific is said about agitation at 
all. Unsurprisingly, given that it was written at the height of a revolutionary upsurge, 
Marx and Engels seem to have assumed worker involvement in organised party 
political struggle. In re-publications of the Manifesto Marx and Engels noted that such 
advice was no longer relevant, as the parties in question no longer existed and the 
whole social and political situation had changed.318 A fuller account of their tactical 
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thinking during the 1848 revolutions is to be found in the Address to the Central 
Committee of the Communist League of 1850, which deals with the question of how 
the working class should relate to other anti-autocratic social forces, such as the 
democratic petty-bourgeoisie or the liberal capitalist class during a democratic 
revolution against an autocratic government.319 Marx advises that, having acquired 
arms, workers should under no circumstances give them up and states that they should 
form their own independent military force. This force could form temporary alliances 
with the more radicalised layers of the population against the more conservative.320 
Thus it would support the bourgeoisie to the extent that it gave battle to the 
aristocracy and the monarchy; the petty bourgeoisie where it engaged in struggle with 
the big bourgeoisie and so on, whilst opposing them in so far as they failed to fight the 
enemies of democracy, or tried to deny democratic rights to workers.321 In more 
peaceful circumstances a workers‘ party should contest elections, and even if a mass 
democratic party were to appear, small groups of Communist workers should find a 
way of broadcasting their views and should avoid being submerged in such a generic 
democratic movement.322 Thus, once again, we see no reference to ‗stagism‘ which 
seems totally inappropriate in a revolutionary situation. Defenders of Krichevskii 
could justifiably reply that Russia was not in such circumstances, but this would only 
point to his lack of wisdom in citing the Communist Manifesto in an attempt to back 
up his argument. This choice of text would have been totally inappropriate to the 
Russian situation at the turn of the twentieth century. As was shown in the previous 
chapter, in so far as Marx and Engels had a view on the methods to be used in Tsarist 
Russia, they expressed conditional sympathy not so much with ‗stagism‘ as with 
Narodnaia Volia. 
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v) Some Conclusions 
 
  This chapter has shown how two separate political tendencies came to exist in 
the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad in the period immediately preceding 
Lenin‘s arrival in western Europe. The first of these tendencies was led by the 
Osvobozhdenie Truda group and represented a revolutionary interpretation of 
Marxism, based on a familiarity of Marx and Engels‘s social and political theories as 
a whole. The second, represented by Rabochee Delo involved only a superficial 
engagement with Marxism, reflected a large degree of ignorance when it came to the 
actual views of Engels and Marx, and appeared at times to be rather dishonest. In its 
initial form, the Rabochee Delo trend appears to have identified exclusively with a 
part of Marx‘s economic theory, but later, in attempt to give this theory some more 
concrete political content, it advocated a reformist, gradualist tactical doctrine which, 
despite their attempt to link it to certain passages in the Marx-Engels oeuvre, had no 
real roots in it. In between these two points, Rabochee Delo completed with 
Osvobozhdenie Truda for an alliance with Lenin and failed, largely because of its 
crude political methods. The price of its failure was a severance of relations with its 
secret ally, the revisionist ED Kuskova. Prior to this event they had hoped to play the 
revisionist off against Osvobozhdenie Truda with the aim of maintaining a powerful 
ideological centre ground, a goal which probably determined their initial attempt at 
expressing a theoretical world view more than any commitment to political principles. 
With the failure of this cunning stratagem, Rabochee Delo were forced to take a more 
solid political position, the result of which was a clearly reformist political outlook 
which had everything in common with the views of the Economist movement of the 
mid 1890s. 
 
 The relevance of all this to Iskra is that it is simply impossible to make sense 
of what follows in this thesis without bearing these considerations in mind. During the 
period dating from April 1900 through to March 1902, the presence and character of 
Rabochee Delo became a consistent feature influencing Iskra‘s thinking. During this 
whole period, Lenin‘s group made efforts to reverse the split between reformist and 
revolutionary in the emigration, seemingly with the effect that he was trying to create 
a social-democratic movement, specifically an RSDLP, which had both reformist and 
revolutionary elements in it. In this sense, our proof that Rabochee Delo really was 
  
 
 
87 
 
something quite different from Plekhanovite Marxism is significant. Specifically, it 
gives an indication of the degree of tolerance Lenin was prepared to demonstrate 
towards his ideological opponents within the social-democratic movement. This is not 
to suggest that there was not a certain agenda behind this desire for a broad workers‘ 
party, nor to imply that through this apparent policy of tolerance, Lenin abandoned 
the ambition to lead it at any point. However it is necessary to point out the difference 
between this interpretation and that of those who wish to portray Lenin as an 
inveterate splitter, who wanted to drive ‗heretics‘ out of the RSDLP. The events and 
debates studied in this chapter provide little support for this view, instead suggesting 
that Lenin advocated the reconstruction of a broad RSDLP in which the Plekhanovites 
would be but one tendency. The chapter does not lend support to the idea that 
Economism was finished as a trend by 1900, nor to the idea that 'Economism' was a 
nothing more than a polemical label used by Lenin to discredit his opponents. The 
presence of a separate programme from that of Osvobozhedenie Truda should be 
sufficient proof that the conflict had a genuine ideological basis, whilst Krichevskii's 
article of August 1900 is mere one of several proofs that a fully fledged anti-
Plekhanovite faction continued to operate in the Russian social-democracy, with a 
basis in the Union Abroad and its journal Rabochee Delo.  
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Chapter Three: Autumn 1899-Autumn 1901: Organisational Tactics 
 
The previous chapter showed how Lenin was faced with contradictory 
pressures during the period we are studying, owing to his rival commitments to the 
Osvobozhdenie Truda group and the RSDLP. As such, the study has so far 
concentrated on the character and situation of the former, and in doing so has had 
more than a little to say about Rabochee Delo. Now it is time to address the second 
aspect of Lenin‘s dilemma, showing how he was determined to play a leading role in 
the RSDLP despite the fact that it appeared to be dominated by adherents of the anti-
Marxist trend, and the fact that some of its leading individuals were not particularly 
honest. The next stage of the argument is to show how, out of the basic contradiction 
between Rabochee Delo and Osvobozhdenie Truda discussed in the previous chapter, 
there emerged a new, secondary opposition between Lenin and Plekhanov on the 
question of how to deal with the Economists and how to relate to the RSDLP 
generally. That is to say, out of a basic ideological conflict between a revolutionary 
and a reformist trends in the social-democratic movement, a conflict on the question 
of correct tactics emerged within the revolutionary camp. The origins of this new 
conflict appear to lie in Plekhanov's crude methods of opposing Rabochee Delo. His 
campaign appears to have started with very aggressive demands for factional rights 
within the Union Abroad, demands implicitly based on the belief that the organisation 
could not survive without his literary input.323 When these demands were not met and 
his bluff was called, Plekhanov published his exposure of Rabochee Delo, the 
Vademecum, which appeared to include letters from individuals not meant for 
publication, a method many would consider problematic, and potentially counter-
productive. Plekhanov's performance concluded with a walkout at a Second Congress 
of the Union Abroad dominated by the Rabochee Delo trend, an action which posed 
the question of whether Osvobozhdenie Truda could still reasonably be considered a 
part of the RSDLP and which was accompanied by an unsuccessful assertion of 
proprietor's rights to the Union's printing press.324  
 
 In marked contrast to such measures, Lenin pursued a much more subtle line, 
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based far more on attempts to co-operate with Rabochee Delo than on attempts to 
seek a decisive confrontation. One of the most important reasons for this appears to 
have been the unfavourable balance of forces obtaining between the revolutionary 
Marxists and the Economists. Specifically, it seems that Lenin considered the split 
actually prosecuted by Plekhanov to have been unwise, owing to the fact that the 
revolutionary Marxists in the emigration lacked the type of factional apparatus with 
which they could take their argument into Russia. Indeed, one result of this appeared 
to be that even Krupskaya and Lenin were taken in by the Economists' representation 
of the split with Osvobozhdenie Truda: activists such as these were simply not hearing 
the other side of the argument. For this reason, Lenin seemed willing to compromise 
with his opponent and to work with Rabochee Delo on the construction of a common 
RSDLP apparatus which could carry both Economist and revolutionary Marxist ideas 
into Russia. This politically sophisticated decision provoked an angry response from 
Plekhanov who saw in it signs of betrayal on the part of Lenin. In this chapter, we will 
show that first appearances gave every justification to this type of response on the part 
of Plekhanov, in so far as Lenin's concept of cooperation involved working very 
closely with the rather scheming, rather two-faced Kopel'zon. However, by studying 
the sum total of Lenin's actions up to the end of 1901, we also hope to make it clear 
that such appearances were in fact deceptive and that not for a single minute had 
Lenin abandoned the goal of overturning the influence of Rabochee Delo and 
Economism in the RSDLP, and of giving pride of place to the revolutionary Marxist 
trend, including the Osvobozhdenie Truda group. 
 
 As with the previous chapter, we will also see how chance events affected 
Lenin's tactical thinking, thus continuing to pursue our argument that, for all his 
determination, Lenin could not have been operating in accordance with a 
preconceived plan. If incidents such as the attempt by Rabochee Delo to split the 
ranks of the revolutionaries and Osvobozhdenie Truda's break with the Union Abroad 
took place entirely without Lenin's participation, the same can be said in this chapter 
of the attempt to recruit Lenin to the editorial board of Rabochaia Gazeta, the 
Economists' plans for a Second Congress in April 1900 and the ultimate collapse of 
these plans owing to police intervention. In relation to all these little-discussed 
incidents, it seems that Lenin had to develop policies in response to changing 
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circumstances. Not only that, he sometimes had to reverse previous policies owing to 
the sheer unpredictability of the situation. Indeed, we are led to the unavoidable 
conclusion that the central project of the entire period we are discussing, the Iskra 
newspaper itself, was the product of precisely such a rapid reversal of policy. This 
unorthodox conclusion seems indisputable on the basis of the facts, and as such it may 
lead to a questioning of whether Lenin's activity during the period we are discussing 
was actually motivated by any particular guiding principle, and whether it was not 
simply a case of extended political improvisation devoid of any real goal. However, 
such an idea cannot be taken seriously. In the previous chapter we saw how Lenin 
demonstrated his loyalty to Osvobozhdenie Truda and fought on their behalf in 
response to an attempt to separate him from the group. This chapter will provide 
further evidence that, despite differences on tactical questions and a certain degree of 
tactically-inspired organisational separation, Lenin always acted in a way designed to 
promote the influence of Osvobozhdenie Truda views within the RSDLP and to 
undermine the strength of the Economists. As such he comes across as tactically 
flexible in the pursuit of a stable strategic goal: an RSDLP in which Osvobozhdenie 
Truda views would be dominant. 
 
i) Rabochaia Gazeta 
 
 Evidence that Rabochee Delo directly approached Lenin, Iu O Martov and AN 
Potresov during the early months of 1900 is to be found in the papers of Martov, 
specifically in a draft of his autobiography Zapiski Sotsial-Demokrata.325 According to 
Martov, these three individuals returned from exile at this point with the impression 
that Economism had become the dominant trend in the Russian social democratic 
movement.326 They also took the view that it was precisely this dominance which 
explained the failure to establish new leading institutions for the RSDLP, despite a 
gap of almost two years since arrests had destroyed the old ones.327 Martov believed 
that the Economist tendency adopted a 'stagist' attitude towards party organisation, 
similar to their attitude towards agitation, which led them to oppose, at least for the 
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time being, the creation of an RSDLP with strong leadership and an all-Russian 
newspaper, in favour of a federal association of regional and national social-
democratic organisations.328 In other words, it was not the police, but the Economists 
who were preventing the re-establishment of the RSDLP central committee and 
Rabochaia Gazeta. This appears to be an accurate portrayal of the situation if we 
consider the organisation resolutions of the stillborn 'Second Congress' planned at 
Smolensk, which was to have taken place in April 1900, an event to which these 
negotiations were clearly related.329 These resolutions would have guaranteed 
maximum power to pre-existing regional organisations such as the Bund and the 
regional newspaper Iuzhnii Rabochii, which went on to form the ill-fated Union of 
Southern Associations and Committees. Such structures would hold the party's funds, 
presses, make all the important decisions and only they would be represented at future 
party congresses.330 The city organisations present at the First Congress would no 
longer have mandates.331 This intended federal structure did not exclude the possibility 
of a re-launched Rabochaia Gazeta, but it did mean that the latter would be 
essentially a private enterprise, providing a service to the federation and being neither 
controlled nor particularly supported by it. The paper would not receive money from 
the regions, would not have its own printing press or distribution network and its 
editorial board would have no real authority over them.332 In these inauspicious 
conditions, the editorial board could use the paper to persuade, but it was in no 
position to express a party line and had no real power. 
 
                                                        
328  «Дело в том, что после провалов 1898 года партийный центр исчез, и его невозобновление 
мы объяснили себе не столько конспиративно-техническими трудностями, сколько торжеством 
настроений «экономизма», который к процессу организационного объединения прилагал тот же 
метод «органической эволюции», как и к процессу перехода самой борьбы рабочих масс от 
более элементарных лозунгов в более сложным (т.н. « теория стадий »). С точки зрения 
экономистов, данному уровню движения соответствовала слабая федеративная связь между 
местными организациями, и на попытки спешить с созданием центрального аппарата 
руководства движением они склонны уже тогда были смотреть, как на «народовольчество» и 
«якобинизм», ведущие к отрыву от масс.» [Leninskii Sbornik, iv 51] 
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  In all probability, these were the terms offered by the representatives of the 
Union Abroad when they met with Lenin and Potresov early in 1900 to offer them 
posts as the editors of a relaunched Rabochaia Gazeta. Martov recounts the incident 
in the following way:   
 
 Оказалось, что два представителя этого союза – П Теплов и Ц Копельзон («Тимофей», 
«Гришин», мой старый товарищ по Вильне), предприняли в это время поездку по России, чтобы 
склонить местные комитеты к организации второго партийного съезда. При этом выяснилось, 
что «эмиссары» союза, знакомые с нашими планами, учитывают их и проектируют на 
предстоящем съезде предложит возобновление, в качестве официального органа партии, 
«Рабочей Газеты» с предоставлением нашей тройке еѐ редакции. Об этом впервые заговорил в 
беседе с Ульяновым в Москве Х Лалаянц, лидер Екатеринославского комитета и редактор  
«Южного Рабочего», приехавший позондировать отношение северян к заграничному проекту 
съезда. Затем ещѐ до моего приезда в Псков, туда заехал сам Тимофей и в беседе с Лениным и 
Потресовым затронул ту же тему.333  
 
 The 'plans' to which Martov refers were the re-establishment of the RSDLP 
central committee and Rabochaia Gazeta, a plan that was apparently first formulated 
by the seventeen exiles when they signed Lenin's Protest against Kuskova.334 They did 
not, therefore, involve Iskra, any Iskra-like newspaper or any of its later 
organisational appendages: 
 
 Восстановить центральный комитет партии и еѐ центральный орган «Рабочую Газету» - 
так, поэтому, формулировали мы наши требования к партии в 1899 г. 335 
                                                        
333  Leninskii Sbornik, iv 51-2: ‗It turned out that two representatives of this Union - P Teplov and Ts. 
Kopel'zon  (‗Timofei‘, ‗Grishin‘), my old comrade from Vilno, were undertaking a trip around Russia 
at this time with the purpose of inclining local committees towards the organisation of a second party 
congress. Through this, it became clear that the ‗emissaries‘ of the union, familiar with our plans, were 
studying them and planning to propose the re-establishment of Rabochaia Gazeta in the capacity of an 
official organ of the party, at the forthcoming congress, granting its editorial functions to our 
threesome. Kh. Lalaiants, the leader of the Ekaterinoslav committee and editor of Iuzhnii Rabochii first 
began to speak about this with Lenin in Moscow, having arrived to sound out relations between the 
north towards the foreign Union‘s congress project. Then, still before my arrival in Pskov, Timofei 
arrived there and in a conversation with Lenin and Potresov touched on this theme.‘     
334  Ibid., iv 51 
335  Ibid., iv 51: ‗The restoration of the central committee of the party and of her central newspaper 
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 There is nothing to suggest that these 'demands' had changed by February of 
the following year. As such, it is clear that, before they became the younger half of 
the Iskra-Zaria editorial board, and before they had even considered the notion of 
Iskra, Lenin, Potresov and Martov were first of all considered for editorial posts in an 
entirely separate journalistic enterprise. This is not a popular view, either among 
Soviet or western scholars, but Martov's evidence is unambiguous. Not only this, we 
are also given the very powerful impression from what Martov writes that the very 
idea of the troika Lenin-Martov-Potresov actually originated from either Iuzhnii 
Rabochii or Rabochee Delo: in other words, it was not the demand of the 
revolutionary Marxists. Rabochee Delo seems the more likely candidate as a source 
for the idea, bearing in mind the motivation we discussed in the previous chapter, 
namely the desire to drive a wedge between the older and younger Plekhanovites. In 
the light of this surprising discovery, the question may also be posed of whether the 
troika was actually drawn together, in the first instance, as a result of their ideological 
compatibility, and whether it was not as a result of some other factor. The latter 
scenario is of course possible, but the fact that all three were revolutionary supporters 
of Osvobozhdenie Truda does not appear to have been coincidental. Lenin's letter to 
Rabochaia Gazeta from the previous autumn contains a clear objection to working 
with adherents of Rabochaia Mysl'.336 In this context, Rabochee Delo's proposal of an 
'all-revolutionary' editorial board would appear to be a concession to his demands. 
Whatever the reality, the whole incident illustrate how factors beyond the control of 
either Plekhanov or Lenin brought the original core of the Iskra group together, a 
view entirely incompatible with the view that the Iskra project was the product of a 
detailed plan hatched by Lenin whilst in Shushenskoe.337 On the contrary, it is easy to 
see how the incident could simply be perceived as another Economist manoeuvre by 
Osvobozhdenie Truda, thus provoking its suspicions that the younger trio were 
betraying revolutionary Marxism for the sake of posts in the RSDLP.     
 
 In this connection, the response of the troika to their proposed nomination is 
                                                        
336  VI Lenin, Collected Works, iv 207-9 
337  L Haimson, The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism, 117; JLH Keep, The Rise of 
Social-Democracy in Russia, 67; R Service, Lenin, A Political Life, i 77, 80-1 
  
 
 
94 
 
also quite intriguing. Martov writes: 
   
 На первый взгляд предложение казалось маккиавелистским: нас как бы хотели оторвать 
от Группы «Освобождение Труда», солидарность свою с которой мы торжественно 
провозгласили, введя нас в «легальные» рамки партийно-уставных отношений, затруднить нам 
союз с этой Группой. Но ни Ленин, ни Потресов не были склонны сообщая мне о беседах с 
Копельзоном, объяснять действия «Союза» исключительно военной хитростью. Напротив, они 
видели в них признание силы той позиции, которую мы приобрели  в партии , и готовность идти 
нам навстречу. А так как и деятели «Союза» понимали, что партия немыслима без Группы 
«Освобождение Труда», то было очевидно, что не перессорить нас с ней они хотят, но скорее 
проложить нашими руками мост к примирению с ней. 338 
 
 Here, Martov seems to have hit the nail on the head. The behaviour of 
Rabochee Delo could undoubtedly be described with the terms 'Machiavellian' and 
'military cunning': both their behaviour in relation to Lenin‘s Tasks of the Social-
Democrats and the letter in the Vademecum suggest that his suspicions are justified. 
Yet it seems that Lenin cannot see it in this way. Despite Rabochee Delo's 
troublemaking manipulation of his words the previous spring, and the obvious attempt 
on this occasion to 'set him against' (peressorit) Axelrod, Lenin is here apparently 
convinced that Rabochee Delo was not trying to do the same thing again, only this 
time using more sophisticated tactics. At first glance, he seems convinced of 
Kopel'zon's good faith as a result of merely verbal assurances that the Rabochee Delo 
followers are not trying to drive Osvobozhdenie Truda out of the party. This is despite 
the fact that, as we saw in the previous chapter, it was at times hard to credit the 
sincerity of some of Rabochee Delo's statements, not least their remarks on Lenin's 
Protest. Whilst it is of course possible that these incidents represented the behaviour 
of just one rogue individual in the group and it is possible that the rest were honest, if 
                                                        
338  Leninskii Sbornik, iv 52: 'At first glance, the plan seemed to be a Machiavellian chess move: it was 
as if they wanted to separate us from Osvobozhdenie Truda, solidarity with whom we proudly declared 
and, leading us into a ‗legal‘ framework of party-constitutional relations, to hamper our union with this 
group. But neither Lenin nor Potresov were inclined, talking to me about the conversations with 
Kopel'zon, to explain the action of the Union exclusively as the result of military cunning. On the 
contrary, they saw in it an admission of the strength of that position we had acquired in the party and a 
willingness to come to terms with us. And seeing how the Union activists understood that the party was 
unthinkable without Osvobozhdenie Truda, it was obvious that they didn't want to set us against them, 
but instead wanted to build a bridge of reconciliation with them using our hands.' 
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this was the case, then there is fair chance that this 'rogue' was Kopel'zon himself, as 
is evidenced by Plekhanov's exposure of him in the Vademecum.  
 
It is possible that Lenin is being a little more subtle than first appearances 
suggest, and that he is not entirely ignorant of these, or other similar incidents. We say 
this because Martov, in a rather measured way, observes that Lenin and Potresov did 
not think Rabochee Delo were motivated 'exclusively' by military cunning. This 
implies that they recognised Kopel'zon‘s dubious motives, but decided that these 
motives were not the only factor to consider. This brings us to the question of Lenin 
and Potresov‘s attitude to Kopel'zon's idea that the younger Plekhanovites should act 
as peacemakers between Rabochee Delo and Osvobozhdenie Truda. It is hard to 
decide whether Lenin considered this proposition to be sincere, but it does seem likely 
that regardless of the perceived sincerity of Kopel'zon, Lenin and Potresov subscribed 
to the general idea of such a peacemaking project. In other words they, like Kopel'zon 
wanted to put an end to the émigré dispute. This is an intriguing idea, because one 
obvious advantage Kopel'zon would gain from such a reconciliation would be that 
Plekhanov‘s criticism of his integrity would stop: his reputation would fare better if 
the dispute were brought to an end. Perhaps this is what Lenin means when he appears 
to say that Kopel'zon‘s approach was based on the strength of the Plekhanovites in the 
party. This is a strange remark in so far as all other circumstances point to the collapse 
of revolutionary Marxism in the RSDLP at this stage. Economism was dominant in St 
Petersburg through its irregular newspaper Rabochaia Mysl' and its trade unionist 
'Workers Organisation'.339 Its organisational preferences were clearly expressed in the 
documents of the Smolensk Congress attempt, which themselves appear to have been 
put together with the help of Iuzhnii Rabochii, a circumstance strongly suggesting 
Economist activity in the south.340 Economism was also dominant in the émigré 
organisation. Against this, revolutionary Marxism had no strong points and Kopel'zon 
appeared to have absolutely no cause to 'come to terms with' (idti nam navstrechu) its 
representatives. As such, it can seem that Lenin was either misinformed at this stage 
or was perhaps bluffing in order both to calm Martov's apprehensions, and to win the 
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maximum number of concessions from Kopel'zon. However, this interpretation might 
be undermined if it could be shown that Lenin understood that Kopel‘zon felt under 
significant pressure as a result of the Vademecum revelations. In the absence of 
further evidence concerning this incident it seems reasonable to assume that all these 
factors played some role.  
 
  Whatever the case, there was undoubtedly willingness on the part of Lenin 
and his colleagues to accept the editorial responsibilities proposed by the Union 
Abroad, even if this acceptance involved numerous conditions, which the Lenin trio 
presented to Kopel'zon. We suspect that this willingness was partially motivated by an 
awareness of the independent role Rabochaia Gazeta would play in the RSDLP, if the 
surviving documents of the Smolensk congress attempt can be seen as an indication of 
relations Kopel'zon proposed between the newspaper and the party.341 No party 
programme had yet been agreed and the draft party constitution was federalistic, all of 
which meant that the editors would have been able to do more or less as they pleased. 
This it would seem that Martov's fear of being 'tied hand and foot' by an overbearing 
central committee dominated by Economists was almost certainly unfounded.342 On 
the contrary, it would appear that Lenin correctly saw this in this absence of control a 
glorious opportunity to agitate for the revolutionary Marxist world view, using 
Rabochaia Gazeta as a mouthpiece whilst exploiting the propaganda value of its 
official status.343 In this sense, it seems that the function of the conditions was not to 
guarantee the formal independence of the editorial board, as this had already been 
assumed by all sides, so much as to satisfy certain political qualms the Lenin group 
had about making a deal with the Economists, whilst also securing every opportunity 
to broadcast their fundamental loyalty to Osvobozhdenie Truda, trying at the same 
time to secure maximum support for its views. Accordingly, the first condition was 
that the nominated editors would seek mandates from Osvobozhdenie Truda to act as 
their representatives at forthcoming congress, before which they would not take up 
their posts.344 In this way, any possible misunderstanding concerning the relations 
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between the editorial group and the Economists could be cleared up. In addition, 
during this time, the revolutionaries would prepare a 'declaration of faith' expressing 
Plekhanovite principles which would be used as a sort of election manifesto by the 
editors at the congress.345 This may have been designed as a preventative measure 
against attempts by elements in the RSDLP to force the editorial group away from 
revolutionary Marxism, but primarily it appears to have been another way of 
distancing themselves from the Economists whilst accepting what was on offer. 
Finally, prior to the congress, the editors would make a 'personal tour' of all the 
leading social-democratic groups likely to be present, in order to discuss the content 
of this declaration and to seek its approval. They stated that if time were not possible 
for such a tour, then the editors would oppose congress either adopting an official 
party newspaper or taking any other 'principled decisions' - a phrase which 
presumably refers to the party programme - and that instead, at their own risk they 
would create a private newspaper that would host a discussion on the main tasks of 
the party.346  
 
 The history of these negotiations leads to the clear conclusion that it was in an 
attempt to negotiate the conflict between the Economists and Osvobozhdenie Truda 
that the concept which later became Iskra first emerged. Prior to the negotiations with 
Kopel'zon, the demand of the group around Lenin appears to have been the re-
establishment of Rabochaia Gazeta in the capacity of an official party newspaper. 
Only in the course of these discussions does the idea of a newspaper without an 
official status in the party, and the assumption that the RSDLP could continue without 
                                                                                                                                                               
предполагавшийся не позже, чем через два месяца, и сейчас же списаться с Группой 
«Освобождение Труда», предложив ей прислать нам свой мандат на этот съезд.» 
345   Ibid., iv 54: «На съезд мы должны были представить обстоятельное «исповедание веры», в 
котором отчетливо были бы выражены революционные задачи партии как мы их понимаем, и 
коллективную свою кандидатуру в редакторы партийного органа мы должны были принять 
только на основе утверждения съездом этой программы. » 
346   Ibid., iv 54 «Если, в виду краткости оставшегося до съезда времени и невозможности 
личным объездом подготовить руководящие круги местных работников к принятию нашей 
платформы, съезд окажется неподготовленным к выработке стройной программы действия, мы 
будем наставать на том, чтобы съезд никак принципиальных связывающих решений не 
принимал, официального органа партии не восстановлял, а предоставил нам, на наш страх и 
риск, открыть в нашем органе обсуждение очередных задач партии. » 
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either a party programme or an official newspaper emerge. The Lenin group seems to 
have been forced into this position on this basis of a fear, stated by Martov but 
strangely denied by Lenin, that the RSDLP was at this stage a stronghold of 
Economism, on the basis of which they concluded that it would be a mistake for them 
to accept official responsibilities. It seems they understood that they could have been 
put in essentially the same situation as the Osvobozhdenie Truda group following the 
earlier change in the status of the Union Abroad, in the sense that, if in terms of the 
party statutes there would be no problem with their editing its newspaper, they would 
sooner or later have been put under pressure to collaborate with Economists and to 
take responsibility for the publication of their views. In so far as the congress had yet 
to be arranged, and their proposed tour had not been started, this idea which became 
Iskra comes across as something of a 'plan B' or a worse-case scenario. This leads to 
the conclusion that the idea might have originated with the rather more pessimistic 
Martov rather than Lenin, the latter being the one who almost certainly conceived the 
idea of a tour of the committees, confident of his ability to win them over, possibly 
excessively so. Thus it is possible to see how, contrary to numerous accounts stressing 
how Lenin was the sole original author of projects such as Iskra and that his peculiar 
genius consisted in putting pre-conceived plans into action, Lenin and his allies in fact 
developed even their most important and lasting ideas out of particular concrete 
circumstances rather than grandiose, pre-conceived and inflexible plans.  
 
 
ii) The Declarations of the Editorial Board of Iskra 
 
 Nothing came of the plans for a second RSDLP congress owing to yet another 
wave of arrests, and as a result there was no longer any question of Rabochaia Gazeta 
being revived.347 With this failure, Martov, Potresov and Lenin were free to carry out 
their reserve plan of a private journalistic enterprise, an option they probably 
considered preferable to official responsibilities. We say this because the political 
problems overshadowing the discussions with Kopel'zon, the conflict between 
Osvobozhdenie Truda and Rabochee Delo, got worse in the months following these 
discussions. If the RSDLP congress failed to materialise in April 1900, the Second 
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Congress of the Union Abroad did, and as has already been noted, its main event was 
a walkout by Osvobozhdenie Truda and about a dozen supporters, who then formed a 
rival émigré organisation, 'The Revolutionary Organisation 'Sotsial-Demokrat''.348 
Thus, the possibility of Russia's revolutionary Marxists actually breaking with the 
RSDLP appeared to have become a reality. Unfortunately there is only the occasional 
clue as to how Lenin viewed this event, which took place whilst he was still in Russia, 
apparently busying himself with making useful contacts in various towns.349 Most 
important is a letter to Krupskaya written some time after his arrival in western 
Europe in late July 1900.350 Its most significant feature is its excited observation that 'a 
completely wrong idea of Vademecum prevails in Russia as a result of the cock-and-
bull stories of the Rabochee Delo supporters'.351 Apparently correcting a previous 
impression he held, he then describes the anti-Plekhanov element in the Union 
Abroad as 'banal Economists', whilst describing their methods as dishonest and given 
towards intrigue.352 He argues that it is this mode of behaviour which justified the 
exposures in the Vademecum, referring to manipulation of his own Tasks of the Social 
Democrats.353 In short, he informs Krupskaya that the letter Plekhanov published in 
this pamphlet were a true reflection of émigré life, a statement which corroborates our 
argument that Rabochee Delo, prior to the split were essentially a Janus-faced 
grouping. More significantly still, the fact that he writes this with the zeal of a new 
convert in a letter sent after his emigration in July 1900 strongly implies that he only 
acquired these opinions after travelling to western Europe and that earlier, whilst in 
Russia, he had held rather different ones. In other words, the letter strongly suggests 
that up to this point he was probably quite sceptical about the split in the emigration 
and that he was unwilling to take sides with Osvobozhdenie Truda in a faction fight, 
even if he was in sympathy with their general views. Thus it is possible to conclude 
that at the meeting with Kopel'zon, Lenin really had been somewhat naive in 
accepting the offer of editorial posts and that he had, as Martov had feared, 
underestimated the 'Machiavellianism' of his opponent. Not only that, Lenin 
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subsequently admitted his mistake. 
 
 Further evidence for a change in Lenin's estimation of Economism at around 
this time comes from probably the earliest surviving document directly connected to 
Iskra, the Draft Declaration of the Editorial Board of Iskra and Zaria.354 This was 
probably written shortly after news of the RSDLP congress's failure had been 
received and in its political positions it suggests a desire to hedge a number of 
questions on which Plekhanov took a much more decisive stance. It was clearly 
written before Lenin's arrival in Europe and this draft was almost certainly taken by 
Lenin to the conference with Osvobozhdenie Truda in August 1900, which Lenin 
wrote about in the short unpublished narrative How the Spark Was Nearly 
Extinguished.355 His account shows how this series of meetings involved some 
extremely sharp exchanges between Plekhanov and Lenin, which seem to have 
bewildered Lenin as much as they hurt him. On the basis of Lenin's version of events 
alone, the conflict has been explained as the result of a personality clash in both 
Soviet and in western accounts.356 However, both the letter to Krupskaya suggesting a 
change of heart in relation to the conflict in the Union Abroad and a comparison of 
Lenin's Draft with his revised version, which was produced in the light of discussions 
with Plekhanov, suggest that there was actually a political content to their 
disagreement involving, among other things, their respective characterisations of the 
Rabochee Delo journal and its followers.357 Indeed, this conflict appears to be one of 
the clearest cases of the 'antithesis' we spoke of in the previous chapter. Lenin on this 
occasion clearly opposes Plekhanov in the name of RSDLP unity despite his basic 
identification with the latter's revolutionary Marxist political outlook.  
 
 It seems that the starting point for Lenin‘s Draft Declaration of the Editorial 
Board of Iskra and Zaria was a criticism of Rabochee Delo's failed strategy for 
drawing all those organisations declaring their adherence to the RSDLP into a 
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common party structure: 
 
  What plan of activity must we adopt to revive the Party on the firmest possible basis? Some 
comrades (even some groups and organisations) are of the opinion that in order to achieve this we must 
resume the practice of electing the central Party body and instruct it to resume the publication of the 
Party organ. We consider such a plan to be a false one or, at all events, a hazardous one. 358 
 
 In place of this strategy, Lenin argues that: 
 
 To establish and consolidate the Party means to establish and consolidate unity among all 
Russian Social-Democrats; such unity cannot be decreed, it cannot be brought about by a decision, say, 
of a meeting of representatives; it must be worked for.359 
 
 ‗Working for unity‘, in Lenin‘s view involves ‗common party literature‘360, 
common both in the sense that it is read and written by all sections of the movement, 
and in the sense that it ‗must express all shades of views and opinions prevailing 
among social democrats‘, with the caveat that they consider themselves part of the 
party and acknowledge its programme.361 Given that an RSDLP programme does not 
exist at this stage, this statement is rather ambiguous. It gives every reason to assume 
that Iskra and Zaria should open their columns to all pro-RSDLP elements. Lenin's 
reasoning appears to be as follows. In consonance with the editorial group's 
conditions concerning their acceptance of official editorial positions, particularly its 
demand for a 'personal tour' of the leading local social-democratic groups, Lenin 
issues a protest against over-hasty decisions made in the absence of an all-sided 
preliminary debate. Such procedures in his view simply paper over disagreements 
rather than genuinely resolve them. ‗Unity‘ decided by a vote would never genuinely 
convince the minority that the majority was right on a matter of principle. On the 
other hand, a process of debate in pamphlets and newspapers, accompanied by the 
presentation of all relevant background information, might help settle differences in a 
manner satisfactory to all sides, actually persuading one section of the internally-
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dissenting party of the correctness of the other's views.362 Thus the basic function of 
the Iskra newspaper as a clearing house for different views inside the RSDLP is 
outlined, albeit one with a broadly Marxist editorial viewpoint.363 In this sense, one 
gets the idea that Lenin had noticed Rabochee Delo's failure to deliver its promised 
debate on the party programme, complete with star contributions from Germany, and 
that he intends that Iskra and Zaria should take on this responsibility, albeit with a 
possibly more 'Russian' emphasis. 
 
 Given this borrowing of Rabochee Delo's clothes, it is not hard to understand 
why Plekhanov might have become suspicious of Lenin. For all its 'unofficial' status, 
the implication is that Iskra would be a publication serving the entire RSDLP at a 
time when the disorganised remnants of the revolutionary Marxists, recently 
withdrawn from the Union Abroad, lacked a journal of their own. It posed the 
question of how Iskra could seriously advance the position of revolutionary Marxism 
whilst at the same time acting as the supposedly impartial chair of an all-sided debate. 
Plekhanov's suspicion that Lenin did not want to fight the Economists even though an 
acrimonious split had actually taken place can only have been heightened by the 
latter's use in the draft of ambiguous and self-contradictory formulations, somewhat 
                                                        
362  Ibid., iv 324 : ‗The character of our task naturally determines the programme for conducting our 
publications. They must devote considerable space to theoretical questions, i.e., to the general theory of 
Social-Democracy and its application to Russian conditions. The urgent need to promote a wide 
discussion of these questions at the present time in particular is beyond all doubt and requires no 
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state of the working-class movement in the west.‘ ‗The discussion of questions of theory and policy 
will be connected with the drafting of a Party programme, the necessity for which was recognised at 
the congress in 1898‘ 
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independent and quite definite tendency? We hold to the second view and hope that an organ having a 
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various viewpoints; and for comradely polemics between contributors.'  
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reminiscent of Rabochee Delo's own confused thinking. For example, in his 
Vademecum, by way of introduction, Plekhanov wrote: 
 
 В нашей заграничной социал-демократической литературе с некоторого времени 
ведется довольно странный для непосвященного читателя спор, предметом которого служит 
вопрос о том, существует или не существует в молодой русской социал-демократии 
направление, известное под именем экономического. По мнению одной из спорящих сторон, П. 
Аксельрода, выражающего взгляд группы «Освобождение Труда», - такое направление не 
только существует, но, при известных условиях может оказать очень вредное влияние на 
дальнейшее развитие нашей партии. Другая сторона, - редакция quasi-периодического издания 
«Рабочее Дело», - не хочет согласиться с П Аксельродом. Она думает, что его мнение лишено 
всякого основания.364 
 
 This is an admirably clear definition of the problem as he sees it, and as we 
saw in the previous chapter, Plekhanov goes on to show that this ‗economic tendency‘ 
includes elements among Rabochee Delo closest supporters. However, this estimate 
was not apparently shared by Lenin. If he appeared to have finally recognised that the 
influence of revolutionary Marxism had declined in the Russian underground, he did 
not appear to blame this disappearance on the emergence of ideological alternatives to 
Marxism. Accordingly, rather than defining the problem as one of 'tendencies', he 
writes in his Draft Declaration of a ‗disunity‘ that has the effect of 
 
  threatening to divert the movement to a false path: narrow practicalism, detached from the 
theoretical clarification of the movement as a whole, may destroy the contact between socialism and 
the revolutionary movement in Russia, on the one hand, and the spontaneous working-class movement, 
on the other.365 
  
                                                        
364  GV Plekhanov, Sochineniia, xii 3: 'For some time, an argument sufficiently strange for the 
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 This statement seems confused in so far as it is hard to image how the 
impersonal force of ‗disunity‘ can in itself lead the movement down any ‗path‘. It is 
surely in fact the sign of different contending elements trying to draw it in different, 
opposing directions. Lenin continues with the following: 
 
 That this danger is not merely imaginary is proved by such literary productions as the Credo -
which has already called forth legitimate protest and condemnation - and the Separate Supplement to 
―Rabochaia Mysl'‖ (September 1899). That supplement has brought out most markedly the trend that 
permeates the whole of Rabochaia Mysl'; in it a particular trend in Russian Social-Democracy has 
begun to manifest itself, a trend that may cause real harm and that must be combated.366 
 
 Despite what he has just written, Lenin now appears to more or less echo the 
position of Axelrod and Plekhanov in identifying some potentially harmful ‗trend‘ 
already emerging within Russian social democracy. He now identifies this ‗trend‘ 
exclusively with an open revisionist challenge to Marxism, in the form of Kuskova‘s 
Credo and the more extreme advocates of anti-intellectual ‗narrow practicalism‘ 
Rabochaia Mysl''.367 Both of these are outspokenly and consciously, as opposed to 
implicitly anti-Marxist. By contrast, silence is maintained on the question of 
Rabochee Delo, despite the exposure of its links with revisionism by Plekhanov in the 
Vademecum and despite the fact that Osvobozhdenie Truda had by this stage broken 
off relations with them. Then, in the very next paragraph, Lenin once again directly 
contradicts not only Axelrod‘s view, but his own previous statement: 
 
 It is still premature to judge how deep the cleavage is, and how far the formation of a special 
trend is probable (at the moment we are not in the least inclined to answer these questions in the 
affirmative and we have not yet lost hope of our being able to work together), but it would be more 
harmful to close our eyes to the gravity of the situation than to exaggerate the cleavage, and we heartily 
welcome the resumption of literary activity on the part of the Emancipation of Labour group, and the 
struggle it has begun against the attempts to distort and vulgarise Social-Democracy.368 
 
 The conclusion: a harmful trend exists, yet it does not exist. If it does exist, it 
exists according to a narrower definition than Plekhanov would prefer. This ridiculous 
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switching of opinions rather well expresses Lenin‘s diplomatically delicate and in fact 
self-contradictory position. Eager to appeal to two sides who have fallen out - 
Rabochee Delo on the one hand, Osvobozhdenie Truda on the other - he incorporates 
the views of both, quite absurdly, into the same document. This ill-thought out 
attempt seems destined to fail not simply because Plekhanov had by this stage 
probably lost all hope of ‗working together‘ with Rabochee Delo. Additional 
questions running through Plekhanov‘s mind must surely have been the degree to 
which the political thinking of Lenin actually differed from that of Rabochee Delo. 
Both were speaking in positive terms about an RSDLP unity predicated on all 
theoretical tendencies. Both had proclaimed their support for Marxism, whilst trying 
to initiate a broad ranging debate on the political character of the RSDLP in their 
respective journals. Both were given to theoretically ambiguous, confusing and poorly 
worded statements that seemed to serve ever more complex and bewildering inter-
factional intrigues. Both denied the existence of Economism as a definite ideological 
trend. It seems safe to conclude that perceptions such as these explain Plekhanov‘s 
differences with the Iskra group at the August 1900 meeting, compounding his initial 
scepticism towards ‗unity‘ which would naturally have emerged in the wake of the 
split. 
   
  Bearing in mind these factors, there can be little doubt that behind 
Plekhanov's angry reception of Lenin and Potresov at the August meeting there was 
the aim of revising the Draft Declaration so as to make it more in consonance with 
Osvobozhdenie Truda views.369 There can also be no doubt that his strategy worked, 
as can be seen from the final version of the Declaration. In it, Rabochee Delo is 
explicitly criticised for taking one of the positions that Lenin himself took in the 
Draft:  
 
  Completely untrue are the assertions of Rabochee Delo to the effect that the Credo merely 
represents the opinions of individuals, that the trend represented by Rabochaia Mysl' expresses merely 
the confusion of mind and the tactlessness of its editors, and not a special tendency in the progress of 
the Russian working-class movement.370  
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 This said, Lenin still does not state that Rabochee Delo is involved in this 
'special tendency', something which Plekhanov had first proven theoretically, whilst 
the existence of the 'Sotsial-Demokrat' group proved it in practice. Only the outspoken 
anti-Marxist tendencies, Kuskova and Rabochaia Mysl'' are identified as 'the enemy'. 
On the other hand, Lenin does seem to have moved from a position in which he had 
simply expressed differences with certain organisational methods of this 'enemy' to a 
criticism of its general world view. Thus we see a strengthened statement of the 
ideological aims of Iskra in the final version of the Declaration. In the draft, Lenin 
had defined the main problem of the Russian social-democratic movement as ‗its state 
of disunity and amateur character‘, in so far as ‗traditions are not established and 
continuity is not maintained‘.371 In other words he emphasised organisational 
weaknesses almost to the exclusion of everything else. By contrast, a new element of 
criticism was introduced into the final version. Alongside the question of 
organisational disunity, comes that of ‗ideological wavering‘, identified with both 
revisionism and, to use Lenin‘s revised formula, ‗the so-called ‗economist‘ trend‘.372 
In the second version, it is this wavering, and not the poor communication between 
social democratic groups that is causing the organisational difficulties. In this sense, 
the blame for Economism as a whole is shifted from practical underground workers to 
conscious ideologues, definitely including Rabochaia Mysl', but possibly also 
Rabochee Delo. It is the lack of a revolutionary perspective that leads to 
organisational problems, not the other way round. A new goal for the paper is 
therefore introduced: 
 
 solid ideological unity which should eliminate discordance and confusion that—let us be 
frank!—reign among Russian Social-Democrats at the present time. This ideological unity must be 
consolidated by a Party programme.373 
 
 Rather than defining a non-existent party programme as the basis for an 
exchange of views as Lenin tried to argue in the draft, the programme now re-emerges 
as the indisputable end point of the discussion. A strong party must be formed which 
not only ‗fights under the banner of revolutionary social democracy‘, but under ‗the 
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single banner of revolutionary social democracy‘. Non-revolutionary ideas are 
explicitly rejected, and not only in the form of individual opinions, such as that of 
Kuskova, or definite publications, such as Rabochaia Mysl'. Though the mode of 
expression is indirect, it seems that Lenin wants these elements driven out of the 
RSDLP. As such, it seem that Iskra, rather than acting as a force for compromise, 
itself starts to represent a special ‗trend‘, and accordingly, the reference to the 
possibility of ‗working together‘ with non-revolutionaries is removed.  
 
 Through our comparison of the draft with the final Declaration of the 
Editorial Board of Iskra we get the sense that the conflict between Lenin and 
Plekhanov had its roots in two different conceptions of Economism. Lenin, prior to 
the meeting with Plekhanov appears to view the phenomenon primarily as a feature of 
raw, untrained activists with a low level of political understanding, whereas 
Plekhanov sees it as a definite political tendency in Russian social-democracy with a 
leadership, an apparatus and means of consciously propagating its views and of 
spreading its influence within the movement. On this question it is absolutely clear 
that Plekhanov is the one in the right, a conclusion we can draw not only from a 
general survey of the Russian social-democracy at this time, but also from Lenin's 
private admission that he was in the wrong to Krupskaya, not to mention the fact that 
he modified the Declaration in the direction of Plekhanov's views. However, this is 
not end of the matter to the extent that, if Lenin conceded to Plekhanov's theoretical 
analysis of Economism, this did not imply approval of the latter's practical method of 
dealing with it. At the Second Congress of the Union Abroad, Osvobozhdenie Truda 
and its sympathisers had broken with the émigré organisation despite the fact that it 
was an official RSDLP body, a decision which invited the conclusion that they had 
also broken with the party as a whole. Thus one gains the impression that, in 
Plekhanov's view, the political apparatus of Economism was the entire RSDLP, and 
not just Rabochee Delo and the Union Abroad. Whatever the truth of this idea, 
Plekhanov's decision did not appear to represent a particularly sophisticated level of 
tactical thinking. So long as they remained part of the RSDLP they had a credible 
claim to input into the party programme and its leading journals owing to their 
superior learning and scholarship. This fact was reflected in Kopel'zon's remark 
during the negotiations with the Lenin group that the RSDLP was 'unthinkable' 
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without Osvobozhdenie Truda. Accordingly, they could still have done much to 
disrupt the dominant tendency in the RSDLP which, prior to the split, appears to have 
sensed the danger of such a possibility. As was shown previously, Rabochee Delo 
indicated its intention to exclude Osvobozhdenie Truda from any discussions on the 
RSDLP programme, an incident suggesting that if Rabochee Delo never had the 
intention of expelling the venerable Plekhanovites from the RSDLP, they were 
certainly prepared to marginalise them to whatever degree proved politically possible. 
Given this context, the split of April 1900 simply gave Rabochee Delo rather more 
than they could have reasonably hoped for, and made it far easier to begin discussions 
on the party programme without Plekhanov, and with whatever figures from the 
revisionist and Economist tendencies it saw fit. A far more effective way of opposing 
this serious challenge to revolutionary Marxism must surely have been to demand the 
right to contribute articles to Rabochee Delo whilst refusing to take editorial 
responsibilities for the publication in general. By becoming ordinary contributors 
whilst leaving the Economists to do most of the technical work of the journal they 
could have consistently frustrated their opponents by providing far more worthwhile 
theoretical articles than the derivative efforts of Krichevksy. This would have 
represented a particular form of power without responsibility, especially if 
Osvobozhdenie Truda had put a case for being given the status of a minority faction, 
which Kopel'zon at least would have felt obliged to accept. This could have given 
Osvobozhdenie Truda the right to broadcast its own separate views on any number of 
questions, to raise its own funds, and to have at least one of its supporters working in 
the administration of the Union alongside Kopel'zon, a situation which was discussed 
in September 1899. Unfortunately, Plekhanov's also preferred to assert his 
proprietorship over the Union's printing press at this point, the final consequences of 
which were, in the words of Lenin to Krupskaya, that 'things literally came to the 
pitch of brawling, hysteria, and so on and so forth.'374 
 
 In the light of such clumsiness, the fact that Plekhanov had a more correct 
understanding of Economism than Lenin can seem to be a secondary matter. The 
question of how to reassert the authority of the revolutionary Marxists within Russian 
social-democracy does not appear to have been one towards which he had devoted 
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sufficient thought. By contrast Lenin, even in his flawed draft of the Declaration had 
attempted to sketch out a political strategy for how this might be achieved using the 
Iskra newspaper both as a host for a debate on the party programme, and a general 
notice board for the entire RSDLP. In the months which followed, he refined his ideas 
in this sense, the result of which was that by the time the first issue of Iskra appeared, 
the newspaper had acquired a definite commitment to reuniting the Plekhanov group 
with the RSDLP. We will examine this stand taken by Lenin, which continued to 
distinguish him from Osvobozhdenie Truda and 'Sotsial-Democrat', both of whom 
continued to show scepticism towards the idea of a rapprochement with Rabochee 
Delo, in the next section. During the first ten months of Iskra's existence, Lenin's 
reunification policy passed through a several distinct phases, each of which 
corresponded to a change in circumstances beyond its author's control. Thus we shall 
see once again that Lenin's tactics were not determined by any detailed advance plan, 
but were highly flexible even if all the variations were directed towards the same 
clearly understood goal. 
 
 
 iii)Lenin's 'reinsertion' of the Plekhanovites back into the RSDLP  
 
 Following the August 1900 meeting, the first step in Lenin's strategy was to 
obtain a formal agreement between Iskra and Osvobozhdenie Truda. The final version 
of this agreement defined the ‗Russian group of Social Democrats‘ - clearly Martov, 
Lenin and Potresov - as the publishers and editors of Iskra and Zaria, whereas the 
Plekhanov group simply ‗participated in the editorial work‘ of the enterprise.375 Any 
article due for publication which touched on ‗matters of principle or special 
significance‘ would be forwarded in advance of publication to Osvobozhdenie Truda 
for approval and recommendations. Where approval was not received or 
recommendations were turned down, the Plekhanovites would be invited to submit its 
own ‗special opinion‘ either as individuals or collectively.376 Through these statutes, 
the Iskra-Zaria editorial board was able to retain a separate public identity from 
Osvobozhdenie Truda, despite their very close practical collaboration. In fact, in every 
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other respect the two groups acted as one, an arrangement expressed in frequent 
correspondence concerning the main articles in the paper; the contribution of signed 
and unsigned articles by Plekhanov, Axelrod and Zasulich; and a degree of practical 
involvement in the venture on the part of Zasulich.377  
 
 The main purpose of this formal separation was to allow the two groups to 
express different opinions on the question of the split, a difference which is noticeable 
in the very first issue of Iskra. The position taken is clearly one inspired by 
diplomacy. On the one hand, Lenin echoes what appears to be Plekhanov's view in the 
preface to his Vademecum, identifying the problem with Rabochee Delo as one of 
'denying the existence of' Economism: 
 
 The most important thing, from our point of view, is the fact that Rabochee Delo was in the 
wrong in this controversy; it erroneously denied the existence of an ―economist‖ trend; it advocated the 
wrong tactics of ignoring the extremism of this trend and of refraining from combating it openly. 378 
 
 This clearly represents a conscious toning down by the editorial collective of 
both Lenin‘s and Plekhanov's real views. If in the 'preface' to his Vademecum, 
Plekhanov makes exactly the same accusation, the documents included in it show that 
Rabochee Delo takes a more or less sympathetic attitude not just to Economism, but 
also to Kuskova and Prokopovich's anti-RSDLP revisionism. Equally, Lenin is quite 
prepared to describe the journal itself as a group of 'base economists' in a private 
letter: he does not believe they are merely expressing an overly tolerant attitude to 
these Economists. We can guess that the fact that his criticism is so mild probably 
reflected a feeling on the part of Lenin that Plekhanov, in his Vademecum made a 
tactical error. This was partially in the sense that it provoked a split at a time when the 
Plekhanovites were still too weak to form a significant separate organisation, and 
partially because the publication of private letters permitted a retaliatory protest about 
Plekhanov's methods which could draw away attention from the real causes of the 
disagreement. Thus emerges the possibility that Lenin's strategy at this stage revolves 
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around trying to repair the damage done by Plekhanov in émigré affairs. This 
impression is confirmed by what Lenin writes next: 
 
 For this reason, while not denying the service which Rabochee Delo has rendered in 
publishing literature and organising its distribution, we refuse to recognise either section of the split 
organisation as the representative of our Party abroad. This question must remain open until our next 
Party congress. The official representatives of Russian Social-Democracy abroad at the present time 
are the Russian members of the permanent international Committee set up in Paris by the International 
Socialist Congress in the autumn of this year. Russia has two representatives on this Committee: G. V. 
Plekhanov and B. Krichevsky (one of the editors of Rabochee Delo). Until the two groups of Russian 
Social-Democracy become reconciled or come to an agreement, we intend to conduct all our business 
pertaining to the representation of Russia with G. V. Plekhanov. 379 
  
  There are three main points of interest here. Firstly, there are a few words of 
recognition for Rabochee Delo's 'services' to Russian social-democracy: Lenin 
probably has in mind at this point the attempt to organise the RSDLP congress and the 
fact that it was prepared to host a debate on the party programme, whilst tactfully 
gliding over the utter failure of both projects. This might not seem very significant, 
but the line did provoke a protest from Plekhanov, an incident which rather well 
illustrates the difference in approach of the two men.380 The second point is the refusal 
to recognise either the Union Abroad or 'Sotsial-Demokrat' as 'the official 
representative of the party abroad', in other words as the émigré section of the 
RSDLP. This very much looks like a form of even handed treatment which would 
further annoy Plekhanov, but in fact it does not yield a protest from him. This is 
because Lenin's formulation here represents something of a favour to him. Most 
observers, given the way he and his supporters walked out of the Union Abroad 
would surely have assumed that the latter remained the official RSDLP organisation 
whereas, by virtue of both its size and the manner of its departure from the main 
group that 'Sotsial-Demokrat' had separated from the RSDLP. However, Lenin denies 
this, using what authority he has as the paper's editor in an attempt to salvage 
Plekhanov's political position and to pave the way for some kind of reversal of the 
disastrous walk-out. Accordingly, Lenin speculates on the possibility of the 
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Economists and the Plekhanovites becoming reconciled. This might seem like the 
most surprising statement of all, as the discussions in August show that Lenin 
ultimately accepted Plekhanov's diagnosis of Economism as a rival political 
phenomenon, alien to revolutionary Marxism. In fact, this unexpected optimism is to 
be explained by certain changes in circumstance, which Lenin keenly exploited.  
 
 In the first few months of the Iskra‘s existence, the editorial board appears to 
have derived hope that a section of the Economists would break with their past views 
and come over to the position of revolutionary Marxism, or at least something close to 
it. This hope came from two separate sources. Firstly, there was a chance that events 
inside Russia would radicalise a further part of the Union Abroad. Iskra first appeared 
at a time when Russian students, after a long period of indifference to politics had 
begun to demonstrate and organise resistance to a heavily policed university system.381 
The protest movement was sparked by a military suppression of a peaceful student 
meeting at the University of Kiev in December 1899 and undoubtedly inspired a 
student previously expelled for political activities to assassinate the Russian Minister 
for Public Enlightenment in February 1900.382 The fact that in the New Year, workers 
started to join the demonstrations and that they often involved clearly anti-autocratic 
slogans could have been taken for a very practical refutation to those fascinated by 
‗stagist‘ tactics and reformist strategies.383 Secondly, there was a group of three 
individuals, one still a member of the Union Abroad, the other two close to Iskra-
Zaria who openly advocated a reunification policy in the emigration. This fraction 
was based in Paris had met with representatives of Osvobozhdenie Truda and the 
editorial trio during the autumm of 1900. As a result it had apparently declared itself 
in full solidarity with Osvobozhdenie Truda‘s views on all questions apart from that 
of organisational separation with the Union Abroad.384 It was perhaps more influential 
than its small size suggested, owing the presence of DB Riazanov in its ranks, an able 
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writer who later went on to become the head of the Marx-Engels Institute, and two 
other unusually energetic individuals.385 Against the background of disturbances in 
Russia, Iskra was apparently making clear its support for this pre-existing 
'reconciliation project', partially to put an end to Osvobozhdenie Truda's isolation, but 
also because in the given political circumstances any movement towards a united 
group would most likely split the Economists, a section of which would now be 
doubting Rabochee Delo's previous political position. One consequence of this could 
have been that the part of the Union that went into any fused group would not be as 
large as the combined forces of Iskra and Sotsial-Democrat. This would give the 
revolutionary Marxists a dominant position in an émigré organisation with a better 
claim than its Economist rival of being recognised as the official representative of the 
RSDLP abroad. 
 
  With the publication of its sixth agitational Listok in April 1901, there was 
indeed a break with the ‗stagist‘ gradualism Rabochee Delo had previously supported. 
Moreover, the change did reflect the events taking place in Russia. Declaring that a 
‗new era‘386 had begun, its editors announced that the workers had acquired ‗political 
and revolutionary‘ ideas in a quite unexpected and in no sense gradual manner.387 
Consequently, the emphasis on economic agitation as a means to politicising workers 
was to be dropped, and the call was given to organise political demonstrations instead. 
In the words of the article: 
 
 Деятельность рассчитанная на серую, мирную обстановку, на период всеобщего упадка 
революционного духа, на медленный эволюционный рост сознательности рабочей массы, на 
систематическое воспитание еѐ, так сказать, путем перехода от простого к сложному, от 
близкого к более далекому, - такая деятельность была бы роковой ошибкой в момент быстрого 
прилива революционных сил, когда каждый день начавшейся активной борьбы с 
самодержавием революционизирует массу гораздо быстрее, чем целые годы мирной 
пропаганды и агитации.388 
                                                        
385   Ibid., iii 58-9 
386  Listok Rabochego Dela 6 (April 1901), 1   
387
  «Рабочие Петербурга, Москвы, Харькова и Киева обнаружили политический смысл и 
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 This might have seemed promising from the perspective of Iskra, were it not 
for the fact that this rather blustering article also defended policy of assassinations,389 
and advocated converting May Day from a working class event into a pro-democracy 
demonstration involving all anti-autocratic forces.390  Because of these problems, Iskra 
felt obliged to issue a criticism of it, the result being Lenin's well-known article 
Where To Begin. Though first appearances might seem to the contrary, the decision to 
print this reply did not actually represent a return to Plekhanov's more combative 
attitude towards Economism. Iskra's strategy at this stage remained one of promoting 
organisational unity, in order to overturn a situation which appeared to leave a section 
of the Plekhanovites outside the RSDLP. However, this was not accompanied by the 
insistence that different viewpoints should not be aired as a price for achieving this 
unity, which was in any case but a means to strengthening the revolutionary Marxist's 
position. Precisely because the rapprochement policy was but a means to an end, if 
there was a chance that a polemical article could change the loyalties of some former 
opponents and thus the balance of forces between Economist and revolutionary, then 
it too was justified. This said, Lenin miscalculated. His polemic did not so much win 
over disaffected Economists, so much as alienate the Paris conciliating group, who 
did indeed choose to regard it as a break with Iskra's prior policy of neutrality in the 
émigré split.391 The main consequence of Where To Begin was the temporary 
                                                                                                                                                               
revolutionary spirit, on the slow evolutionary growth of the consciousness of the working mass, on the 
systematic raising of it, so to say from the simple to the complex, from the near to the further, such 
activity would be a fatal mistake in this, the moment of a rapid flow of revolutionary force, when every 
day, starting with an active struggle with the autocracy, revolutionises the masses much more quickly 
than a year of peaceful propaganda or agitation.' [Ibid., 4]  
389  «Выстрелы Карповича и Логовского и то горячее сочувствие, которые они встретили в рядах 
молодежи и всех революционных элементов вообще, ясно показывают, что белый террор 
царского правительства снова, с необратимой силой закона природы, создает почву для 
красного террора революционеров. Наши партийные организации не могут и не должны 
игнорировать этого факта, обходить его молчанием. Они должны сообща решить, какое 
положение им вследует занять, по отношению к террору. » [ Ibid., 5]    
390
  «... наши партийные организации должные на этот раз призывать к участию в майской 
манифестации не только пролетариат, но и все революционные, анти-правительственные 
силы...» [Ibid., 6] 
391  Leninskii Sbornik, iii 162-3 
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defection of the entire conciliation group to the side of the Union Abroad, in an 
attempt to punish Iskra with a boycott. After a short period, the Parisians re-emerged 
as an independent group, but it now had the support of the Union Abroad for its 
reunification project as well as that of Iskra as a result of its gesture of protest.392 
 
 Ironically, it was this petty manoeuvre, and not the substantial issues such as 
May Day and terrorism which first caused Lenin to question his policy of 
reconciliation with the Economists. In a letter to Axelrod in April 1901 sent during 
the 'boycott', Lenin suggested the idea of organising an entirely separate revolutionary 
Marxist émigré organisation excluding both the Union Abroad and the Riazanov 
group.393 This seemed to represent a partial admission that his strategy was not 
working, that the split was permanent and that the RSDLP would perhaps remain in 
Economist hands. However, at this stage he was still prepared to keep his options 
open. This new 'League-type organisation', to use Lenin's words would not establish 
relations with Iskra, which Lenin was by this stage characterising as a ‗Russian‘ 
rather than an émigré operation.394 Instead it would combine Zaria, which would pass 
to the control of Osvobozhdenie Truda, and 'Sotsial-Demokrat'. As such, even after 
the debacle over Where To Begin, Lenin still sought to keep Iskra as aloof as possible 
from the émigré disputes, and thus to give at least one half of the revolutionary 
Marxists maximum authority and independence in relation to it.395 Through such an 
arrangement, Riazanov's quibbles about the status of Iskra could be appeased, and any 
further criticism Rabochee Delo could be published in Zaria without compromising 
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Литературной Комиссии брошюры и.т.п.) ... Верховное решение литературных вопросов в Лиге 
принадлежит конференции из трех членов: от Группа Освобождение Труда, от Зари и от 
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как русское издание конечно, в Лигу формально не входит).» (Emphasis in original) 
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Iskra's plans. This rearrangement might seem ridiculous given the fact that both Iskra 
and Zaria were edited by exactly the same six people, but there is little doubt that 
other émigrés took the distinction seriously. The remarkable thing about the Riazanov 
incident was that, despite criticising Iskra for replying to Rabochee Delo, he had 
himself written a much lengthier criticism of the Rabochee Delo programme in the 
March issue of Zaria.396 The letter to Axelrod therefore reveals a flexible side to 
Lenin's tactical thinking, an impression reinforced when we consider Lenin's response 
to the unexpected news that they had been 'forgiven' by the Parisian conciliators, and 
that a new unity conference, involving the Union Abroad, 'Sotsial-Demokrat', Iskra 
and the Parisians themselves was being planned. On hearing this change of 
circumstances, Lenin once again switched tactics, urging his colleagues to support 
this initiative and dropping, for the moment at least, the question of a separate 
revolutionary Marxist émigré organisation. To this meeting Iskra agreed readily and, 
dragging its feet and protesting somewhat, 'Sotsial-Demokrat' also sent 
representation.397  
 
 In preparation for this event, Lenin put forward a completely different plan for 
reorganising the émigré social-democracy. Now, he directly proposed the re-
establishment of an all-inclusive 'Foreign Committee of the RSDLP' which, perhaps 
surprisingly, given his later views on the subject, was to be constructed on federal 
lines.398 According to this new plan, Zaria would replace Rabochee Delo as the 
Foreign Committee's ‗thick‘ theoretical journal, whilst Rabochee Delo and its 
‗supplement‘ would be converted into ‗a popular collection or journal for workers‘.399 
The Parisian group would produce a series of pamphlets, whilst Iskra would also join 
the arrangement, presumably on the grounds that the émigré split had been 
successfully resolved. Whilst the point about Rabochee Delo might look like another 
aggressive move against the Economists, this modification had been in circulation 
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since the attempt at a second RSDLP Congress the previous year, and as such was 
probably supported by Rabochee Delo itself.400 The proposed organisation's ‗federal‘ 
character prevented the interference of one group with the internal affairs of the other, 
beyond the initial agreement over the distribution of literary functions. This might 
surprise those who are used to the image of Lenin as an implacable centraliser, but it 
seems that a stricter discipline would have been impossible, given the two opposing 
tendencies that were supposed to co-exist in this committee. Ostensibly to reinforce 
unity of purpose, all elements of the federation would be requested to subscribe to a 
programmatic statement written by Plekhanov, stating its opposition to revisionist 
ideological currents and its unalloyed support for scientific socialism, its support for 
the struggle to overthrow the autocracy and for a democratic republic, and so on.401 
Whilst this last point could be interpreted as an attempt at direct confrontation with 
the Economists, because of the recent shift in Rabochee Delo's policy, it seems likely 
that Lenin believed they would accept this revolutionary statement of principles, not 
least as a result of pressure from the Parisian group. This calculation was proved 
correct, and all émigré groups subscribed to Plekhanov's statement at a meeting in 
June.402  
 
 This said, there was an element of a trap in Lenin's tactics at this point. As we 
have just noted, there was undoubtedly a fair amount of scepticism towards Lenin's 
plan from members of both Osvobozhdenie Truda and 'Sotsial-Demokrat', in the 
weeks preceding the June meeting. Even the normally conciliatory Axelrod appeared 
opposed to further negotiations with members of the Union Abroad.403 Equally, 
everything we have discussed in this and the previous chapter shows the leading 
individuals in Rabochee Delo and the Union Abroad to be inconsistent and prone to 
insincerity. At first glance, it can therefore seem that he was a little naive to expect his 
plans to succeed, or to believe that those who signed the June agreement would keep 
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» [AN Potresov & BI Nikolaevskii, Sotsial-democraticheskoe dvizhenie, i 321 [article 4c] ]  
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their word, especially when we learn that Rabochee Delo did subsequently break 
terms. However, we do not believe this perception to be a correct one. Lenin was 
probably aware of the fragile nature of any pact just as much as the older émigrés, but 
he had the advantage over them of having a plan to make Rabochee Delo look much 
more isolated than it really was, should it go back on its word. This was as follows. 
The June meeting was attended by Iskra, 'Sotsial-Democrat', the Union Abroad and 
the Parisian conciliators. Of these, the Union Abroad was by far the most solid 
organisation, probably still making up a majority of the émigré social-democracy. 
However, the other three groups were more or less united in their Plekhanovite 
political outlook, a circumstance which seems to have pressured the ideologically 
uncertain Union Abroad into putting its name to Plekhanov's programmatic document, 
if only for the sake of maintaining unity. However, in the months that followed the 
conference this pretence proved impossible to keep up, especially in the wake of 
Where To Begin, to which Rabochee Delo would probably want to respond. 
Accordingly, two articles appeared in the tenth issue of Rabochee Delo which clearly 
contradicted the June programme.404 This gave the remaining three organisations the 
opportunity to accuse the Union Abroad of splitting tactics, which was significant in 
so far as it represented a complete reversal in terms of the balance of forces on either 
side of the original break between the Plekhanovites and the Economists. For the first 
time since April 1900 it gave the former, not the latter the greater claim to the RSDLP 
title, by a majority of three organisations to one. The June unity conference was 
decisive in this respect as it persuaded the Union Abroad to voluntarily relinquish its 
pretensions to being an official RSDLP organisation in favour of a new official 
RSDLP committee recognised by all tendencies. Lenin‘s persuading the Union to 
agree to this was a therefore in itself major organisational coup for the Plekhanovites. 
Better still, when new polemical articles appeared in the tenth issue of Rabochee 
Delo, the spirit of which clearly contradicted the revolutionary programme, it seems 
like it was the Economist journal and not the revolutionary Marxists who were 
walking away from a united émigré social-democratic organisation.  
 
 Consequently, what at first sight appeared to be a naivety that only promised a 
                                                        
404  Rabochee Delo 10 (Sept 1901) 1-63. For a more detailed account of these articles, albeit it one 
rather reticent concerning their organisational context: LT Lih, Lenin Rediscovered,  309-321 
  
 
 
119 
 
hard lesson for an individual inexperienced in the cynical politics of émigré life was 
in fact a very well-executed political manoeuvre. This becomes clear when we study 
documents connected to the second unity meeting, which took place in Zurich in 
October 1901, following the offending articles in Rabochee Delo. Lenin's opening 
speech at this meeting contains the following observations: 
 
 As a representative of Iskra I consider it necessary to touch on the history of our attitude to the 
other organisations. Iskra has been completely independent from its very inception, recognising only 
ideological connections with Russian Social-Democracy and functioning on instructions from many 
comrades in Russia. In its first issue Iskra declared that it would not deal with the organisational 
differences that had arisen in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and attached the greatest 
importance to its position on matters of principle. 
  
 Some members of the Union Abroad proposed that we hold a conference to come to an 
agreement with the organisations abroad. We understood the proposal to mean that a group in the 
Union was in agreement with our principles, which made it possible that the Union would also accept 
them. The revolutionary organisation 'Sotsial-Demokrat', voiced agreement, notwithstanding 
considerable organisational differences, as well as differences on principle. The Union, unfortunately, 
refused to negotiate. When a new group of initiators appeared, the Union consented to the negotiations. 
Since the Union had no distinct physiognomy and since a new trend towards revolutionary Marxism 
had manifested itself within it, it was to be hoped that an agreement on principle would be possible. 
Iskra and 'Sotsial-Demokrat' again consented, and the Geneva Conference was held. At the beginning 
of our session Comrade Kruglov read the conference resolution without any comments. No one from 
the Union took the floor in opposition.  
 We affirm that in its tenth issue, Rabochee Delo made a decisive break with the traditions of 
revolutionary Marxism and opposed the agreement on principles elaborated at the Geneva Conference, 
with whose tendencies the Union is apparently in agreement.405  
  
 This provides a very concise summary of Lenin's thinking over the previous 
ten months. He states at the beginning that Iskra remains neutral in relation to the 
émigré dispute, possibly exaggerating a little when claiming to be receiving 
instructions from Russia, simply to underline the point that he did not want the paper 
to be considered part of the émigré scene, even though it was being published in 
Munich. This is partially a white lie, a convenient shorthand method of expressing 
Lenin's support for Plekhanov's programmatic writings whilst rejecting the 
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organisational tactics of Plekhanov himself, characterised as they were by the clumsy 
decision to walk out of the Union Abroad. Lenin then speaks of 'some members of the 
Union Abroad' - these are the Parisian group: Riazanov, Steklov and Gurevich. Lenin 
is in fact wrong when he describes them as members of the Union as, by the time they 
took on their conciliating role, two of them had already resigned, and only one, 
Gurevich, remained in the Union.406 This in fact explains why the Union Abroad 
'refused to negotiate' at first, and was only assured of the Parisian's bona fides 
following their temporary boycott of Iskra. The Economists' change of policy is 
expressed in Lenin's speech as the appearance of a 'new group' of initiators more to 
the liking of the Union Abroad, a formulation which accurately reflects the change in 
the political identity of the group whilst disguising the fact that its personal 
composition remained the same, possibly for security reasons. As for Lenin's belief 
that a broader section of the Union Abroad could be turning towards Plekhanovism, 
apart from the Parisians, we can essentially take this at face value. There is plenty of 
evidence for the political instability of Union's views in 1901, and given the events in 
Russia, a radicalisation of their stance was always likely.  
 
 Lenin then speaks of the June conference, and its formal acceptance of the 
Plekhanovite programme. He alleges a violation of the agreement by Rabochee Delo, 
an argument that is convincing. The resolution to the June meeting declared support 
for scientific socialism and a revolutionary version of social democracy. It explicitly 
rejected ‗attempts to introduce opportunism into the class struggle of the proletariat - 
an attempt expressed in so-called economism, Bernsteinism, Millerandism etc‘.407 The 
immediate political task of the working class was defined as the overthrow of the 
autocracy, which is presented ‗as a preliminary condition of its full social 
liberation‘.408 Under Russian conditions, the leadership of the anti-autocratic struggle 
                                                        
406  Ibid., v 528-9: Here Lenin appears to correct his mistake, whilst rather disguising the fact that the 
personal composition of the ‗initiators‘ group‘ never changed. 
407  « Признавая основные принципы научного социализма и действуя солидарно с 
международной социал-демократией, мы отвергаем всякие попытки внесения оппортунизма в 
классовую борьбу пролетариата, - попытки, выразившиеся в так называемом экономизме, 
бернштейнианстве, мильеранизме и.т.п. »  [ KPSS v resoliutsiakh, 36]                
408  «Заявляя свою солидарность с манифестом (1898 г.) РСДРП и с основными традициями 
русской социал-демократии, мы признаем ближайшей задачей рабочего класса в России 
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fell to the proletariat.409 Agitational policy must make use of the concrete grievances 
of the masses to present the positive alternative of a democratic republic and a 
socialist system, propaganda must teach scientific socialism, and so on.410 As for the 
two problematic articles, Krichevskii's restated the original Rabochee Delo notion that 
‗scientific socialism‘ was useless unless supplemented by ‗the concrete class 
relations‘ obtaining in Russia and the demands of the working class;411 his defence of 
Bernstein place in the social democratic movement;412 and in addition raised the 
prospect of unity with populist elements.413 The author also supported agitation in 
support of assassinations and even, where possible, demonstrations in favour of 
them.414 Equally, in the second article, Martynov directly challenged the Plekhanovite 
view on the overthrow of the autocracy. Instead he advanced a rather confused 
reformist strategy, suggesting that the RSDLP ‗can and must put forward to the 
government concrete demands for legislative and administrative measures against 
economic exploitation, against unemployment, against hunger etc‘.415 In his view ‗in 
                                                                                                                                                               
низвержение самодержавия как необходимое предварительное условие его полного социального 
освобождения.» [Ibid., 36 ]     
409  «Условия исторического развития России выдвигают перед РСДРП, стоящей на почве 
классового движения пролетариата, задачу вести борьбу с абсолютизмом во главе всех 
угнетенных слоев нации.» [Ibid.,  36] 
410  «В круг деятельности социал-демократии входит: а) руководство всеми проявлениями 
борьбы пролетариата  против всех форм политического, экономического и социального 
угнетения в целях превращения недовольства и возмущения рабочего класса в сознательную 
борьбу за демократическую республику и социалистический строй.» [Ibid., 36] 
411  Rabochee Delo 10 (Sep. 1901), 6  
412  «В современном же социалистическом движении нет столкновения классовых интересов, 
оно все целиком во всех своих разновидностях, включая и самых отъявленных 
бернштейнианцев, стоит на почве классовых интересов пролетариата, его классовой борьбы за 
политическое и экономическое освобождение.» [Ibid., 33] 
413  «Объединение социалдемократов, понимаемое в этом смысле является к тому же первым 
этапом к объединению всех русских революционеров-социалистов ...» [Ibid., 36]   
414  «Охотно признаемся что вслед за приглашением наших партийных организаций занять 
единодушную позицию по отношению к террору, мы думали было высказать наше мнение и 
насчет того, какова должна быть эта позиция - а именно пригласить наши организации, в случае 
террористических фактов, издавать сочувственные прокламации и устраивать сочувственные 
демонстрации.» [ Ibid., 22-24]  
415  «Наша партия могла бы и должна была бы ставит правительству конкретные требования 
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our political conditions these demands would have a revolutionary significance‘.416 It 
is of course quite a strange ‗revolution‘ that would consist in the Tsar and his 
‗administration‘ submitting to the partial demands of a working class party, acting as 
its champion whilst remaining on his throne. Not a few historians have since argued 
that precisely such measures were needed to prevent revolution and have more than 
once accused the Russian autocracy of inflexibility in these matters, even blaming this 
factor for the revolution that ultimately swept it away.417 With such confused notions 
being mooted, it was clear that the June meeting had become meaningless. 
 
 The fruits of this trouncing of Rabochee Delo's position were expressed in 
Lenin's statement on the conference which appeared in the next issue of Iskra.418 This 
statement announced the fusion of Iskra with 'Sotsial-Demokrat' and, through the 
latter, Osvobozhdeniye Truda, to create the 'League of Revolutionary Russian Social-
Democrats Abroad'. The period of Iskra's 'organisational neutrality' and the practice of 
taking an intermediate position between Plekhanov and the Economists had thus come 
to an end. It had been achieved in the following manner, according to Lenin: 
 
 Early in summer, a conference of representatives of the three organisations drafted an 
agreement. The basis of the agreement was provided by a number of resolutions on matters of 
principle, according to which the Union Abroad would put an end to all flirting with Economism and 
Bernsteinism, and recognise the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy.419  
 
 Lenin observes of the October meeting: 
 
 In fact, at the conference of the three organisations, the Union Abroad proposed 
―amendments‖ to the above-mentioned resolutions, which clearly showed that it was reverting to its 
previous deviations. The other organisations felt obliged to leave the conference, and in fact did so.420 
                                                                                                                                                               
законодательных и административных мероприятий против экономической эксплуатации, 
против безработицы, против голода   и. т. д.» [ Ibid., 43] 
416  «И несомненно, что при наших политических условиях такая тактика имела бы 
революционное значение.»  [Ibid.,43] 
417
 O Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (London: Pimlico,1996) 809-1  
418   VI Lenin, Collected Works, v 241-2 
419   Ibid., v 241 
420   Ibid., v 242 
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 This is an intriguing way of presenting matters. The second conference is 
presented as a meeting of 'three' organisations. This statement does not seem quite 
accurate: in fact four definite groupings attended - the Union Abroad, Iskra, 'Sotsial-
Demokrat' and the Parisians. One might also include a fifth, Osvobozhdenie Truda, 
though it seems this group was considered a component part of 'Sotsial-Demokrat'. It 
is probable that Lenin here considers the Parisians to be part of the Union Abroad, 
thus producing a meeting of two revolutionary groups - Iskra and 'Sotsial-Demokrat' - 
and one Economist group - the Union Abroad. The function of the meeting was to 
recreate a united official foreign committee of the RSDLP. The apparent majority 
walk out of the meeting in protest at the Union's breach of agreement. However, in 
writing this, Lenin is being a little too kind to his opponents. In fact, it is possible to 
say that the Union Abroad's amendments to and polemics against the June agreement 
alienated four separate organisations. As such, they could be effectively portrayed as 
the 'wreckers' and a minority of one against four, and we are left with conclusion that 
Lenin is simply being magnanimous towards an utterly out-manoeuvred opponent. 
The question which might then be posed is why, if they were certain of such a 
majority, the revolutionary Marxists actually walked out of the meeting, and did not 
simply consolidate their majority in an official, united émigré committee of the 
RSDLP. The short answer to this appears to be that they had simply had enough of the 
inconsistency and intrigues of both the Union Abroad and the Parisians who, for all 
their apparent sympathy with Plekhanovite views, are repeatedly referred to as Union 
Abroad members, and who are not mentioned as a component part of the new 
revolutionary 'League'. Regardless of this factor, Lenin's adroit manoeuvring turns the 
tables on the Economists, utterly undermining their organisation‘s claim to be the 
official émigré body of the RSDLP. They were a minority and they had violated the 
founding statute of this body, agreed by all in June. The period of partial conflict 
between Ozvobozhdeniye Truda and the RSDLP is thus brought to a close. The 
émigré split is not liquidated, but Economism's claim to authority within the RSDLP 
receives a blow, and the claim of revolutionary Marxism to an official status within 
the RSDLP is, if not exactly sealed by this incident, massively strengthened. 
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iv) Some Conclusions 
 
 One conclusion which could be derived from this chapter is that Lenin had the 
quite unusual capacity to develop concrete policies which advanced the cause of 
general political ideas. For Plekhanov, it was enough to advocate a revolutionary 
Marxist understanding of the world, he did not properly understand the mechanics of 
political power that could put him in a position of genuine influence. By contrast, 
Lenin understood that the influence of an idea depends to a huge degree on the status 
on the person articulating it, and accordingly gave battle for the right to be an 
authentic spokesman of the RSDLP. The methods he used in this struggle never 
descended to the type of deceit demonstrable in the Economist leaders, but instead 
involved negotiations, deal-making and attempts to define organisational relations that 
would put his opponents at a disadvantage, usually with the explicit consent of these 
same opponents. Speaking bluntly, one could say he made fools of them. Analysing 
the way in which he did this can be very interesting, as it represents a fine exhibition 
of political skills and general intelligence. On the other hand it can seem that there is 
nothing in it which indicates a special Leninist modus operandi. In other words, given 
these kind of tricks are employed by all successful politicians, one could argue that 
they are not of interest to a political theorist aiming to learn something about the way 
revolutionary Marxists organise their political parties. Because of this feature in 
Lenin's behaviour, certain writers have rather unfortunately concluded that Lenin is 
nothing more than a Marxist Machiavelli or, worse, a Machiavellian who happened 
through circumstance to be a Marxist. He is sometimes seen as an individual well-
rehearsed in all the dark arts necessary to wield power, a power which he chose to 
use, essentially as a result of personal inclination, in the service of revolutionary 
socialism.  
 
 This seems to be a one-sided view. As well as revealing some remarkably 
sharp tactical thinking, Lenin also seems to have been committed to the strategy of 
seeking to ensure that the revolutionary Marxist current remained part of the RSDLP, 
and that it did not form a separate group outside it. The reason he pursues this course 
is not hard to determine. Since the 1880s, the Plekhanovites had formally supported 
the idea of creating a workers' socialist party prior to the appearance of a democratic 
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system in Russia. As we shall see in the next chapter, regardless of its problems, 
Lenin always identified the RSDLP with this Plekhanovite notion, refusing to allow 
even his own teacher in theoretical matters to turn against the party when a non-
revolutionary Marxist current appeared to have taken over within it. Thus, behind 
Lenin's manoeuvres there is a stable political position. Throughout the entire period 
we are studying Lenin appears to have aimed for the creation of a real, functioning 
RSDLP that was not only possessed an official leadership and programme, but also a 
solid organisational apparatus, a more or less unified political will and, crucially, a 
revolutionary Marxist current within it that could exercise a real influence on all these 
features. Such a regeneration of the RSDLP could not be achieved by means of the 
tricks discussed in the present chapter. It required a clear vision of what the revived 
party should look like, and some definite principles of organisation. To be in a 
position to put these principles into practice it was, apparently, necessary for Lenin to 
play a hard political game at certain times. However, once he was in a position of 
greater authority, it seems that his behaviour changes somewhat, owing to the fact that 
the position of the revolutionary Marxists in the RSDLP is finally secure. Not only 
that, from this point on Lenin reveals himself to be a fairly democratic and consensual 
party leader who consolidates the position of the revolutionary Marxists not so much 
by manoeuvres, but by creating a constitutional basis within the RSDLP for 
competition between the revolutionary Marxist and Economist tendencies, and then 
winning this contest for the former.  
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B: The Struggle Between Democratic 
Centralism and Federalism 
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Chapter Four: November 1901-February 1903: Party Democracy 
 
 The next two chapters are dedicated to events connected with the Second 
Congress of the RSDLP, which took place in July and August 1903. This event 
represented the high point of a campaign on the part of Lenin to reorganise the 
RSDLP, which started in the immediate aftermath of the second émigré split in 
October 1901. It was also the point at which this campaign met with a crucial defeat, 
which in the end actually delayed the reunification of the RSDLP on Leninist 
principles for nine years, until the Sixth All-Russia RSDLP Conference in 1912. From 
the point of view of Marxist political theory, the way in which Lenin guided the 
organising drive towards this Second Congress is extremely interesting, in terms of its 
capacity to expose myths concerning the way Lenin organised and led the workers‘ 
party. In particular, we are concerned with the view that these methods were 
dictatorial, hyper-centralist and that they involved forcing uniform opinions on an 
unwilling membership. In the light of the evidence we are about to discuss, we 
contend that such arguments have gained an undeserved credibility because of 
ignorance concerning the pre-history of the Second Congress, or possibly even the 
conscious turning of a blind eye to this process on the part of scholars. Whatever the 
case, in no previous history has the organising process leading up to this Congress 
been given sufficient attention. 
 
  In particular, historians to date have not given enough thought to the fact that 
the RSDLP was a pre-existing organisation, founded prior to all the events we have 
been discussing in this thesis, even if its apparatus was non-existent. Behind this lapse 
is the false notion that a Marxist workers' party is nothing but an apparatus of full-
time officials and material resources, a view which ignores both its ideological and its 
social aspect. Against this common view, we contend that a party which lacks a well-
developed apparatus can be taken seriously if it is united by clear ideas about how 
society and politics should be, and if it has real roots in a definite section of the 
population. Accordingly, we challenge the notion that the 1903 RSDLP Congress was 
not in fact a 'second' congress as a flawed one, an argument which, incidentally, 
rehearses the Bund's extremely inconsistent and self-justifying opinion of the event.421 
                                                        
421  BD Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, 232; ST Possony, Lenin: The Compulsive 
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It ignores the fact that, between 1898 and 1903, the RSDLP became a popular label of 
political self-identification among Russian revolutionaries, trade unionists and 
political dissidents: during this period it seems likely that thousands of individuals 
during this period considered themselves to be members or supporters of this party. 
This popularity can be seen from the fact that publications as diverse as the Economist 
Rabochee Delo, Iskra, Iuzhnii Rabochii, the Parisian group's Borba all acknowledged 
their adherence to the party, not infrequently on the masthead of their newspaper or 
journal, as did the Bund itself right up until the beginning of 1903.422 Because 
previous researchers have not acknowledge this phenomenon, they have also proved 
strangers to the fact that the political preferences the various Russian social-
democratic organisations who considered themselves part of the RSDLP changed over 
time as a result of new ones being created, old ones being smashed by the police, and 
others changing their political views. For this reason, the widespread support for the 
general idea of a workers‘ social-democratic party did not actually reflect a consistent 
set of programmatic and organisational ideas. On the contrary, the question of the 
RSDLP's political character gave cause for a struggle between different political 
tendencies even before Iskra had been conceived, a fact which makes the all too 
common criticism of their factional domination at the Second Congress seem a little 
misplaced. All previous RSDLP meetings, not to mention those which followed, also 
had definite political colourations, which reflected the dominance of one or another 
particular faction at them.423 
 
  In 1898 the RSDLP was founded on the initiative of the revolutionary Kiev 
newspaper Rabochaia Gazeta, which looked towards Osvobozhdenie Truda, though it 
                                                                                                                                                               
Revolutionary, 93; RD Warth, Lenin, 50; M Liebman Leninism under Lenin, trans. B Pearce, (London: 
Merlin Press,1975) 27; R Pipes The Russian Revolution 1899-1919 (London: Collins Harvell, 1997) 
360 
422  Rabocheee Delo 1 (April 1899) 5; Iskra 1-44 1; Rabochee Delo 10 (Sep 1901) 125; OA Ermanskii, 
Otchet s''ezda iuzhnikh komitetov i organizatsii, (Geneva, 1902); RSDLP, Minutes of the Second 
RSDLP Congress 479-82; R Taylor & N Harding, Key Documents, 268 
423  BD Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, 231-2; JLH Keep, The Rise of Social-Democracy in 
Russia, 110; ST Possony, Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary, 93; R Service, Lenin, A Political Life, 
i 101; P Pomper, The Intelligentsia and Power,  72-3  
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apparently also had some political differences with it.424 Apart from this organization, 
but probably in close sympathy with them, the delegate from St Petersburg was S.I. 
Radchenko, a close ally of Lenin and Krupskaya, clearly a Plekhanovite.425 Their 
combined influence produced a bold, revolutionary Manifesto which not only 
identified the main immediate task of the working-class movement as the 
achievement of a democratic constitution, but also stated that the working class would 
play the leading role in Russia's democratic revolution.426 Not only that, the party 
constitution agreed at this meeting was quite centralised, stating that the seven 
organisations present had fused into one structure, and accepted a commonly elected 
leadership, whose decisions they were expected to obey, and whose activities they 
were prepared to fund.427 Both these features indicate how the First Congress of the 
RSDLP expressed the views of the militant left-wing of the Russian social-democratic 
movement. However, as is well-known, most of the participants in this congress were 
arrested: serious damage was done to the Kiev movement, and this destroyed 
Rabochaia Gazeta.428 Further, the one delegate who escaped, Radchenko, was by this 
stage representing a rump of just four Plekhanovites in St Petersburg, the rest of the 
local movement having gone over to Economism following the police raid against the 
Lenin tendency.429 As such, the First Congress can be seen as representing the last 
stand of a fatally weakened left wing of Russian social-democracy. Somewhat 
ironically, the notion of the RSDLP grew in popularity in the months that followed, 
but its banner was taken up by people with rather different views in this next period. 
 
  The documents of the Lalaiants-Kopel'zon attempt at a second RSDLP 
сongress in the spring of 1900 clearly reflected this change in political direction.430 
The demand of the First Congress that the Second discuss and approve a party 
programme, clearly stating the common views and goals of the party, was 
                                                        
424  VP Akimov, ‗A Short History‘, 298-9 
425  NK Krupskaya, Memories, 23 
426  R Taylor & N Harding, Key Documents, 223-5 
427  Ibid., 225-6 
428
  Akimov claims five hundred social-democrats were arrested after the First Congress, one hundred 
and seventy six of them in Kiev [VP Akimov, ‗A Short History‘, 302]  
429  NK Krupskaya, Memories, 21, 23; VP Akimov, ‗A Short History‘, 265-77 
430  AN Potresov & BI Nikolaevskii, Sotsial-democraticheskoe dvizhenie, i 316-22 
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significantly modified on this occasion. There is evidence that the founders of the 
RSDLP wanted Osvobozhdenie Truda to contribute to this party programme, given its 
well-developed theoretical views.431 However, in 1900 this plan was replaced with the 
more modest goal of preparing a 'programme-minimum', the idea being to focus on 
supposedly 'achievable' goals, whilst bypassing any discussion of theoretical views or 
the general aims of the party, a departure which challenged its previously 
revolutionary political content.432 In the same fashion, despite the production of a 
fairly complete party constitution in 1898, the group around Kopel'zon and Lalaiants 
took the trouble to work out a new one, expressing federalistic notions that contrasted 
with the centralism of the previous statutes.433 For these two reasons it seemed that the 
RSDLP was being converted from a clearly revolutionary and Marxist organisation, 
albeit one in which differing conceptions of Marxism could co-exist, into a federalist 
labour party which remained silent on the question of revolution, and which scarcely 
seemed to propogate any definite views at all. This new approach seemed to aim at 
incorporating within its fairly loose structure all the most significant Russian social-
democratic organisations, and to accomodate all their diverse opinions in one party 
structure by means of the politics of the lowest common denominator. Consequently, 
during the period we are studying there appear to have been two clear and distinct 
views as to what the RSDLP actually was, both of which remained in the realm of 
theory, neither side having been able to properly realise their plans. The first, 
represented by Iskra seemed to take as its general starting point the documents of the 
First Congress. The second was the federalist-Economist view, which found 
expression in the pre-congress documents of the Lalaiants-Kopel'zon 'congress 
attempt'. The latter initially seemed to have the political advantage in that it was 
supported by the Union Abroad, the Bund and for a time the 'southern' - in other 
words, the Ukrainian - social-democratic organisations. Iskra's main weapon was only 
the argument that it, rather than the Lalaiants-Kopel'zon alliance more truly 
represented the views of the only ever official RSDLP meeting, along with an 
                                                        
431  R Taylor & N Harding, Key Documents, 236-41 
432
  AN Potresov & BI Nikolaevskii, Sotsial-democraticheskoe dvizhenie, i 319 [article 1] As we saw 
earlier, this lack was challenged by the 'editorial board of Rabochaia Gazeta': Lenin, Martov and 
Potresov. 
433  Ibid., i 319-21 [article 3]  
  
 
 
132 
 
effective all-Russian - as opposed to regional - network for broadcasting its views. 
 
   In the next two chapters, we will be examining the struggle between these 
two tendencies over the character of the RSDLP, focusing on the period from the final 
split in the emigration, at the end of 1901, up to the end of the Second Congress itself. 
In our view, this can be characterised as a struggle between a fairly elitist type of 
federalism and reformism, on the one hand, and revolutionary democratic centralism 
on the other. We will examine this conflict as follows. In the present chapter we will 
focus on what can be regarded as the first phase of this conflict, the preparations for 
the Second Congress of the RSDLP, the second being the factional struggle at the 
Congress itself. These preparations for congress set out in particularly bold relief 
Lenin's democratic and constitutionally-minded organisational principles. They show 
how he fought to create a multi-tendency workers party, based in class struggle 
socialism and capable of incorporating reformist and revolutionary currents within it, 
whilst at the same time striving to secure a clearly revolutionary programme and 
leadership for such a party. That is to say, during this period Lenin and Iskra strives to 
act both as lawgiver and government to the RSDLP, in the sense that their methods 
are clearly shown to revolve around the creation of a generally-recognised 
constitutional order inside the party. In the name of this type of order, he fights 
against arbitrary decision making by the most influential individuals; stands for the 
creation of a party leadership which has the express support of the greater part of 
those Russian organisations that consider themselves part of the party; and gives a 
real form to the principle that the party should be governed by rules consciously 
approved by these same organisations. On this party-constitutional basis, he directs 
the construction of a sovereign RSDLP congress with a robust claim to being 
representative of the real balance of factional forces in the organisation, despite its 
being dominated by the Iskra faction. This domination, we contend, is the product of 
a fair fight for power and influence within the RSDLP carried on largely in 
accordance with the rules and assumptions laid down by Lenin, but approved by the 
party as a whole. 
 
 Controversially perhaps, whilst in the process of designing the new party order 
itself, Lenin simultaneously supported the aggressive prosecution of this factional 
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struggle, which may cause questions to be posed about separation of powers by 
constitutional-democratic purists. However, given the complete collapse of RSDLP 
institutions, this was probably the only avenue open for an individual who wanted the 
party to be both revolutionary Marxist in leadership and democratic-constitutional in 
form. An individual who was 'above factions' did not exist in the context we are 
describing, and as a result, a common RSDLP framework could only have been 
constructed as a result of partial and temporary co-operation between partisans of 
opposing views. Consequently, the fact that Lenin both fought and co-operated with 
the Bund, Rabochee Delo and the Southern Union in the period we are about to 
discuss should not come as a surprise. The ongoing conflict did not negate Lenin's 
commitment to treating his opponents fairly, or his commitment to subordinating his 
own faction to commonly recognised rules and norms that would regulate the 
factional conflict within the RSDLP.  
  
 
i) Two Contrasting Methods of Organising a Congress 
 
 Accordingly, the investigation now moves to the months following the final 
split in the emigration at the end of 1901. During this time, both sides began to 
campaign among the social-democratic organisations in Russia in an attempt to 
mobilise support for their views. At first glance, it seems that Iskra had certain 
advantages over its opponent, as for more than a year it had been smuggling its illegal 
literature into Russia along with other Marxist literature, establishing a team of often 
homeless, passportless and jobless agents whose function it was to supply the paper to 
the local organisations.434 It has been established for example, that in July 1901, the 
Russian section of Iskra was possessed of nine agents, two of whom were running an 
underground press in Kishinev, with others based in St Petersburg, Moscow, 
Kharkov, Odessa, Kiev and Vilno.435 We also know that a few of these agents had no 
fixed abode.436 Around these professional agents were gathered small bands of trusted 
volunteers who were recruited to do much of the difficult and dangerous work, whilst 
                                                        
434  Leninskii Sbornik, viii 93-360; OA Piatnitskii, Memoirs of a Bolshevik, 24-61 
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the 'professional' directed things from behind the scenes, effectively remaining in 
hiding.437 Together, these two types of activist made up the Russian Iskra 
organisation, a body which has everything in common with Lenin's notion of an 
'organisation of revolutionaries' that he describes in What Is To Be Done?438 Following 
the 'second' emigre split this organisation held its founding congress in Samara during 
January 1902, at which its future strategy was outlined.439 The meeting decided to 
place at the core of the organisation a central committee of sixteen 'professionals', 
who were to be distributed to all areas of the country, with the exception of two 
'flying' agents, who moved from place to place.440 Their job was not simply the 
distribution of the newspaper: in addition they had to campaign to win supporters for 
its views, especially among the leading bodies of the local organisations, the 
committees. This was expressed in the following congress resolution: 
 
 Отношение к местным комитетам. Каждый член Ц.К., являясь в данное место, 
должен стремиться к приобретению там наибольшего влияния и иметь конечной целю 
присоединение данного комитета к организации Искры и к признанию еѐ партийным органом. 
Для этого он 1) входит автономно в местную группу, предлагая ей услугу по доставке 
литература, газеты, по печатанию прокламаций, заявлений и пр. 2) если, несмотря на все усилия, 
Комитет остается враждебным - он образует свою собственную группу и свой местный 
комитет.441    
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  Indeed, committees where a critical mass was sympathetic to Iskra were urged 
not only to declare their support for the views of the Iskra newspaper, but to fuse 
directly with the Iskra organisation. This process involved the co-option of Iskra 
members onto the committee, a declaration of support in the Iskra newspaper, the 
remitting of funds to Iskra and above all, participation by the local organisations in 
what Iskra termed 'All-Russian' work.442 In other words, members of the local 
organisation would be detailed for work distributing literature, setting up new printing 
presses and stores, setting up social-democratic groups in new areas and other tasks 
conducive to the good of the social-democratic movement as a whole. In this fashion, 
a bloc of well-co-ordinated, mutually supporting pro-Iskra local organisations was 
expected to emerge over time and one gets the sense that this is what Lenin was 
talking about when, in his Declaration of the Editorial Board of Iskra, he spoke of 
unity being 'worked for'.  
 
 The Economists had nothing quite so sophisticated with which to oppose 
Iskra, but they initially had the far greater advantage of clear bases of support within 
the most influential Russian organisations. In particular, the Union Abroad seemed to 
have the sympathy of the Bund leadership and the newly formed Union of Southern 
Committees and Associations, which comprised about half a dozen groups between 
Kiev and Kharkov in the north, and the Black Sea in the south.443 This suggested that 
anything up to twenty local groups were on the side of the Economists, at a time when 
Iskra, though increasingly well-known, had yet to obtain a solid constituency.444 For 
these reasons, the established differences of opinion on how to organise a congress 
took on a particularly sharp practical form during this period. If Iskra wanted to delay, 
in order to 'work for unity', the Economists had all the more reason to proceed with all 
due haste and appoint new leading bodies: the balance of factional forces was at this 
stage favourable to them. Nor was this situation a matter of coincidence, as it reflected 
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the fundamentally different attitude each group took to the RSDLP.  Iskra wanted to 
change organisational relations by merging all groups into one and was thus obliged 
to engage in a more or less lengthy campaign of persuasion. The Economists' 
organisational policy, by contrast, was essentially to give a party-constitutional 
blessing to the status quo, a loose federation of groups. On this basis it could easily 
gain the immediate support of significant regional organisations, such as the Bund, 
whose actual structures appear to have inspired the organisational formulae advanced 
by the Economists at the 1900 congress 'attempt. These conservative views are most 
clearly expressed in the draft constitution which was to have been presented to this 
congress. The third resolution dealing with organisational matters reads: 
 
 Съезд полагает: а) Создать окружные районные организации близколежащих городов с 
конспирацией сношений между этими последними, сношения ЦК установить только с 
районными организациями, а функции ЦК сузить.445  
 
 The document continues: 
 
 Организации этих районных союзов должна быть такова: крупнейший город с наиболее 
солидным и прочным движением в данном районе берет на себя обязанность организовать 
возможно близкие сношения с другими городами своего района. Для этих городов он 1)издает 
орган района, 2) доставляет литература, 3) печатает (в случае необходимости) листки и 
прокламации, 4) по возможности распределяет людей, 5) ведет союзную кассу, 6) если нужно, 
устраивает местные съезды 7) представительствует на общерусских съездах, 8)исполняет 
разные конспиративные поручения.446 
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 In this Economist proposition we meet with the idea of very strong regional 
organisations, which 'narrow' (souzit) the functions of the central committee. Not only 
that, they seem to take away the rights of the local groups to be represented at the 
RSDLP congress, whilst also absorbing a large number of their practical functions. 
Consequently, we are in a position to hypothesise that this type of federal 
arrangement was designed to replicate the one obtaining inside the Bund, in so far as 
the latter also had its own separate newsheets, émigré department, congresses and 
central committee, with the last of these exercising fairly unmitigated authority over 
local groups in periods between Bund congresses.447 If this hypothesisis accepted, the 
conclusion follows that the Layalants-Kopel'zon RSDLP constitution represented a 
promise not to touch these pre-existing Bund institutions in return for which it seems 
that the Economists were offered this organisation's support in its struggle with 
Iskra.448 Also of note in this connection is the fact that the Union of Southern 
Associations and Committees, of which Lalaiants appears to have been a member, 
was formed on very similar lines in so far as it appointed the pre-existing Iuzhnii 
Rabochii as the Union's official regional newspaper, and also elected its own central 
committee at its founding congress early in 1902.449 However, as this event clearly 
postdates the 1900 congress 'attempt', there can be little doubt as to where the 
organisers of the latter got their organisational ideas. 
 
  With these two points of support - the Bund and the Southern Union - the 
Economists actually looked likely to win the battle against Iskra inside Russia during 
the period following the second émigré split. This would probably have resulted in the 
entire RSDLP being reorganised on federal lines. It was most likely on the basis of 
this expectation that the Economists reached the idea of attempting for a second time 
to call an official party congress. The actual meeting this plan produced took place at 
short notice in March 1902, the venue being Belostock, but in the end it was not 
declared an official RSDLP congress owing to insufficient interest from Russian 
                                                        
447  VP Akimov, ‗A Short History‘, 221-30 
448  NK Krupskaya, Memories, 65; KPSS v resoliutsiakh, 41. It also needs to be recognised that the 
Bund did not need too much encouragement to go against Iskra, given their previous clashes over the 
question of whether Jews should be integrated into the Russian labour movement, or should form 
separate, purely Jewish organisations [Iskra 7 (Aug.1901), 6 & 8 (Sept. 1901), 6].  
449   OA Ermanskii, Otchet S''ezda iuzhnikh komitetov, 10-11 
  
 
 
138 
 
social-democratic organisations.450 This episode is interesting because it illustrates the 
somewhat shabby organisational methods used by the Economist tendency, and their 
clear disregard for commonly-held notions of inclusiveness, transparency and 
accountability. In this sense, the Belostock meeting dispels any notion that the main 
difference between Iskra and its opponents during this period was that the former 
were supporters of dictatorial or manipulative methods during the period we are 
discussing, whereas the latter were essentially democratic and open. Despite the 
attempts of at least one supposedly serious historian, their political differences cannot 
be reduced to such a simple, value-laden opposition.451 The Belostock episode is more 
interesting still in so far as it forced Lenin to articulate his own counter-strategy for 
organising an effective party congress in the form of a letter to the meeting protesting 
the hasty and secretive manner of its convocation.452 This letter is incredibly important 
in that, given the meeting's failure to meet the generally-agreed requirements for an 
RSDLP congress, Lenin was actually obliged to implement the plan he described over 
the following year and a half. For this reason in particular, the Belostock conference is 
therefore our natural starting point when it comes to showing how Lenin's 
organisational methods were fundamentally more democratic than those of his 
Economist, Bundist and Southern Union opponents, despite the fact that Lenin was an 
advocate of organisational centralism, the fusion of all organisations into one, 
whereas his opponents were advocates of federalism. 
 
 The origins of creating an Economist-dominated congress at Belostock in 
March 1902 lay in the immediate aftermath of the second émigré split of the previous 
October, in so far as the Union Abroad at this point decided that a conference of 
Russian organisations should be called to finally resolve the émigré dispute. This 
intention was known to Iskra and in fact it seems to have provided the pretext for 
Lenin writing What Is To Be Done?453 However, Iskra was not aware until 3rd March 
that the meeting, which was due to start on 21st March, had acquired pretensions 
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towards being a congress.454 Not only that, the only information circulated concerning 
the purpose of this 'congress' was as follows: 
 
 А) Экономическая борьба и средства борьбы (стачки, бойкот, демонстрация, 
экономический террор). Б) Политическая борьба и средства (демонстрации, террор 
наступательный и оборонительный)  В) Политическая агитация. Г) 1-е мая. Д) Отношения к 
оппозиционным элементам. Е) Отношения к революционным группам, не входящим в партию. 
Ж) Организации партии. З) Центральный орган и заграничное представительство и заграничные 
партийные организации.455 
 
 This represented an abridgement of procedure relative to the previous congress 
attempt, when draft resolutions on each question that was to be discussed were 
circulated in advance of the meeting and, in the same spirit, Lenin, Martov and 
Potresov had offered to make a 'personal tour' of all the main organisations to discuss 
their 'declaration of faith'. The advantages of this type of procedure are fairly obvious: 
they permit members of an organisation sending representatives to a congress to 
discuss the questions on which their representative is being asked to vote. This can 
accordingly influence their choice of representative and, once they have made that 
choice, allow them to influence the way he or she votes. Equally, people not attending 
the congress can submit changes to the resolutions, and usually opposing resolutions, 
through these representatives. In these ways, rather than just the people actually 
present at the meeting, the whole party participates in the work of the congress and 
the political consciousness of ordinary members can be raised in this way. By the 
same token, the procedure also offers at least some guarantee that the leading 
institutions of the party reflect the opinions of the rank and file. On the other hand, 
simply circulating a list of topics to be discussed, especially without an explanation of 
why they have been chosen does not permit this kind of structured discussion based 
around the strengths and weaknesses of definite propositions, in other words, around 
resolutions. Indeed, there is more than a hint that such a discussion would be opposed 
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by the organisers of the Belostock meeting, ostensibly in the name of secrecy. This 
view gains credibility partially from the short notice at which the congress was called: 
Lenin receives the invitation two and a half weeks before the meeting was due to 
open. Given that false passports456 would probably have to be obtained, along with 
several other necessities for illegal travel, and that members of the emigration were 
distributed around several cities in Europe, the possibility of this broader membership 
having any input into the congress was simply non-existent. Organisations inside 
Russia would probably also have had similar practical problems, especially given the 
fact that there were at this stage two large federations in existence, the local 
organisations of which had almost certainly not even been informed of the fact of the 
congress, let alone permitted to contribute to its work. This conclusion is based on an 
unusual instruction, circulated along with the congress agenda: 
 
 Примите все меры к тому, чтобы широкая публика не узнала о готовящемся съезде.457 
 
 The 'broad public' here almost certainly refers primarily to the party rank and 
file, the 'public opinion of the party', rather than the broader mass of non-social-
democrats. This is because the main way either could find out about the fact a 
congress was taking place could be through an announcement in underground 
newspapers, or proclamations printed on underground presses, neither of which were 
read by broad sections of the public.458 Almost certainly, the organisers are here 
instructing social-democratic editors not to publish such an announcement which, we 
must emphasise, would not need to include the details of time and place, matters 
which would have been of great interest to the police. On the contrary, unlike the 
1900 attempt, where the intended political content of the congress was published in 
advance, in the form of draft resolutions, the very fact of the congress now appears to 
be a secret, an arrangement which shuts off the possibility of ordinary party members 
having any influence on it. 
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 On finding out about the plans to convert the conference into a congress, 
Lenin drafted a letter of protest and apparently sent it to Byelostock in the hands of FI 
Dan, who was later a Menshevik historian and who does not report this event in his 
own account of the Russian social-democratic movement.459 This appears to be 
because the letter reveals some of the more democratic aspects of Lenin's 
organisational thinking that Dan is so strangely quiet about it. Lenin begins the letter 
with the demand that the organisers retain their original plan of holding a conference 
to discuss the specific question of the émigré split.460 His next point is to criticise the 
agenda, posing the questions of whether it is a draft or a final version, and if it is the 
latter, on whose authority it has been approved.461 He also notes its failure to refer to 
the question of the party programme, despite the fact that the First Congress identified 
this task as a priority.462 In this way, he draws attentions to its shortcoming both from 
the traditionally 'revolutionary' and the traditionally 'Economist' view of the RSDLP, 
showing that the planned meeting has established no real links with either the 'narrow 
radical' party of 1898, nor the 'broad and inclusive' model promoted in 1900. Having 
noted that the agenda seems to be inspired by Economism, and that this is fatal in a 
political situation in which the anti-autocratic mood is being exploited by non-social 
democratic revolutionary forces, Lenin then refers in more general terms to the 
democratic shortcomings of the congress: 
 
 (Secondly), it is astonishing that the agenda raises (a few days before the congress!) questions 
that should be  discussed only after thorough preparations, only when it is possible to adopt really 
definite and comprehensible decisions on them—otherwise it is better not to discuss them at all for the 
time being. For example, points E and F: the attitude towards opposition and other revolutionary 
trends. These questions must be discussed in advance, from all angles, reports drawn up on them, and 
differences in existing shades made clear—only then can we adopt decisions that would actually offer 
something new, that would serve as a real guide for the whole Party, and not merely repeat some 
traditional ―generalisation.‖ In point of fact, just consider: can we in a few days prepare a 
comprehensive and well-grounded decision that would take into consideration all the practical 
requirements of the movement on the questions of the attitude towards the ―revolutionary-socialist 
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Svoboda group‖ or towards the new-born ―Socialist-Revolutionary Party‖? 463  
 
 Here, Lenin appears to be applying his notion of 'working for unity' to the 
concrete question of congress organisation. What he says could be viewed as 
pragmatism pure and simple, but this pragmatism is clearly that of an individual 
committed to meaningful debate inside the party. Rather than using congress simply 
to secure the dominance of one tendency over another by means of a hasty 
mobilisation of forces, which then vote through a series of verbal formulations 
reflecting their established views, he sees it as an opportunity for full and properly-
informed debate in which new information and ideas can come to light. The result 
should be a policy that can guide the party through the concrete circumstances in 
which it finds itself, not simply the registration of the balance of factional forces 
inside the party. To achieve this, preparatory work is necessary, both in the sense of 
researching all the relevant information, and the drafting of provisional theses for 
consideration by congress. Significantly, Lenin does not seem to regard this 
preparatory work as an opportunity to impose uniform views on the congress itself: on 
the contrary, 'existing shades must be made clear', the assumption seeming to be that 
congress would then be in a position to decide between more than one properly-
informed opinion. These remarks therefore strengthen the argument that the 
revolutionary Lenin, rather than the reformist Economists, had a greater grasp of the 
meaning of party democracy during this period. 
 
 In the light of his view of what a congress should really achieve, Lenin then 
sketches out an alternative agenda for the Belostock meeting, the greater part of which 
is dedicated to preparations for a future RSDLP congress, the assumption being that 
the meeting would renounce its own pretensions to this title. Lenin's first point in this 
connection is the idea that the meeting should establish some agreed principles of 
representation for the future congress, determining what type of party organisations 
should be present, thus properly establishing its roots in the Russian social-democratic 
movement. It has already been noted in this connection that the documents from the 
1900 congress attempt seem to indicate a drastically reduced scheme of 
representation, in the sense that only the central committees of different regional 
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organisations such as the Bund and the Southern Union would be allowed to send 
representatives, and not the local branch organisations - the local committees - united 
by these regional organisations. In this light, the following suggestion by Lenin: 
 
 We should discuss .... the general principles of representation and the fullest possible 
representation (i. e., so as to ensure representation of definite pre-selected committees and certain 
groups, and possibly also of study circles of Russian Social-Democrats, to say nothing of the 
comparatively easy task of securing representatives from the two Social-Democratic organisations 
abroad; a procedure should also be adopted for discussing the question of inviting to the congress such 
organisations that may be founded in the interim between conference and congress, etc., etc.)464 
 
 seems to represent a much more democratic method of operation. Lenin, 
unlike his federalist opponents appears to advocate the 'fullest scheme of 
representation', including somewhat ambiguously-defined committees, groups and 
study-circles. Normally, a 'committee' in the jargon of the movement referred to the 
essentially self-selecting leadership of the social-democratic movement in a large 
town.465 Thus the Southern Union was made up of committees from Nikolayev, 
Odessa, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav and Kishinev as well as at least one non-committee 
'organisation', the 'Odessa Group of Revolutionary Social-Democrats'.466 The last of 
these appears to have been a splinter group. The Bund, meanwhile had committees in 
as many as fourteen towns during this period, but the movement in at least eleven 
other locations was not considered sufficiently large for its local leadership to be 
awarded official 'committee' status by the Bund's central committee.467 It seems that 
Lenin intends all such bodies to be represented directly at the party congress and not 
indirectly, through members of the central committee of the Southern Union and the 
central committee of the Bund. Further, Lenin refers to 'study circles' in his plan, 
which were essentially groups of five to ten workers who followed courses in Marxist 
theory. There appear to have been several of these in every city which was possessed 
of a social-democratic movement. For example, when Lenin was active in St 
Petersburg, for example, he led a study circle in the Nevsky gate area of the city, 
recruits to which were workers apparently draw from a local Sunday school where 
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Krupskaya was a teacher.468 The Bund also organised a great number of these circles 
in each of the towns where it was organised, work carried out alongside its 
organisation of illegal trade unions.469 Consequently, by advocating the inclusion of 
the study circles, Lenin appeared to be suggesting that each town would be entitled to 
several delegates at the congress, and that among them should be workers, provided 
that they had a sufficiently high level of political understanding to make a meaningful 
contribution to the decision-making process. The overall significance of this 
suggestion can be expressed numerically as follows. According to the federal formula 
supported by the Economists, an RSDLP congress, at which only regional 'central 
committees' were represented, could be made up of as few as a dozen individuals, 
which would include perhaps two or three representatives from each of the main 
national or regional federations, plus representative from the emigration and the main 
party publications.470 By contrast, Lenin's scheme of representation suggests that the 
congress would include delegates from around twenty local committees, plus maybe 
two or three additional delegates from each town, the result being a congress 
involving up to hundred individuals. Naturally, this is very strong evidence for 
Lenin's democratic sensibilities. 
 
   In this letter, Lenin makes several further suggestions as to how the 
remaining institutions of the party might be revived. The most significant appears to 
have been the idea that the Economist-dominated conference elect an organising 
committee which, as well as ensuring that all the plans made by the meeting were 
carried through, should also start to carry out a number of general tasks, such as the 
transportation of illegal literature around the country, the creation of new underground 
print shops and the issuing of leaflets in the name of the RSDLP as a whole.471 He also 
imagines that the committee would offer these services to broader labour and student 
organisations whose aims were in keeping with the RSDLP, but which were not 
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affiliated to it.472 This organising committee appears to have been a kind of ad hoc 
central committee to the RSDLP, provisional in the sense that it had not been elected 
by an official congress of the party, but would nonetheless carry out the main 
functions of such a body until such a congress took place.473 As a part of the RSDLP, 
and because of its unofficial status, it seems that the organising committee would 
include individuals from all the main political tendencies so as to gain maximum 
support.474 At the same time, it would take over many of the functions up to this point 
carried out exclusively by the Iskra organisation, the services of which Lenin offered 
to this proposed committee. This might appear like a clever factional manoeuvre, the 
aim of which was to get all the tendencies in the RSDLP to carry out the plan for 
party reunification hatched by Iskra alone, but further examination of the document 
suggests that this is not the case, and that it is more likely that Lenin hoped that the 
Bund and the Southern Union would offer their 'services' in exactly the same way, 
even though this is not stated explicitly. This is because Lenin also suggests the 
meeting elect a commission to reconcile the two drafts of the party programme which 
were at this point being prepared by himself and Plekhanov.475 In other words, whilst 
insisting that the Plekhanovites had a key role to play in formulating the party's 
official world view, he also seemed to recognise that its views should be subject to 
some form of wider control, and that the input of the wider party into the draft was 
essential. Equally, in relation to the question of the party newspaper, Lenin does not 
simply insist that Iskra, as the most frequently appearing and most widely-distributed 
paper should be automatically considered for this role. On the contrary, whilst 
drawing attention to the fact that it is the only All-Russian social-democratic 
fortnightly, he identifies the aim of producing a weekly title by combining its forces 
with other elements present at the meeting.476 Thus, rather than plotting a crude 
factional takeover, Lenin appears to be proposing several forms of collaboration 
between all tendencies present at the meeting, only one of which was the organising 
committee. 
                                                        
472  Ibid., vi 102 
473
  Ibid., vi 102-3 
474  Minutes of the RSDLP Second Congress,,  29, 35 
475  Leninskii Sbornik, ii 15-171; VI Lenin, Collected Works, vi 103 
476  VI Lenin, Collected Works, vi 103-4 
  
 
 
146 
 
 
 In the light of Lenin's behaviour in the previous chapter, this might seem hard 
for some to accept or, alternatively, appear like some sudden switch of position. 
However, it is not so much Lenin as the situation that has changed. Previously, his 
main goal was to secure the position of Plekhanovism in the RSDLP and thus to 
prevent it developing into a clearly reformist organisation. This entire situation had 
been created by Plekhanov's tactical mistake of splitting from the Union Abroad, this 
cutting off Osvobozhdenie Truda from an RSDLP which had the support of social-
democratic organisations in several dozen Russian cities. In doing so, Plekhanov had 
appeared to be turning his back on these Russian organisations, thus strengthening the 
argument that the RSDLP was not a revolutionary Marxist organisation. Lenin's 
manoeuvres rectified this situation, but only to the degree that the damage done by 
Plekhanov was repaired, so that by October 1901 the RSDLP was more or less in the 
situation it had been in prior to April 1900: that is, with competing Economist and 
revolutionary factions. Having achieved this goal, Lenin was not really concerned 
with pursuing this type of battle with the Economists any further, in the sense of 
trying to consolidate his gains by driving them out of the RSDLP completely. The 
reasons for this are fairly clear: if we go back to the period preceding the split in the 
Union Abroad, we find Lenin collaborating quite happily with the Economists, for all 
his ideological differences with them: only thus can we explain his willingness to 
accept the editorial post in Rabochaia Gazeta, his initial refusal to criticise Rabochee 
Delo in the Draft Declaration of the Editorial Board of Iskra, and so on. Whilst he 
was quite prepared to speak out against the excesses of Economism during this period, 
this was never translated into organisational manipulations. Following the resolution 
of the Plekhanov 'problem', which we characterised as the reinsertion of 
Osvobozhdenie Truda back into the RSDLP, Lenin essentially reverted to his previous 
position. The basis of it, in both its earlier and later versions, was a desire to 
reconstruct the RSDLP involving all elements who claimed to support it. This implies 
that, throughout the whole period we are studying Lenin was essentially in favour of a 
pluralistic, multi-tendency RSDLP, incorporating both revolutionary and reformist 
socialist trends. Plekhanov's mistake upset this equilibrium and therefore had to be 
corrected using whatever means necessary. Once it was resolved, attempt to restore 
the relative harmony could be initiated, in the sense that the conflict between 
  
 
 
147 
 
reformist and revolutionary would from this point on take the form of an open and fair 
competition for power and influence within a common party. 
 
 
ii)Revolutionary Marxism and Reformism in the Context of RSDLP Democracy 
 
 The main features of Lenin's plan were accepted by the Belostock meeting, in 
so far as it abandoned its pretences to be the Second Congress of the RSDLP, and 
elected an organising committee for joint work towards a far more representative and 
well-prepared meeting that could more justifiably take the name.477 However, as has 
just been indicated, such all-sided agreement on best way to develop the RSDLP 
could not mean an end to the fundamental opposition between Economism and 
revolutionary Marxism that now characterised the party. The immediate result of this 
appears to have been that, whilst Lenin was prepared to support and respect the 
decisions of a multi-tendency organising committee, the conflict between 
revolutionary and reformist now began to take the form of a pre-congress campaign 
aiming at winning over various local organisations, the goal being to persuade them to 
send Iskra supporters and not Economists to the congress at which the party's future 
would be decided.478 It seems that Lenin must have conceived this campaign in quite 
broad terms. As had been agreed at the Iskra congress in January, committees won to 
Iskra were to be absorbed into the Russian Iskra organisation, freely exchanging 
personnel and funds among themselves and thereby forming a centralised unit.479 The 
short-term goal of this process appeared to be the creation of an Iskra bloc of local 
organisation, probably based in the Russian 'north' and on the Volga, which could 
appear at first glance as a third regional federation, comparable to the Bund, which 
occupied the western territories, and the Southern Union, whose basis was the 
Ukraine. With the prospect of a congress, Lenin clearly imagined there would be 
some form of electoral competition between these blocs, with each attempting to 
poach local organisations from one another in a struggle to secure the nomination of 
sympathetic delegates. At any rate, Iskra was in a particularly strong position to do 
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this, given its all-Russian character, even if as a proportion of the party as a whole it 
was clearly in a minority. The paper and its agents were distributed in every area of 
the country, and accordingly acquired groups of sympathisers in Kiev and 
Ekaterinoslav, for example, despite the fact that these were clearly in the territory 
covered by the Southern Union. By contrast, the Southern Union only produced a 
regional paper, Iuzhnii Rabochii and had no contacts outside its core territory. 
Likewise, the Bund appeared to be in a weak position in so far as its clearly Jewish 
identity was a barrier to its expansion which, in any case could only have been into 
the territory of its ally, the Southern Union owing to the discriminatory laws against 
Jews residing beyond the pale of residence.480 Eager to capitalise on this situation, 
Lenin urged the Iskra agents to engage in a renewed struggle for influence within all 
the local organisations, with particular emphasis on the south and St Petersburg, 
which at this stage were dominated by the Economists, but in which all three main 
organisations seemed to have a certain presence.481 In other words, having formalised 
the idea of a pluralistic party with the opposing trends in this same party, Lenin 
initiated a struggle to make the Iskra group as strong as possible in relation to these 
opponents, bearing in mind its minority status, and possibly with a mind to the fact 
that the majority would use its power to pass a federalistic constitution at the 
forthcoming congress. By consolidating Iskra in the north, Lenin was clearly 
preparing for battle on the terrain of a federal arrangement, whilst by expanding into 
the South, he was creating an effective argument against such an arrangement in the 
first place. 
 
 When Lenin advocated this course of action, it seems that he was not fully 
aware of the fact that a huge police raid had taken place on the organisations involved 
in the Belostock meeting, hence his reference in the letter to the need to 'undermine' 
the Southern Union, a job which had by this stage been carried out perfectly well by 
the gendarmerie.482 This created a rather complex situation. The spokesman of the 
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organising committee at the actual Second Congress of the RSDLP reports that 
 
 The (Belostock) conference had, incidentally, made provision that in the event of the 
Organising Committee proving unable to function, it would be the duty of those taking part in the 
conference to re-establish it.483 
 
 In accordance with this provision, which had in all probability been advanced 
by the Iskra representatives themselves, the one surviving member of the organising 
committee, a representative of the Bund, indicated his desire to re-establish the 
organising committee, a message which brought to Lenin's attention, presumably 
through the London-based Foreign Committee of the Bund.484 Lenin, in his turn, 
informed the leadership of the Russian Iskra organisation of this fact and wrote them 
the following note: 
 
 We have just given the Bundist contact with you. This concerns the congress. You and he (+ 
the bureau or someone else) must form a Russian Committee for preparing the congress. Behave as 
impressively as you can and act with caution. Take on yourself the greatest possible number of districts 
in which you undertake to prepare for the congress, refer to the bureau (giving it some other name), in a 
word, make sure that the whole thing is entirely in your hands, leaving the Bund, for the time being, 
confined to the Bund. We shall begin negotiations here about a rapprochement over here, and will 
inform you immediately. 
 
 And so, for the time being, have in mind the composition of a Russian Committee for 
Preparing the Congress which is most advantageous for us (you may find it convenient to say that you 
have already formed this committee, and are very glad to have the Bund participate or something like 
this). Take on yourself, without fail, to be secretary in this committee. These are the first steps. And 
then we shall see. 
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 I say have the composition ―in mind‖ to have as free a hand as possible: don‘t commit 
yourself to the Bund right away (you can say, for example, that connections have been established with 
the Volga, the Caucasus, the centre—we have a man from over there—and the South—we‘re sending 
two down there), and make yourself master of the undertaking. But do all this most carefully, without 
rousing objections.485 
 
 Lenin's meaning here is very clear. Obliged by the agreement at the Belostock 
conference to help in the reconstruction of the organising committee, he nonetheless 
seeks to use it to consolidate the factional advantage of Iskra. He employs bluff and a 
certain element of deceit with the aim of preventing the Bund from using the 
organising committee to establish itself in new areas and, of course, to capture 
precisely these areas for his own side. This in itself is not a violation of the Belostock 
decision, nor could anyone seriously argue that Lenin's desire to get the better of the 
Bund represented a breach of its spirit, even if the methods he advocates at this point 
are not entirely comradely. Lenin clearly instructs his colleague to abide by the terms 
of the cross-factional agreement. Because of this, we are presented with a 
contradictory picture of Iskra, which on the one hand represents revolutionary 
Marxism, and as such battles different reformist organisations for a predominant 
position in the RSDLP, in this case on the organising committee. On the other hand 
and alongside this commitment to a power-struggle, there is a commitment to the 
principle that RSDLP institutions should be established with the consent of all the 
main shades of opinion inside the party. It is only possible to resolve this 
contradiction by concluding that Lenin supported a competitive, pluralistic regime 
inside the RSDLP in which different strands of opinion came to agreements on the 
question of how to make their struggle with one another a law-governed and 
democratic process, a type of agreement which did not in the least negative their 
fundamental rivalry with one another.  
 
 This said, it can seem that this willingness to fight as well as to co-operate 
may have contributed to the temporary suspension of work on the organising 
committee during the summer and early Autumn of 1902, the circumstances being as 
follows. From the beginning of March 1902, many professional agents and leading 
volunteer members languished in Kiev's Lukianovskaia gaol, owing to a raid on the 
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Iskra regional conference in Kiev, which had been held shortly before the Belostock 
meeting.486 Crucially, it seems that the capture of Silvin and Babushkin, both of whom 
were travelling agents, made it very difficult for the Iskra organisation to carry out its 
organising committee obligations.487 We say this because at a later stage Lenin makes 
it clear that the job of an organisating committee agent involved much travelling and a 
totally illegal existence, in other words one in which the agent never registers with the 
authorities.488 Whatever the case, the arrests appear to have produced a change of 
tactics, possibly decided by the Russian Iskra organisation itself, which essentially 
revolved around rebuilding its own structures and consolidating its position in the 
northern area of the country, whilst abandoning the task of reestablishing the 
organising committee, a departure which appears to reflect a break with the spirit, if 
not the letter of the Belostock agreement. Evidence for this change of tactics can be 
found in the fierce faction fight that broke out in St Petersburg at this time between 
the supporters of Rabochee Delo and the local Iskra group, led by I I Radchenko.489 
This seems significant in so far as Krupskaya characterises Radchenko as a travelling 
Iskra agent, which could suggests that he was redeployed to St Petersburg when he 
could have worked on the organising committee.490 Moreover, during this struggle, 
Radchenko received the hearty encouragement of Lenin, which leads us to the 
conclusion that Lenin too was prepared to ignore the Belostock decision when it came 
to re-establishing the organising committee.491 Indeed, it can appear that he 
subordinates this commitment that of strengthening the Iskra faction at the expense of 
the Economists, especially in St Petersburg. 
 
 In fact, there can be little doubt that this is exactly what happened, albeit for a 
short period dating from May to August 1902. The question we therefore have to ask 
is how this episode relates to Lenin's overall strategy. Previously, we suggested that a 
new phase in Lenin's political activity opened up with his victory at the Belostock 
conference, characterised by a desire to rebuild the RSDLP as a multi-tendency and 
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democratic socialist labour party. We contend that this remains the case, despite 
Lenin's apparent lapse, following the arrests, into a position in which he appears to be 
only interested in building a revolutionary Marxist organisation. This is, first of all, 
because the lapse was clearly temporary and, as we shall see below, once the Russian 
Iskra's position was properly consolidated, Lenin once more began to agitate for the 
creation of a new organising committee. Thus it seems that his policy was to fight for 
a new RSDLP congress, prepared in accordance with his argument at Belostock, but 
only on condition that this did not damage the position of Iskra in relation to its 
factional opponents. This would be for the fairly good reason that the alternative 
strategy of trying to dominate the organising committee and trying to marginalise the 
Bund could well have led to a situation in which Iskra, almost alone, created a 
democratic and well-prepared congress only then to have found itself incapable of 
carrying out the additional work of campaigning for Iskra views among the 
organisations eligible to send delegates to it. Concretely, it seems that by taking on 
extra organising committee work in order to keep the Bund out of the Ukraine, 
positions in the north would have been lost to supporters of Rabochee Delo. The 
result would have been a reformist-dominated congress prepared mainly by the work 
of revolutionaries, an obvious tactical mistake for Iskra. The question remains 
whether Iskra's refusal to make such a mistake, not to mention its apparent failure to 
offer to co-operate with the Bund on more equitable terms in the organising 
committee once it became clear how weak its own organisation had become, 
represented violations of the organisational principles we discussed earlier. It is hard 
to provide an answer to these points, beyond noting that the Belostock meeting, 
stipulated only that the organising committee could be re-formed following its 
collapse by any faction, and that it had to include all major groupings in the party.492 
 
  As shall now be demonstrated, Lenin ultimately fulfilled this condition, albeit 
in his own time and in his own way, so as to bring maximum benefit to Iskra. 
Specifically, this shows that having pluralistic political principles is not the same 
thing as the complete self-negation of one's own views to the advantage of somebody 
else's, and that concretely, Lenin's commitment to party democracy during this period 
did come at the expense of his support for revolutionary principles or for an organised 
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revolutionary faction. In other words, in order to become a party democrat, Lenin did 
not have to temporarily suspend his revolutionary Marxism and begin implementing 
reformist policies. On the contrary, he devised a strategy for organising committee 
work that satisfied both Iskra's factional interests and the principles Lenin articulated 
at Belostock, the main phases of which we shall now describe. For all the minor faults 
in its execution, this strategy provides obvious proofs, comment on which is largely 
superfluous, as to the democratic and constitutional nature of Lenin's methods of party 
organisation, proofs that undermine any doubts which may arise concerning his good 
faith during the summer of 1902. 
  
 
iii) The Reconstitution of the Organising Committee and its Work 
 
 Two factors advantageous to Iskra appear to have conspired to precipitate a 
new attempt at forming the organising committee late in the summer of 1902. The 
first of these appears to have been Radchenko's success in St Petersburg, as a result of 
which another Iskra agent active in the city, one VP Krasnukha, went abroad to meet 
Lenin for discussion on work towards the congress.493 By this stage, a social-
democratic organisation active in several small towns in the upper Volga region, the 
Northern Union, had also been won to Iskra and its representative, VA Noskov also 
appeared in London, apparently on the same mission.494 A meeting of these took place 
on 15th August with Lenin and the Iskra agent Krasikov, dedicated to discussing how 
to relaunch the organising committee.495 The second factor which counted in Iskra's 
favour was news from the south that, although the leadership of the Southern Union 
had been completely dismantled as a result of the police action at Belostock, its 
newspaper, Iuzhnii Rabochii intended to resume publication, and that the latter now 
considered itself an adherent of Iskra principles.496 This ideological change cannot be 
taken entirely seriously, and was probably motivated by the fact that, in the wake of 
the raids, the papers' editors had become completely isolated from the social-
democratic movement, and wanted the help of the Iskra organisation to re-establish 
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contacts with activists in the different southern towns.497 Despite this, Iskra seemed 
willing to co-operate with the group.498 The result was a tactically much more 
considered attempt to re-establish the organising committee in accordance with 
Belostock principles, yet without undermining Iskra's own position.  
 
 The first step was to establish a purely Iskra core made up of representatives 
of St Petersburg, the Northern Union and the Russian Iskra organisation.499 This 
would begin work as a provisional group, seeking to expand the influence of Iskra 
whilst at the same time sounding out and appointing agents for the real organising 
committee in different areas of the country. In relation to the southern region, it was 
decided to investigate Iuzhnii Rabochii more closely by sending Iskra agents to meet 
them and, providing they were found to be of sufficient standard, to co-opt them onto 
the organising committee in an official capacity.500 Having obtained this unequal 
union of two organisations, the Bund would then be approached and invited to send 
its representative. Then, one representative from each of the three main organisations 
- the Bund, Iskra and Iuzhnii Rabochii - plus the St Petersburg committee, which was 
represented by Krasnukha, would together vote additional personnel on to the 
committee and thereafter direct the committee's policy.501 Thus it seems clear that the 
remaining members would provide practical services to the committee but would not 
have the 'full rights' of these four central individuals. An approach to the emigre 
organisations who had participated in the Belostock meeting, such as the Foreign 
Committee of the Bund, the Union Abroad and the revolutionary League would be 
delayed further still, the aim being to create a separate 'emigre department' of the 
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organising committee to incorporate these groups.502 The aim of this was to guarantee 
a Russian section of the organising committee utterly dominated by Iskra and its co-
thinkers in the south, whilst the overseas section would be dominated by the anti-Iskra 
groups who had conceived of the Belostock meeting. Having satisfied the Belostock 
principles in this manner, the final move would be to formally subordinate the 
émigrés to the Russians, and to confine the former to work among the emigration in 
accordance with instructions received from Russia.503 Ostensibly, the most important 
part of this, given the eventual decision to hold the congress abroad, appears to have 
been devoted to finding a venue and arranging the accommodation of delegates and to 
secure their safe passage over the border. However, it is clear Lenin intended to keep 
this function firmly in the hands of Iskra alone, owing to their superior experience in 
matters related to smuggling activists over the Russian frontier, though to obtain this 
outcome it was now necessary to have the support of the Bund and Iuzhnii 
Rabochii.504 
 
 The result of this plan was a meeting in Pskov in November, to which 
representatives of Russian Iskra, Iuzhnii Rabochii and the Bund were invited.505 The 
Bund, however, did not attend owing to an accidental breakdown in communication. 
It seems that Krasikov delivered an invitation to a local branch of the Jewish 
organisation, but that this was either ignored or not forwarded to its leadership.506 The 
result was that the existence of the organising committee was declared without the 
presence of the Bund, a procedure that caused Lenin to query the actions of Krasikov, 
at this stage the main travelling Iskra agent, as it did not coincide with the agreed 
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plan.507 The result was that at first the committee was rather lopsided, and appeared to 
have been constituted somewhat in violation of the Belostock terms, a compromise 
apparently justified by those present at the Pskov meeting on the grounds that further 
delays were unacceptable.508 Lenin's concern on this point was apposite, as it gave the 
Bund the opportunity to protest that it was being excluded, even though the organising 
committee's public statement clearly referred to the Bund's wished for participation.509 
Indeed, the public exchange of views on this matter did not raise the credibility of the 
organising committee, even though the Bund ultimately consented to send a 
representative and acknowledged that the organising committee was correctly 
constituted.510 Thus, even if its work was disrupted towards the end of 1902 by further 
arrests, by January the Russian section of the organising committee was in a position 
to carry out its work having been constituted largely in accordance with the Belostock 
formula.  
 
 One remaining problem was that of the émigré department. It seems that Lenin 
had planned to approach both the Foreign Committee of the Bund and the Union for 
some form of co-operation in organising the congress, in a letter stressing the legal 
basis of the group in the Belostock conference.511 However, it also appears that he had 
a change of heart on this point, possibly having heard of the problem with the Bund, 
as a result of which he did not carry through this part of his plan. As has already been 
noted, the foreign committee would have probably been dominated by the Economists 
and, possibly recalling his mistake the previous May, Lenin apparently decided to do 
nothing and to allow the Economists to exercise their right to create such a body on 
their own initiative. The result of this rather conscious passivity was that nothing was 
done about the foreign section until February, when a representative of the Union 
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Abroad finally wrote to Lenin about this question, perhaps having read the 
announcement of the organising committee in Iskra.512 Lenin replied by referring them 
to the Russian 'section' of the committee who were of course in no hurry to reply, 
given its anti-Economist majority and a certain amount of prompting from the Iskra 
leader. Consequently, the Union Abroad and the other émigré organisations played no 
actual role in the work of congress organisation.513 Whilst this policy was formally 
incorrect, this breach of the Belostock agreement cannot be regarded as particularly 
important, and it in fact represented something of a deviation in the direction of 
common sense. This is partially because following Belostock, both Rabochee Delo 
and its Listok ceased to appear, leading to the question of whether the Union Abroad 
could still be considered an active social-democratic group capable of carrying out 
organising work, especially when we consider the two failures at congress 
organisation for which the Union had been partially responsible. Not only this, a very 
similar impression is obtained when we study the Plekhanovite League Abroad, which 
reveals a picture of absolute lethargy during this period and which appeared to have 
no contact whatsoever with Russian life, with the exception of its group in Berlin.514 
As for the Foreign Committee of the Bund it seems that, like the émigré 
Plekhanovites, they were prepared to submit to the judgement of their Russian 
colleagues, with the effect that only one inactive émigré group, the Union Abroad, 
protested its exclusion from the organising committee.515 Finally, it is necessary to 
consider the fact that the organising work in the emigration ultimately carried out by a 
single individual, which naturally poses the question of whether a separate section of 
the organising committee was really necessary.516    
 
 The real work of the organising committee was broadly dictated by Lenin's 
letter to the Belostock meeting, though there were clearly certain modifications 
determined by both circumstance and the fact that Lenin did not at any stage exert 
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direct control over it. The question of the party programme had already been resolved 
by this stage with the appearance of the Plekhanov-Lenin draft in Iskra the previous 
April.517 As a result, critical articles on it were published by Riazanov, Iuzhnii 
Rabochii, whose criticism of the agrarian section was published in Iskra itself, the 
Iskra supporter P.P. Maslov and the Polish Socialist Party, even if the original project 
of a 'programme commission' had been abandoned.518 Thus, the draft programme was 
given significant publicity prior to its approval or rejection by congress, permitting an 
informed debate on it throughout the RSDLP. The organising committee also took on 
the responsibilities normally carried out by the central committee, in so far as it 
published numerous leaflets on questions of national importance.519 However the 
greater part of its work was given over to resolving the controversial question of 
which organisations had the right to attend the congress. Lenin had originally 
suggested a very complete scheme of representation, involving individual circles in 
each local movement, but this was ultimately passed over in favour of the inclusion of 
only the largest committees, a modification which received Lenin's approval after it 
had been published, a fact indicating, incidentally, that the scheme was not his 
work.520 The reason for this change appears to have been the fear of giving an 
excessive voice to groups without real influence in the working class, in a situation 
where it was hard to measure the relative effectiveness of each local group according 
to a common scale.521 This was of course in a context in which there was no agreed 
definition of a party member and his or her duties, with the effect that different groups 
could not be awarded votes in direct proportion to their membership size. 
Consequently, the organisers were faced with devising a fair way of apportioning 
votes between such diverse organistions as: an illegal trade union of hundreds of 
members; a fortnightly newspaper edited by six people but read by thousands, whilst 
receiving articles from all over the country; a courier service which connected twenty 
local groups yet which was made up of no more than a few dozen highly experienced 
individuals; and several small groups of social-democrats who read books in secret 
                                                        
517  Iskra 21 (Apr. 15, 1902)  1-2 
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and issued a leaflet in one town perhaps once every six months. In a more mature 
party, or in a more democratic society, solutions might well have been found to these 
difficulties. Indeed, the organisers felt obliged to note that, were Russia a democracy, 
each local organisation could have been apportioned votes at the congress in 
proportion to the votes it had received in public elections.522 However, in the absence 
of such established methods of deciding the matter, and lack of general agreement as 
to the nature of the party, they decided that most workable solution was to give each 
organisation that made a significant contribution to the social-democratic movement 
the same share of influence whilst denying representation to those who did not, whilst 
clearly defining and seeking general consent for the minimum standards required. One 
can of course debate the pros and cons of this procedure in democratic terms, but 
there is nothing to suggest that it was a calculated attempt to exclude any particular 
faction or point of view.  
 
  Because of these considerations, work on the scheme of representation took 
on a somewhat top-down approach, though this did not mean it lacked democratic 
validity. In the circular announcing its existence, the organising committee stated: 
 
 It is self-evident that the Organising Committee, which has arisen on the initiative of several 
organisations, will be bound by obligatory relations only with those organisations that have already 
authorised it or that will authorise it to act for them. Its relation to all other committees and groups is 
that of a separate organisation, which offers its services to them.523 
   
 Thus it openly acknowledges its provisional, unofficial character, an attitude 
contrasting starkly with the pretensions of the Belostock meeting. Not only that, in 
accordance with this modest self-definition, the organising committee set itself the 
task of acquiring a mandate to act in the name of the RSDLP, in a procedure which 
must surely have undermined any lingering doubts in relation to the committee's 
composition. This it did by drawing up a list of seventeen local committees which it 
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considered to be the most prominent and by seeking declarations of support from 
them for the organising committee's work.524 These seventeen did not include the 
Bund, the St Petersburg Committee, Iuzhnii Rabochii and the Northern Union, all of 
whom at this stage had representatives on the organising committee itself, but the list 
does appear to have represented a majority of the actually existing local organisations, 
even before their greater size and influence was taken into consideration.525 Agents of 
the organising committee made personal visits to each of these, after which their 
declarations of support were published in Iskra.526 This process seems to have 
produced a fierce struggle in several areas between the Economists and the Iskra 
supporters, on the grounds that the former did not actually have a representative on 
the organising committee, despite having a strong oppositional presence in the Iskra-
led movements in Kiev and St Petersburg, and possibly in other areas too.527 However, 
local Iskra supporters seem to have fought off this challenge in nearly every case, 
with the effect that all but one local group gave permission for the organising 
committee to organise a party congress.528 Despite this unanimity, the fact that there 
were such a conflicts as the ones in Kiev and St Petersburg provides strong evidence 
that the seventeen were not simply hand-picked for their pro-Iskra political allegiance, 
and considered together they do seem to include most of the major industrial centres 
and regions of European Russia and the Caucasus.529 The failure of the Economists to 
disrupt the organising committee's work further seems to have been based more on the 
fact that they lacked an all-Russian, or even a regional apparatus linking its supporters 
in different towns, a lack which also explains the failure of the organising committee 
to accept an Economist into its midst. 
 
                                                        
524  Minutes of the RSDLP Second Congress,  30-1 
525  Ibid., 32: here it appears that there were thirty-two Russian committees making up the RSDLP, 
including those involved in the organising committee, but not including the Russian Iskra organisation, 
and with the Bund counting as just one committee, for reasons we shall explain below. 
526  Iskra 34 (Feb 15, 1903) 6 
527  Leninskii Sbornik, viii 301-2; VI Lenin, Collected Works, xxxvi 116-7, 126-8, 131-2, 135  
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  Minutes of the RSDLP Second Congress,  31 
529  Ibid., 31: i.e. St Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, the Don region, the Upper 
Volga industrial region, the Donbass, Tiflis, Baku, Tula, Saratov, Bryansk, Odessa, Nikolayev and 
Voronezh.  Also consulted was the Siberian Union, which apparently had a weak base in several towns.    
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 Having obtained this vote of confidence, the next step was to draft rules of 
representation defining who could and could not attend the congress, the aim being to 
achieve a sufficiently inclusive meeting, without permitting the over-representation of 
small groups which had limited contact with the labour movement.530 Accordingly, 
only organisations active among large populations of workers were allowed to send 
delegates. They also had to prove that they had been in existence for at least one year 
and that they had consistently carried out 'agitational, propagandist or organisational 
work among the working-class masses'.531 On the basis of these requirements, the 
organising committee produced a whole series of regulations detailing the rights and 
obligations of organisations to be represented at the congress.532 It is not essential to 
our argument that we examine the provisions of these rules in detail beyond noting 
that, as well as providing for the participation of the most solid local organisations, all 
the main émigré organisations were explicitly granted the right to attend congress 
with equal voting rights.533 More important is the fact that these provisions were also 
circulated to all known local social-democratic organisations, all of whom were 
invited to submit amendments. This said, only the sixteen 'most influential' had the 
right to vote on these, along with the right to approve the document as a whole, which 
suggested an attempt to balance concerns for inclusiveness with an arrangement that 
ensured the majority view did actually prevail.534 The result was a list of amendments 
proposed by six 'major' and two 'minor' committees, none of which convinced a 
majority of the sixteen largest organisations.535 On this basis, the representation 
scheme was declared to be valid in the eyes of the party, and the organisers began to 
draw up a list of local organisations entitled to attend the congress.  
 
 The organising committee's initial estimate was that fourteen local 
organisations fulfilled the requirements of its rules: eighteen were thus denied 
representation at the congress.536 At first glance, this can seem like poor basis on 
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which to hold a supposedly representative meeting, but closer examination suggests 
that a lot of the groups excluded were still in the earliest stages of their formation, had 
ambiguous attitudes towards the RSDLP, or had demonstrated little practical 
initiative. This impression is obtained from the appeals process which the organising 
committee devised in order to deal with complaints on this score.537 Among those that 
were accepted we find the Association of Mining and Metallurgical Workers from the 
Donbass region, and the Crimean Union. The former's appeal was accepted on the 
grounds that, though small, its area of work was strategic for the RSDLP as a whole, 
and that 'despite exceptionally difficult circumstances ... it has formed firm ties with 
all the largest centres in the area, and since the beginning of 1903 has even carried on 
vigorous agitation, issuing a number of proclamations'.538 In the same spirit, the 
Crimean Union, by demonstrating activity in five separate towns was accepted. Those 
that were rejected included the Odessa organisation Rabochaia Volia on the grounds 
that 
 
 it was an extremely small organisation which, though it had indeed been formed prior to May 
1 last year, carried out hardly any activity prior to autumn of last year [i.e. 1902 - RM]. Since then, the 
'activity' of the Rabochaia Volia group has been known to the Odessa committee only in the form of 
three or four proclamations, distributed in very small numbers. As regards the other organisations 
working in neighbouring towns, neither the Nikolayev nor the Kishinev Committee knew anything at 
all about Rabochaia Volia, apart from the fact that they had at some point separated off from the 
Odessa committee.539 
 
 Even given the possibility of politically motivated score-settling through this 
kind of testimony, it seems that there is a fair principle at work here. Two 
organisations apparently capable of activity in several towns are admitted, whereas as 
one, largely unknown group, operating in a town where a larger, better-known group 
already exists, is excluded. Whilst the latter might seem tough on minority opinions, it 
seems the only practical alternative in cases such as Odessa was to have given one 
vote to each side, which is hardly fair if one of these sides represented a massive 
majority and the other an insignificant minority of local activists. On the other hand, 
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where two more or less equally developed factions existed in the same town, as was 
the case with St Petersburg, places at congress were given to both sides, with the 
effect that St Petersburg had an Economist and an Iskra delegate.540 It is perhaps also 
worth noting in this connection that the Odessa Rabochaia Volia group does not 
appear to have been an Economist group: if, as appears likely, it was connected with 
the 'Odessa Group of Revolutionary Social-Democrats' present at the First Congress 
of the Southern Union, it would seem that its political colouration was probably a 
vulgarised form of Plekhanovism.541 
 
 Apart from these factors, it is important to note that this same appeals process 
resulted in the admission of five extra Russian groups to the congress, with the effect 
that out of thirty-four local groups in total, including the likes of Rabochaia Volia, 
nineteen well-established and active organisations were granted equal representation 
rights: two votes at the congress.542 The figure of two was apparently chosen to allow 
for the possibility of both an Economist and a revolutionary delegate should both 
trends have a significant presence in any particular town though in the end this 
provision only had an effect on St Petersburg.543 This said, it is worth emphasising 
that, when the organising committee made this decision, there was simply no evidence 
that more than a small number of local committees supported Iskra, a situation which 
meant that the two delegate rule was not without significance. In fact, by the end of 
                                                        
540  Ibid., 34 
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February 1902 a total of eight local organisations appear to have declared for Iskra 
among whom we find Kazan, which was not entitled to representation, Iuzhnii 
Rabochii and the Iuzhnii Rabochii affiliated Kharkov committee.544 St Petersburg had 
been the first to publicly state its Iskra sympathies, a statement which led to a split, 
both sides of which were ultimately granted congress rights.545 In Kiev, the 
Economists carried out a sort of coup d'etat in the committee after it declared for 
Iskra. All of this points to the fact that, having established and fair and reasonable 
method of deciding how the party should be represented at its congress, a pre-
congress campaign involving all factions would then begin with the aim of securing 
the election of sympathetic delegates.546 That is to say, for all Lenin's games with the 
Bund and the Union Abroad in and around the organising committee itself, the end 
result of this process was a constitutional order inside the RSDLP on the basis of 
which a free contest between reformist and revolutionary for power and influence 
could take place. Significantly, this order appears to have been the brainchild not of 
the supposedly democratic reformists but of Iskra and of Lenin in particular. From the 
evidence we have presented in this section, there can be no serious doubt of this fact: 
its entire origins lie in the letter Lenin wrote to the Belostock conference, even if his 
original plan was modified somewhat to take account of changing circumstances. 
 
  Consequently, all that remains to be explained is how it came to pass that 
Iskra won this free contest so decisively, to the extend that the Economist were only 
able to send just one delegate  from a Russian local organisation to the congress, 
Iuzhnii Rabochii two, the Bund three, whilst Iskra captured twenty seven, the 
remainder being independents.547 Though the details remain obscure, the general 
answer to this question appears to lie in the far superior organisation of the Iskra 
faction, in so far as its Russian network of agents were able to work tirelessly to 
ensure that the committees elected sympathetic delegates. In addition, the authority of 
Iskra newspaper must have been utterly unrivalled by this stage, in so far as its eight 
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fortnightly pages contained reports from every corner of Russia on such diverse 
themes as strikes, student and peasant rebellions, the gentry politics of the zemstva, 
police violence and torture, and news of the arrests, sentences and conditions of 
arrested revolutionarieis and oppositionists, regardless of their faction. However, its 
authority was not only the result of this extensive coverage: the newspaper opened its 
columns to critical points of view, including replies to its articles from the Bund, 
Iuzhnii Rabochii, the St Petersburg Economists and any other group that wished to 
send material.548 By contrast, both main Economist publications, Rabochee Delo and 
Rabochaia Mysl', had folded by this stage and there is no evidence of any co-
ordinated campaign by them to win the committees to their side following the 
finalisation of the congress arrangements. If their supporters fought Iskra in some big 
cities, they never really branched out into the provinces, a fact which, far more 
effectively than the myth about the Second Congress being a 'stitch-up', explains their 
weak representation at the event.  
 
iv)The Jewish Bund 
 
 A common objection to the conclusion just drawn is that the Bund, in being 
granted three votes at the congress as an exception to the rule of two for each 
organisation, was still absurdly under-represented.549 By the end of 1904 one witness 
sympathetic to this organisation claimed it had functioning organisations in fourteen 
separate industrial towns and claimed that as many as seventy thousand workers 
participated in its activity.550 On this basis, it might seem that a delegation carrying 
anything up to twenty eight votes might have been appropriate, depending on the size 
and solidity of these local branches. Moreover, it can seem that the majority on the 
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organising committee, in so far as it stipulated the size of the Bund's delegation in its 
draft 'rules of representation' and then sought approval of this draft from sixteen 
organizations, among which the Bund was not included, actually excluded the Jewish 
organisation from the democratic processes it had created, possibly in the face of 
resistance from the Bund representative on this committee.551 There is a certain one-
sided truth to this allegation, not to mention circumstantial evidence to support it in 
the form of the Bund's failure to attend the Pskov meeting. However, to appreciate the 
whole picture, it is necessary to go back a little in history in order to trace the 
changing relations between the Bund and the RSDLP as a whole, in the light of which 
it seems the Bund did not suffer discrimination. According to the decision of the 1898 
congress: 
 
 The organisations of the Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, the 
groups of Rabochaia Gazeta and the General Jewish Workers' Union in Russia and Poland are merged 
into a single organisation called the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and the General Jewish 
Workers' Union in Russia and Poland enters the party as an autonomous organisation, independent only 
in questions especially concerning the Jewish proletariat.552 
 
 This formulation expressed the fact that the RSDLP was a centralised party, 
with the effect that four Unions of Struggle, Rabochaia Gazeta and the Bund were 
'merged' into just one organisation with common political aims, common funds and a 
common leadership. This leadership had the authority to give any of these formerly 
independent organisations instructions. At the same time, there were clearly limits to 
this centralisation. According to the above-mentioned resolution, the Bund retained its 
identity even though it was now part of the RSDLP. It could act independently in 
matters relating to Jewish religion or culture, matters concerning which non-Jews 
would probably be fairly ignorant. For example, this provision would appear to grant 
Jewish RSDLP members the right to produce social-democratic literature in Yiddish, 
whilst at the same time developing policies in relation to the synagogue, the religious 
schools, community leaders and the like. However, in more general questions of a 
type which affected all nationalities equally, the Jewish Bund was indistinguishable 
from the rest of the party. In other words it accepted the Manifesto, the general 
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instructions of the party leadership, it donated funds to the central bodies, it 
distributed Rabochaia Gazeta, and all other social-democratic literature and its 
members freely co-operated with members of the ex-Unions of Struggle wherever this 
was necessary.553 Connected to this, a second limit on centralisation was recognised: 
 
 Local committees carry out the instructions of the Central Committee in that form which they 
find most fitting in relation to local conditions. In exceptional circumstances local committees are 
granted the right to refuse to carry out the demands of the central committee, having made the latter 
aware of its reasons for refusal. In all other instances, local committees act entirely independently, 
guided only by the programme of the party. 554 
 
 Against the assertions of maximum political unity between the six founding 
organisations, there is a common-sense concession to the fact that conditions in 
different areas of the country are not identical. Consequently, the resolution 
acknowledges that a certain flexibility is required when it come to implementing the 
common policy of the party. It is recognised that the central committee can make 
mistakes and that local branches of the RSDLP can challenge its wisdom, whilst at the 
same time freely acting on their own initiative, developing the work of the RSDLP in 
areas where the central committee has not given its opinion. This provision in the 
original RSDLP constitution is significant because it gives the strong impression that 
the apparent privilege of ‗autonomy‘ granted to the Bund was in fact a right granted to 
all component organisations of the RSDLP. Consequently, even though it has a 
special name and produces literature in a unique language, the Bund does in fact 
appear to be just another local organisation of the RSDLP, with the same rights and 
responsibilities as those in Moscow, St Petersburg, Ekaterinoslav and Kiev, even 
though it was active in several towns, as opposed to just one big city.  
 
 As was noted previously, the 1900 congress plan involved an attempt to 
overthrow the relations established in 1898 and to replace them with a federalist 
constitution made up of several regional centres. Each of these gathered together 
social-democratic groups in a number of small towns, provided them with a local 
newspaper, organised the provision of literature and represented them at the RSDLP 
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congress. The present study has also suggested that this new draft constitution was 
based on the actual character of the Bund, observing that the Bund was probably not 
the source of this revision and that it most likely came from the group around Iuzhnii 
Rabochii. Consequently, one significant implication of the 1900 congress was that it 
converted the Jewish Bund from an anomaly inside the RSDLP into its basic template. 
In other words, rather than being a party taking as its starting point social-democratic 
movements based in the big-city factory proletariat, whilst accepting into its ranks 
organisations uniting the labour movement of several small towns, organisations 
which generally combined factory workers with home-workers, miners and the like, 
the party was to be based in the latter. If one of the main reasons for this would appear 
to have been the weak state of the St Petersburg and Moscow movements during this 
period, its most important consequence was the emergence of an increasingly vocal 
Jewish separatism articulated by the Bund which, unlike the RSDLP, had managed to 
retain its structures in tact during the previous two years. This was expressed in the 
view that the RSDLP should be reconstituted as a federation of social-democratic 
parties, each of which was based in a definite national group inhabiting the Russian 
empire. This view was registered at the Fourth Congress of the Bund, which was held 
in April 1901: 
 
 Отношение Бунда к Росс[ийской] С[оциал]-Д[емократической] Раб[очей] Партии. 
Представляя себе Российскую С[оциал]-Д[емократическую] Р[абочую] П[артию] как 
федеративное соединение социалдемокр. партий всех нации, населяющих российское 
государство, съезд постановил, чтобы Бунд, как представитель еврейск[ого]. пролетариата, 
вступил в неѐ, как федеративная часть и поручает Центральному Комитету провести это 
решение в жизнь.555       
 
 Politically, this resolution represented a clean break with the ideas of 1898 in 
so far as the Bund now characterised itself as the 'representative of the Jewish 
proletariat' within the RSDLP and not, as at least one critic of their position observed, 
the representative of a closely united multi-racial RSDLP among the Jewish 
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proletariat.556 In other words, it declared that there were some differences of interest 
between Jewish and non-Jewish workers and that workers from different nationalities 
generally had separate and to some degree rival interests. This naturally represented a 
challenge to the internationalist outlook of Marxism which declared that 'the working 
class has no nation', and that the common interests of workers of all nations consisted 
in putting an end to the capitalist system. For this task, national differences in the 
labour movement had to be consciously subordinated to the common imperative of 
fighting the capitalist class. This meant that social-democratic workers, regardless of 
nationality, religion or any other social identifier, would co-operate in common 
organizations, the limits of which were determined only by state boundaries, and only 
then because the workers' movement would be subject to different legal conditions in 
each state. Despite the legally necessary existence of separate workers' parties in 
separate states, they should all co-operate in the closest possible manner through the 
International.   
 
 It is not necessary to go too deeply into the rights and wrongs of this argument 
at this stage. The main points are that the Bund brought this federalist thinking to the 
organising committee; that its point of view on these matters set it against Iskra and 
Iuzhnii Rabochii; and that in this conflict, the Bund both argued and acted in a manner 
rather contrary to its interests. This is for the following reasons. In an attempt to put 
the case that the congress should be made up of representatives from the type of 
regional and national blocs envisaged in the 1900 draft RSDLP constitution, the Bund 
put forward the unconvincing argument that the RSDLP no longer existed, and need 
to be refounded: 
 
 Раз партии фактически не существуют, то предстоящий съезд должен носить характер 
учредительного, а потому право участия в нем должно принадлежать всем существующим в 
России социалдемократическим  организациям, как русской, так и всех других 
национальностей, помимо различных русских  социалдемократических комитетов и Бунда, 
необходимо, чтобы на съезде имели свои представительства социалдемократические 
организации поляков, литовцев, латышей и.т.д. Только при соблюдении этого условия 
возможно, по нашему мнению создание "одной централизованной, дисциплинированной армии" 
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- Российской Социалдемократической Рабочей Партиии.557  
 
 This view of the Second Congress being at the same time a 'founding' congress 
of the party has, unfortunately, been echoed by more than one historian despite its 
elementary illogicality. This view is illogical because the idea of a new 'founding' 
(uchreditelny) congress was not, for example, raised during the congress attempt of 
1900, at which the organisers more than once acknowledge the decisions of the 
previous congress, not least through their intention to relaunch Rabochaia Gazeta.558 
The same can be said of the Belostock meeting, at which the Bund backed a 
resolution defining the status of the event in the following terms:   
 
 Ввиду отсутствия центральной партийной организации, которая могла бы 
удовлетворительно подготовить в технико-конспиративном отношении II съезд партии, а также 
ввиду того что на собрании не было достаточно организаций  и вопросы не были всеми 
организациями в достаточной степени разработаны, собрание объявляет себя предварительной 
конференцией, имеющей целью подготовить в ближайшем будущем  созыв такого съезда, 
положить начало фактическому объединению партии и решить неотложные практические 
задачи (our italics).559 
 
 Clearly the Bund was happy to acknowledge the validity of the First Congress 
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representation. Only though the observance of this condition is the creation of 'one centralised, 
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at Belostock to the extent that it declared the meeting 'a preparatory conference, 
having as a goal the preparation of such a congress in the nearest future': the congress 
in question was clearly the Second Congress of the RSDLP. We are thus led to the 
unusual conclusion that in the view of the Bund, the RSDLP 'stopped existing' some 
time between March and December 1902. Clearly this is nonsense: if it stopped 
existing at any point then it was in March 1898, immediately after its First Congress 
and the smashing of its newspaper and central committee. For two whole years after 
this point it seems the Bund acknowledged the RSDLP only to then start arguing that 
it was non-existent in an unconvincing attempt to promote its federal preferences. The 
result was a firm rejection of its views by Iskra and Iuzhnii Rabochii who were 
merely being consistent in their assertion that the RSDLP actually existed. In this way 
the Bund simply handed these factions the political initative, which they used to 
advocate a more centralised scheme of representation to the party congress. Worse, 
the nature of this scheme seems to have completely confused the Bund, causing its 
representatives to make an extremely poor tactical choice.  
 
 The majority on the organising committee appear to have stood for the 
principle that any national organisation was eligible to send representatives the 
congress provided they wished to be considered as part of the Russian party and not 
the social-democracy of some other country.560 Accordingly, the Bund and the 
Caucasian Union were recognised as part of the RSDLP, essentially at these 
organisations' own request. By contrast, the Polish and Lithuanian social-democrats 
were invited to declare for the RSDLP but in the end did not accept.561 Having thus 
obtained the support of three distinct national blocs, the organising committee 
majority then introduced into its scheme of representation measures designed to 
undermine the possibility of federal relations obtaining between the Russians, the 
Caucasians and the Jews. This took the form of the following paragraph: 
 
 Organisations which are grouped in associations do not have the right to independent 
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representation.562  
 
 As befits a centralised scheme of representation, this law was applied 
uniformly to all three national groups, but it gave rather different results in each case. 
In general it meant that local organisations belonging to larger networks would lose 
their rights to direct representation at the congress if they were part of a larger union. 
In other words, where organisations existed that were made up of several smaller 
subgroups united under a common leadership, only the 'headquarters' would be 
entitled to representation. In the Russian zone, this had the effect of allowing social-
democratic groups in small towns to be represented at the congress, albeit indirectly. 
For example, the Crimean Union, which we spoke about in relation to the appeals 
process, had a presence in five different towns. Together these were granted two 
votes, presumably on the grounds that these towns together made up a 'locality with a 
more or less significant working class population', proof of residence in which was an 
essential criterion for organisations aiming to earn representation at congress.563 
Exactly the same situation appears to have applied to the Northern Union, which had 
a presence in three towns,564 the Siberian Union and the Mining and Metalworkers' 
Union.565 If all these organisations had asked their local branches to be considered 
separately, they would almost certainly have been declined representation at the 
congress.  
 
 However, the case of the Caucasus was somewhat different in that the 
Caucasian Union had a base in three large cities: Tiflis, Batum and Baku.566 The 
regulation about regional and national networks actually gave them the incentive to 
split into three distinct local organisations, each of which would then probably gain 
admittance to the congress in its own right. This is in fact exactly what happened, 
with the effect that the number of delegates to the congress coming from the Caucasus 
was raised from two to six.567 Seemingly, the majority on the organising committee 
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wanted the Bund to do the same, as a result of which its central committee would 
dissolve itself and place its resources at the disposal of the RSDLP as a whole, in 
return for a large number of extra congress votes. Having decided that they were 
actually part of an actually existing RSDLP, this was clearly the most logical thing for 
the Bund to do: the alternative was simply to break with the RSDLP, as there was no 
likelihood from this point on of it adopting an internal constitution to the Bund's 
liking. It seems fairly clear that the Bund toyed with this idea in the spring of 1903 but 
it did not act in a decisive manner.568 Instead it remained in the RSDLP and agreed to 
attend the congress at which it would be formally entitled to just five delegates out of 
a much larger number.569 In fact, given the Bund's preference for a federation of 
social-democratic parties, each of which represented different ethnic groups, it would 
have made far more sense to have adopted the position of the Poles and the 
Lithuanians. This involved allowing the RSDLP to hold its congress, and only 
afterwards entering into negotiations with it. Indeed, an alliance with the Poles and 
the Lithuanians would have made much more sense at this stage, even if in the short 
term, the Bund might have received some criticism for splitting with a party it had 
helped to create. 
 
 It remains something of a mystery and, as such, the subject of further research 
why the Bund made the decision it did. However, the fact that at root it supported a 
racially segregated workers' movement appears to have been the crucial factor. 
Martov demonstrates this in his report to the Second Congress on events in Riga 
during 1902 when, under the influence of the Bund, the social-democratic movement 
developed separate Jewish, Lettish and Russian organisations, each of which was 
bound to operate only among workers of its own nationality in this racially mixed 
town.570 The organisational absurdities of such a system are not hard to imagine, 
especially in a situation where the social segregation of workers may not be as great 
as their would-be leaders‘ political segregation. This negative attitude on the part of 
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the Bund to non-Jewish workers seems to have hampered their tactical thinking, and 
to have set them against the Polish social-democrats in particular. Circumstantial 
evidence suggests that we should not blame anti-semitism for this outcome, so much 
as the fact that, under the influence of leaders such as Luxembourg, the Polish social-
democracy took an extremely hostile attitude towards nationalism of all forms. This 
led to them opposing the right of stateless peoples such as the Poles to self-
determination, on the grounds that it might inflame national feeling.571 This attitude 
would have clearly obstructed any alliance with the Bund, who would have probably 
felt that they stood a better chance of obtaining recognition from the Iskra majority in 
the RSDLP, which did at least recognise the right of all national minorities inside 
Russia to form independent nation states, or even to fuse with another pre-existing 
state should they wish to.572 Against this, there can be no doubt that Iskra and the 
Bund were destined to clash because of the latter's rather imperious assertion that it 
represented all Jews in the Russian labour movement, an outlook which can have only 
annoyed the large number of Jews who supported Iskra by posing the question of their 
own individual right to determine their national identity.573 Ultimately, the latter 
supported racial integration and the right to break with their own Jewish origins, 
whereas the former wanted to maintain at all costs a separate Jewish identity. For this 
reason, the Bund would never have been able to find a political home for itself inside 
a centralised RSDLP and it is tempting to conclude that it should have broken with it 
as soon as the organising committee rejected its own federal formula. Unfortunately it 
did not, and the result was some rather absurd scenes at the Second Congress of the 
RSDLP, which ended with the Bund storming out of the meeting and out of the 
organisation whilst at the same time shattering the nerves and the political unity of the 
Iskra supporters. 
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iv)  Some conclusions 
 
The basic line of argument pursued throughout this chapter is that in March 
1902, Lenin sketched out a highly democratic plan for the construction of a Second 
RSDLP congress and that, following the Economists' failure to bring together such a 
meeting, he spent the next year and four months bringing the plan to life. This episode 
shows that during the Iskra period Lenin was concerned to give the RSDLP a 
constitutional framework, on the basis of which different political tendencies within 
the labour movement could participate in a common party. It also proves that, even 
though he was prepared to fight hard for the interests of the revolutionary Marxists, he 
was fundamentally prepared to submit to majority rule inside the RSDLP and to work 
within cross-factional institutions such as the organising committee. This was the case 
even when such institutions were dominated by the Economists. This is clear from the 
way in which he proposed that the Economist-dominated Belostock meeting elect an 
organising committee and a programme commission. His confidence in accepting 
such arrangements was based in a faith in the revolutionaries' superiority in terms of 
their theoretical arguments, their energy and commitment and their greater experience 
at conducting political work in highly repressive circumstances. 
 
  Because of these advantages, Lenin appeared to believe that Iskra could 
ultimately come to dominate its opponents, by offering them the use of its facilities 
and personnel, not to mention a whole series of constructive ideas. Thus they would 
become authoritative within the party despite their status as a minority, whose forces 
were at this stage incapable of marshalling the type of support enjoyed by the leaders 
of the Bund or the Southern Union. In the short term, this type of strategy naturally 
required a certain amount of compromise on the part of Iskra. For example, there is 
no reference to centralised party structures or a specifically revolutionary party 
programme in the period from Belostock to Pskov: instead, Lenin poses the need for 
party structures and a party programme in the most general terms. In relation to the 
programme, the draft presented to any cross-factional commission by Lenin and 
Plekhanov would have been clearly revolutionary, but at the same time Lenin was 
clearly prepared to tolerate its being watered down by the Economists. The 
calculation here is based on the fact that the Economists themselves had more or less 
  
 
 
176 
 
admitted their own inability to produce a theoretical statement of the RSDLP's basic 
world view worthy of the name. On this basis, the Plekhanovites could act as if they 
were offering a service to the party, when at the same time they were promoting their 
own specific point of view. The former aspect would probably limit the degree to 
which the draft would be attacked, but this was no absolute guarantee against its 
content being converted into some sort of uneasy compromise between the reformist 
and revolutionary world view. Concerning the party constitution, Lenin says 
absolutely nothing in his letter to the Belostock meeting. This implies that he is 
prepared to tolerate a federal party constitution at this stage. This conclusion can be 
drawn from the documents of the 1900 attempt which, if Martov's account is to be 
believed, the Lenin group also made no attempt to modify. Strange though it may 
seem, it therefore appears that in the post-Belostock period Lenin had in mind a kind 
of workers' party sharing certain parallels with the British Labour Party during a later 
period: federal, mass-membership and with theoretical principles, in the form of the 
old Clause Four, fudging the distinction between revolutionary and reformist ideas. 
 
 The question which inevitably follows from this is that of what made Lenin 
change and, indeed, how much his views on the RSDLP internal regime actually did 
change. One key factor appears to have been chance, in so far as the Tsar's police 
completely destroyed the Southern Union, an occurrence which utterly changed the 
balance of forces between the revolutionaries and the reformists. Following this event, 
the latter could only maintain a strong presence among the Jewish population of the 
pale. Lenin naturally sought to take advantage of this situation, which illustrates once 
again how ridiculous the notion that Lenin had a detailed plan for the takeover of the 
RSDLP worked out even in Shushenkoye. On the basis of the former group's greater  
resilience the wake of the police onslaught, the balance of power between Iskra and 
Iuzhnii Rabochii was reversed, and this reversal led to some new notions concerning 
party organisation. As a result of this more favourable situation Lenin for the first 
time began to make a move against federalist notions in the RSDLP, in favour of the 
more familiar centralism that had up to this point prevailed only in the Iskra 
organisation itself. Specifically, with the Southern Union formally declared defunct 
and its remnants now loyal to Iskra, it was now possible to raise the idea of 
significantly modifying the Bund's organisational structures, rather than simply 
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copying them. At its most radical, this policy could have involved converting the 
Bund into a 'North Western Union of the RSDLP', to use the words of one Iskra 
supporter at the Second Congress, an organisation which would repudiate its former 
racial identity and admit all social-democratic workers.574 However, there is simply no 
evidence that Lenin thought it politically feasible to go to this logical extreme at this 
stage or at any other, still less to force this type of arrangement on to the Jewish 
organisation, whilst there is evidence that, in the last analysis he was prepared to 
make concessions to Jewish separatism.575 This said, the exact status of the Bund in 
the RSDLP was to some degree a side issue. The main points were that Iskra and 
Iuzhnii Rabochii did expect the Jewish organisation to submit to a higher RSDLP 
authority; and that the previous notion of power residing primarily in regional unions, 
linked only by a relatively powerless central committee and party newspaper, was no 
longer to be accepted. Consequently, even if the Bund did demand and achieve 
significant concessions in the direction of federalism, the rest of the party would 
operate in accordance with Iskra centralising principles rather than imitating the 
pattern set by the Bund as had previously been the case. Accordingly, local and 
regional papers outside the pale such as Rabochaia Mysl' and Iuzhnii Rabochii would 
be fused into one official party newspaper along with Iskra. No attempts would be 
made to revise the Southern regional structure and its Caucasian equivalent would be 
either dissolved or reorganised so as to play a more modest role in party affairs. Thus 
the triumph of centralism over federalism would probably have taken the form of 
converting the Bund once more into an unusual exception to the general principle of 
centralism, rather than the federalistic rule it had become in the period between 1898 
and 1902. 
 
 Thus emerges the idea of a more centralised party, modelled to some degree 
on the Iskra organisation. As has been shown, there was nothing unusual in the idea 
of reorganising the party along the lines of one of its more influential parts. Lenin was 
only doing with Iuzhnii Rabochii what the Bund had earlier done with Kopel'zon and 
Lalaiants. In this sense the Iskra policy in the organising committee could not be 
viewed as an unfair attempt at factional takeover. It was simply that, having spent a 
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whole period in the minority, during which time it submitted to the views of the 
majority in organisational questions, Iskra felt that it was entitled to assert its own 
definite view on the party, in alliance with Iuzhnii Rabochii once it was in a position 
to do so. As shall be demonstrated in the next section, this was not in the end tolerated 
by Iskra's opponents who, very simply, did not appear to enjoy being in a minority 
and therefore engaged in disruptive and splitting activities. This does not reflect badly 
on Iskra's policy, so much as the inability of the Bund and the Economists to tolerate 
the idea of a multi-tendency workers party that they did not control. Specifically, it 
seems they could tolerate pluralism so long as it was they who held the power and it 
was the revolutionary Marxists who played the role of loyal opposition: so long as it 
was the latter who were prepared to submit to others' views for the sake of party unity. 
When the roles were reversed, this commitment to a multi-tendency party suddenly 
disappeared, a circumstance which suggests that both the Bund and the Economists 
simply used the RSDLP as a plaything for their own factional interests, and had no 
broader commitment to building a workers' party. In other words, they would support 
building the RSDLP so long as it was reformist and federalist, but under no other 
conditions, whereas the revolutionaries were much more flexible. This naturally poses 
a whole series of questions concerning which side was the more tolerant and loyal and 
which was the more dogmatic and given to unwarranted splits.  
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Chapter Five: December 1902-August 1903: Struggle 
 
 In the previous chapter, the central argument was that there was a conflict 
between undemocratic federalism and democratic centralism passing through two 
distinct, though in fact overlapping phases. The first of these started with Lenin's 
letter to the Belostock meeting and ended with the election of a significant majority of 
Iskra delegates to the Second Congress by the local committees. The period between 
these two points was marked by: the capture of the St Petersburg committee; the 
realignment of Iuzhnii Rabochii; the capture of the organising committee; and 
declarations of support for this body and its centralistic assumptions by a significant 
majority of Russian social-democratic committees. As such it represents a period of 
unalloyed victories for the revolutionary Marxist faction. The second, which will be 
described in this chapter, proves to be much less one-sided. Its most significant 
feature is the attempts to overturn these gains by the remnants of the reformist wing of 
the party, attempts that earned partial successes, even as the revolutionaries were 
consolidating their dominance through their majority at the Second Congress. These 
successes seem all the more remarkable in so far as the reformists' counter-campaign 
was for a long time not guided by any consciously worked-out strategy, in contrast to 
the Iskra campaign of the previous period. Instead, it appeared to consist in energetic 
attempts to frustrate and disrupt Iskra's measures aimed at transforming the party's 
organisational structure, and its main methods appear to have been procedural 
objections, obstruction, the instigation of meaningless or hopeless controversies, and 
delay. Only with the recruitment of the Iskra editor Martov to their campaign did this 
begin to change, with this individual devising a plan to put an end to the conflict 
between the revolutionaries and the reformists. 
 
 Some of the earliest signs of resistance to Iskra in the organising committee, in 
the form of the controversy over the definition of the RSDLP as an existing or non-
existing organisation, have already been discussed. Were it a question of a campaign 
with a positive end in sight, this defeat would have represented the last stand of the 
Bund in the RSDLP. The organising committee, in its resolution of this question, 
denied the Bund the one thing that was most important to it: the complete preservation 
of its existing structures, with the effect that the Bund now had to leave the RSDLP in 
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order to obtain what it really wanted - an independent Jewish socialist party operating 
as part of a broader federation of social-democratic parties within the Russian empire. 
However this did not occur because the Bund, instead of following this line began to 
engage in a war of attrition whose sole aim was to weaken the revolutionary Marxists, 
probably calculating that, as a more solid organisation it would gain in relative terms 
from such a contest. Thus, showing scant regard for the aim of its struggle in the 
organising committee, the Bund remained in the RSDLP and attended the Second 
Congress with a rump of five delegates. In alliance with three adherents of the defunct 
Rabochee Delo, this small minority was able to exert a surprisingly large degree of 
influence on the course of the meeting using the conventional combat methods of 
parliamentary struggle: filibuster, the quibbling of procedural points, the 'talking out' 
of a question and so on. The general aim of this was to put irresistible pressure on the 
meeting's agenda and, through its abridgement, thus minimising the degree to which 
Iskra could use its majority to transform the RSDLP into a democratic centralist, 
revolutionary Marxist party. Thus, though clearly not in a position to win significant 
concessions in any of the debates in terms of their voting power, the Bund-Economist 
bloc quite effectively wore down the nerves and sapped the will of a section of its 
revolutionary opponents. The most important, yet clearly unplanned consequence of 
this was the actual splitting of the Iskra delegation, an outcome the reformists could 
scarcely have anticipated. A minority of the Iskra bloc broke with the majority 
seemingly as a result of the determined pressure of the anti-Iskra factions and 
appeared to adopt a policy of appeasement in an attempt to put an end to the 
disruption the latter were causing to the meeting.  
 
 More intriguingly still, it seems that the weak unity the Iskra bloc displayed at 
the Second Congress was the product of a previous battle with the Economists, which 
took place around the time the organising committee was re-formed. The policy of 
fusing Iskra-dominated local committees with the Russian Iskra organisation, which 
included accepting Iskra agents onto the former, making a public declaration of 
loyalty to the principles of the paper and remitting funds to it, seems to have produced 
a pro-Economist rebellion in both St Petersburg and Kiev during the final months of 
1902. In St Petersburg, this went as far as the Economists setting up a rival 
committee, an event which apparently led to fears among a group of émigré 
  
 
 
181 
 
supporters of Iskra that a similar split would take place throughout the entire RSDLP, 
the result being two separate Russian social-democratic parties. On the basis of this 
fear, criticism of the Russian Iskra organisation's fusion policy appears to have gained 
an audience amongst a certain section of Iskra supporters. This mood of opposition to 
Lenin‘s strategy appears to have solidified among a minority of revolutionary 
Marxists following the arrest of some of the most senior Iskra agents, in connection 
with the Pskov organisation committee meeting: their resolve, it seems, was 
weakening. As a result of these practical setbacks, Russian Iskra appears to have gone 
into a period of relative passivity. Organising committee duties increasingly appear to 
have been taken up by the representatives of Iuzhnii Rabochii and those Iskra 
supporters increasingly critical of their own faction's previous organisational policy, 
and who were therefore seeking to distance themselves from the Russian network of 
agents in particular. Thus, the Iskra bloc, whose unity was broken at the Second 
Congress by the actions of the Bund and the Economists, appears to have been subject 
to internal strain for many months prior to this event though, as we have already 
suggested, this fact was probably unknown to the reformists. This strain was only 
exacerbated by the behaviour of the Bund and the Economists at the meeting itself, in 
the sense that two opposing policies emerged concerning the future of the Russian 
Iskra organisation. Whilst all the revolutionary Marxists were agreed that it had to be 
formally dissolved in accordance with the policy of fusing all pre-existing 
organisations into a common RSDLP structure, the scale of reformist resistance at the 
Congress caused Lenin to conclude that factional battles would probably continue 
after the congress, with the effect that he advocated reserving all the leading positions 
in the RSDLP for those previously committed to the journalistic and practical wings 
of Iskra: thus the new RSDLP apparatus would closely resemble the old Iskra 
factional apparatus. Conversely, the group around Martov advocated admitting a 
significant majority critical of Iskra into the new structures, whilst at the same time 
allowing the anti-Iskra factions to retain their own special organisations alongside the 
new centralised party structure. 
 
 For all these reasons the notion that the split in Iskra was the product of some 
arcane dispute about the first clause of the party's constitution, an absurdly simplistic, 
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yet fairly common explanation of the event is rejected in the present chapter.576 One 
cannot argue that a long-term split in the Russian social-democratic movement 
emerged from a quibble, only for it to then acquire principled substance by some 
mysterious process, the result of which was crucial disagreements on the questions of 
alliances with the bourgeoisie in the democratic revolution and the socialist seizure of 
power in a backward country.577 It makes far more sense to accept that a well-
established reformist trend existed in Russian social-democracy prior to the Second 
Congress and that, via disagreements over the nature of party membership and other 
issues, the previously revolutionary Mensheviks simply joined it, betraying their 
former allies in a clumsy attempt to achieve peace in the party. Equally, the idea 
found in left-wing circles that the split was unnecessary and without reason is 
rejected.578 In fact it touched on a number of issues: whether and under what 
conditions a revolutionary Marxist factional apparatus was necessary in a broad party; 
whether it was legitimate for revolutionary Marxists not just to participate in broader 
workers' parties but to lead and control them; whether revolutionaries had the right to 
reorganise parties they had won control of; whether this type of re-organisation could 
extend to dissolving the factional apparatuses of their opponents; whether it could use 
command methods to ensure the membership carried out the decisions of the 
democratically-elected congress and so on. Whilst there is no intention of examining 
the rights and wrongs of all these issues in the present study, what follows will at least 
demonstrate their existence as factors in the split and, in doing so show how seriously 
mistaken are attempts to explain it exclusively with reference to the minutes of that 
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meeting, almost to the exclusion of all other sources.579 These minutes, however 
useful, only give a rough illustration of how the split actually happened but do not 
reveal all its underlying causes. To find these it has been necessary to study a series of 
documents dating from the time of the Pskov conference up to the opening of the 
Second Congress, not to mention the accounts given by Lenin, Krasikov and Martov 
of the Iskra caucus meetings during the congress itself, where the actual breakdown of 
relations between the Iskra majority and minority took place.  
 
 For this reason the present account of the Second Congress cannot be strictly 
chronological in order, as different phases of the Second Congress itself are affected 
by different phases of its pre-history that do not follow each other in time. Instead we 
have identified two key processes, one concerning the reformists, the other the 
internal relations among the revolutionaries, each of which has its effect on two of the 
most important conflicts at the congress: the clash between Iskra as a whole and the 
Economist-Bund bloc, and the struggle within Iskra itself. These processes will be 
traced separately, showing how each handed something of a victory to reformism 
even as the rather slow-witted representatives of the reformist organisations, failing to 
realise their advantage, walked out of the congress. The present chapter will also 
illustrate how Martov, as a result of these pressures came to develop a strategy aiming 
to grant concessions both to the anti-Iskra factions and to the critical trend within 
Iskra, and how in doing so he emerged as the intellectual leader of a new 
phenomenon, Menshevism, at the congress and in the post-congress period. 
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i) The Resistance Campaign of the Bund and the Economists 
 
 Earlier, it was shown how, from the time the first attempt at a Second 
Congress in 1900, the Bund appeared to be aiming at looser relations with the non-
Jewish social democracy in Russia. At a local level this appeared to result in the 
organised separation of Jewish workers from those of other ethnic groups, with the 
effect that contact between social-democratic workers of different nationalities was 
mediated by a tiny group of leaders. At least, this type of arrangement is clearly 
shown in the 'Letter from Riga' read by Martov at the Second Congress. This source 
suggests that the leaders of the different ethnic workers' organisations would negotiate 
relations between the national groupings and discourage direct contact between rank 
and file workers of different nationalities.
580
 Not only this, there is evidence that 
during the same period the Bund was seeking to increase its sphere of influence by 
setting up exclusively Jewish organisations in the southern region.
581
 This was 
controversial as it involved the claim that non-Jewish social-democratic organisations 
were incapable of properly representing the interests of Jewish workers, even in areas 
where Jews had freely joined such organisations and had a history of co-operation 
with Russians, Poles and Ukrainians.  
 
 These highly divisive features of Bund policy were eventually codified in the 
organisations' revised constitution which was passed at its Fifth Congress, a meeting 
held just a few weeks before the Second Congress of the RSDLP in June 1903.582 
Even without these specific features, this 'constitution' was problematic in so far as it 
sought to precisely define relations between Jewish and non-Jewish social democratic 
organisations operating within Russia without consulting the latter. For this reason, 
leading Iskra members regarded it as an attempt on the part of the Bund to ‗dictate a 
treaty' to the rest of the RSDLP - in other words, an attempt to tell the party as a 
whole how it should be organised, without tolerating input from the other component 
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parts of it in relation to this question.583 In this context, its second paragraph made a 
particularly aggressive statement: 
 
 The Bund is the Social Democratic organisation of the Jewish proletariat not restricted in its 
activity by any geographical limits and it enters the party as the sole representative of the Jewish 
proletariat.584 
 
  The Bund‘s policy of creating and encouraging separate ethnically based 
workers organisations was in this way radicalised to the point where it made a claim 
to represent all Jews in the party. This would include those participating in integrated 
organizations: it was to be the 'sole representative of the Jewish proletariat‘. It seems 
reasonable to assume that, were this principle to be accepted, Jews belonging to 
organisations other than the Bund would either be invited to leave these organisations 
and to enter the exclusively Jewish organisation, or instructed to accept the Bund 
leadership as their spokesman on political issues, without having any rights in relation 
to the election or control of this leadership. Apparently, this bold claim on the 
political allegiance of integrated Jews is made despite the clear political differences 
that existed between the Bund and the Iskra dominated Russian movement. The Bund 
appears to ignore the fact that some Jewish revolutionary Marxists had consciously 
chosen not to join the Bund organisation and that the consent of these integrated Jews 
for their change in political status had no more been obtained than that of the social-
democratic organisations to which they belonged. It seems likely that the new 
constitution of the Bund therefore involved an undemocratic, unfair and 
presumptuous assertion of rights over those who played no part in its construction. 
Not only that, the part of the constitution cited is interesting in so far as it contains the 
implication that the Bund was not actually a part of the RSDLP, a view which 
rehearses the argument earlier rejected by the organising committee concerning the 
fact of the party‘s existence.585 Disregarding this decision, the Bund resolution uses 
the present tense: it ‗enters‘ the RSDLP, ignoring the fact that in the view of 
everybody else it ‗entered‘ it in 1898, at its First Congress, and that in the absence of 
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a clear declaration to the contrary, it was assumed to remain a part of this party.586 
Against this background, the continued assumption that the RSDLP did not yet exist 
and that the forthcoming congress was a founding one represented persistent dissent 
against the decision of a committee to which it had freely granted authoritative 
powers. Thus we see evidence of the Bund's preference for uncooperative behaviour, 
as there was no likelihood of congress overturning the decisions of the organising 
committee given the scheme of representation that had been agreed. 
 
 The Bund's behaviour became more problematic in so far as the Fifth 
Congress instructed the Bund's delegation to the Second Congress of the RSDLP to 
present this federal constitution as a resolution in the debate on the RSDLP‘s 
organizational rules. In case of its rejection, a compromise document was drawn up in 
advance, in which the original demands were mixed with centralising elements: the 
RSDLP congress was granted the right to overrule the decisions of the Bund congress, 
but the Bund would retain all its separate structures, such as an independent central 
committee and newspaper.587 This was to be submitted in the form of an ultimatum to 
the RSDLP, meaning that if it was rejected, the Bund delegates would leave the 
congress.588 With this strategy determined beforehand, the Bund inevitably developed 
an excessive concern with procedural points at the subsequent congress of the RSDLP 
when the agenda drafted by Lenin and Martov placed the question of the Bund's 
relation to the rest of the RSDLP as the first item.589 In the light of the Fifth Congress 
decisions, this agenda seemed to suggest that an unnaturally rapid exist for the Bund 
both from the Second Congress and the RSDLP was likely, a view since echoed by 
certain hostile critics of Lenin who have viewed this agenda as means of manipulating 
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the congress.590 However, this is a false interpretation of the Iskra leaders‘ actions at 
this point: it was the Bund who had freely chosen to issue what it had describes in its 
own worda as an ‗ultimatum‘ to the RSDLP. Given this fact, it is actually meaningless 
to argue about the precise point in procedings at which that ultimatum should have 
been discussed. The Iskra leaders' decision seems reasonable in so far as the struggles 
around the organising committee had already shown that the question of these 
relations could easily lead to a split: it seems extremely irregular to allow a group 
planning to leave the RSDLP to have influence on the debate on its programme, 
constitution, tactics and the like, as a parting shot. Before discussing this detail, Lenin 
argued that it was first necessary to establish who it was exactly that considered 
themselves part of the RSDLP.591 Not only that, the opening debate on the Bund was 
to be framed in the most general terms, with the effect that no constitution of any type 
would be adopted at the end of the debate. On the contrary, congress would make a 
decision 'in principle', in favour of either centralistic or federal organisational 
principles. Having made that decision, the Bund would then have the opportunity to 
leave if it was not satisfied with the principle adopted, thus accepting that it had no 
right to influence the debate on a party constitution which it had no intention of 
recognising. If, on the other hand, it decided to stay at the end of the first debate, it 
would naturally have both the right to influence the party rules debate and at the same 
time the obligation of adhering to whatever decision the congress made. Thus, the 
inevitable arguments with the Bund would be kept within certain limits, ensuring a 
certain minimum of order at the congress.  
 
 The agenda drafted by Lenin and Martov had to be approved by the congress 
itself, and because of the Bund's fear of an early exit, it put up stiff resistance to the 
Iskra proposal.592 Thus it seems that the Bund delegates did not want to leave the 
RSDLP in good order on the basis of clearly articulated disagreements, but wanted 
instead to make the split as difficult as possible for Iskra by means of fighting a 
rearguard action, with the aim of forcing its opponent to concede its demands. This 
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can be seen from the following developments. In the debate on the agenda, the Bund 
delegates argued that a general discussion of the relations between their own 
organisation and the RSDLP was not necessary, a dubious claim, to say the least.593 
Behind this can be detected the intention of remaining at the congress for as long as 
possible and of exercising the maximum amount of influence on its decisions, before 
leaving and refusing to recognise the decisions it had helped shape, should its 
ultimatum not be accepted. Clearly this produced the danger that concessions might 
be granted to the Bund minority, the character of which would be binding on the 
RSDLP even after the Bund itself had disowned the organisation. For this reason, the 
Iskra agenda was approved.594 However, having suffered this defeat, the Bund 
delegates then simply refused to acknowledge the nature of the first debate as defined 
by the majority of the congress, thus demonstrating the same contempt for official 
decisions which their organisation had previously shown in relation to the organising 
committee. Thus, as a 'resolution of principle' to the first debate, MI Liber,595 the 
Bund's main spokesman, submitted the Bund's constitution as decided by its Fifth 
Congress, thus attempting to dodge general questions around racial federalism, 
centralism, internationalism and national chauvinism.596 This was in contrast to 
Martov's opposing resolution which noted, among other observations, that 'the closest 
unity of the Jewish proletariat with the proletariat of other races amidst which it lives 
is absolutely necessary in the interests of its struggle for political and economic 
liberation', and so on.597 The result was an extremely lengthy debate in which both 
sides actually talked at cross purposes with one another.  
 
 Liber tried to rebut the accusation that he was disregarding the democratically 
chosen congress agenda by arguing that the Bund's constitution was a clear expression 
of a set of organisational principles.598 However, his performance did not convince, 
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and he was exposed when, after some nine hours of debate, these 'organisational 
principles in constitutional form' were withdrawn, and the pre-prepared compromise 
document substituted for them.599 This change produced incredulity among the Iskra 
supporters, for whom political principles were not something one compromised in 
order to resolve a disagreement. The debate for them was about basic beliefs, and if 
such a debate did not exclude individuals changing their mind, the ideas at stake had 
to be clear and consistent.600 By offering to compromise, the Bund gave sufficient 
evidence that it was talking about a definite practical arrangement which, in its proper 
place, could have been the subject of proper negotiations. However, by trying to dress 
up practical arrangements as the starting point for a theoretical debate, they were 
clearly ignoring the congress agenda and throwing the meeting into confusion, 
presumably as a defensive strategy. They probably feared they would have been 
unable to defeat the Iskra leaders on a more theoretical plane.601 Whatever the case, 
the subsequent proposal on the part of Liber that their 'compromise constitution' be 
debated 'paragraph by paragraph' must surely have undermined the pretence that the 
Bund was debating matters of general theory, utterly exposing the time wasting 
character of his tactics.602 One of the paragraphs in question read: 
 
 The Bund elects its representation in the central committee of the Party, the Foreign 
Committee of the Party and the Party congresses.603 
 
 One cannot say that such a paragraph, any more than three or four others with 
a similar content expresses any general social democratic value or principle, or for 
that matter any value or principle opposed to social democracy, connected or 
unconnected to questions of party organisation. Instead, this paragraph, along with 
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two or three more just like it, attempts to define the relations of power obtaining 
between the Bund leadership and that of the RSDLP. Thus, rather than openly 
expressing their views on federalism, centralism and internationalism, the Bund 
appeared to be initiating an untimely argument about the spoils of office, a position 
which can scarcely have improved their organisation's standing in the eyes of the 
majority of delegates. Apart from this, their whole approach utterly disregarded the 
official decisions of democratically constituted RSDLP bodies. The congress had 
decided in favour of a debate on principles, but the Bund refused to engage on this 
terrain, acting only in accordance with the decisions of its own congress and even 
then, implementing these decisions in a remarkably inflexible manner and with 
complete disregard for external circumstances. The opportunity to submit these 
resolutions was to be afforded to the Bund during item six of the congress agenda, 
when organisational rules were to be discussed, but the Bund delegates seemed 
determined to create a confrontation so as to put pressure on the Iskra faction. 
 
 The Bund's strategy of disruption was also taken up by the Economist 
representatives of the Union Abroad, who also threw the democratically constituted, 
but Iskra-dominated congress into disorder by means of excessive long and 
complicated interventions into the debate and procedural arguments. The most 
spectacular example of this came during the debate on the party programme. The 
Economist and former Rabochee Delo editor AS Martynov somehow managed to get 
himself appointed as the leading discussant in this debate despite not having produced 
a draft programme for the congress to consider.604 He also seemingly obtained an 
exception to the half-hour limitation on opening speeches.605 He used his time to 
deliver a lengthy critique of Lenin's doctrine of social-democratic consciousness as 
expressed in a certain well-known section of What Is To Be Done? This intervention 
was remarkable not simply because of its amazing length, but because Martynov 
really had no authority to lead this discussion, having not submitted a draft 
programme of his own, nor even producing any reasoned amendments to the 
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Plekhanov-Lenin draft he was ostensibly criticising.606 Not only that, the question of 
What Is To Be Done? seems completely irrelevant to a debate on the party programme 
which had nothing to say on programmatic matters. For all these reasons, it seems 
likely that the discussion of it was introduced primarily in an attempt to provoke a 
split in the Iskra camp, rather than to have their own definite views incorporated into 
the Plekhanov-Lenin document. Consider the following contributions from the 
Economist Akimov: 
 
 I regard as mistaken Comrade Plekhanov‘s view that the reference to Lenin‘s little book was 
unfounded. One cannot, he says, criticise a programme on the basis of one phrase in one book written 
by one of the editors of the draft. The phrase of Comrade Lenin‘s which Comrade Martynov criticised 
is no isolated phrase, it expounds the fundamental idea of What Is To Be Done?, and that idea, it seems 
to me, finds expression in the draft programme. It is an idea which does not coincide at all with what 
Plekhanov wrote in his commentaries. And I am sure that Plekhanov does not agree with Lenin. 
(Laughter).607 
 
 Despite the incredulous laughter, Akimov was in fact telling the truth about 
Plekhanov and Lenin: there had been a whole series of disagreements between 
Plekhanov and Lenin over both the programme and over What Is To Be Done?608 It 
also appears that Plekhanov had been sufficiently indiscrete to admit this to Martynov 
at the congress in a private conversation, even if he denied these differences in the 
debating chamber, an error which appears to have provoked this new diversion from 
the official subject of discussion.609 The Bund naturally joined this utterly irrelevant 
debate on the side of the Economists, yet like them was utterly incapable of pointing 
any remotely significant features in the programme reflecting Lenin's notions of 
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social-democratic consciousness.610 Martov thus summarised the situation fairly when 
he remarked: 
 
 I am amazed that all the considerations set out by Comrade Martynov should have result in 
nothing more than a proposal to insert the word 'consciousness‘ …. I have nothing against inserting this 
word.611 
 
 Thus the whole controversy could have been easily resolved, had the anti-
Iskra groups been at all interested in working constructively, by means of a small 
concession freely offered by one of the recognised Iskra leaders.        
       
 Anybody familiar with the minutes of the Second Congress can be in no doubt 
that the Bund and Economists, who together made up a total of eight votes out of 
fifty-one at the congress were trying to engage in disruption because they could not 
dominate proceedings by any other means. There is some danger of descending into 
banality in describing further incidents produced by this and as such, at this point we 
will beg readers' understanding when we simply cite the places in the text of the 
minutes were these incidents occur, along with Lenin's useful discussion of them.612 It 
is reasonable to assume that the Bund and the Economists were trying to stop the 
congress carrying out its work because they knew that Iskra would consolidate its 
position of power, using its majority, by passing a programme and a party constitution 
together with tactical and organisational resolutions that reflected its views. Not only 
that, it would use the majority to elect a party leadership dominated by revolutionary 
Marxists. By repeatedly throwing the congress into confusion by means of arguments 
over correct procedure there was some hope that at least part of this process would be 
prevented. In particular, the lengthy character of some of the debates we have been 
discussing created pressure to trunctate the Iskra devised and majority-approved 
agenda of the congress. This would reduce the degree to which Iskra could transform 
the RSDLP in accordance with its own preferences. If it is possible to argue that such 
means are in general compatible with party democracy, in so far as the minority does 
have the right to influence the majority using a whole variety of means, it is hard to 
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refrain from the observation that, in the case of the Bund and the Economists, this 
technique involved repeated violations of democratically legitimate decisions made 
by both the organising committee and the congress itself, and that minorities do not 
really have the right to do this. They were breaking rules and violating procedures to 
which they had voluntarily agreed to submit, simply because the majority view was 
not in accordance with their own. If party democracy is to be meaningful, respect for 
such rules and procedures is essential, otherwise democracy only ever remains in the 
realm of theory and never enters into practice.   
 
 
ii) Elements within the Iskra Faction Break with Lenin's Organisational Plan 
 
 As is well-known, the Iskra faction split at congress into a majority, led by 
Lenin and a minority, led by Martov. Whilst most accounts to date have emphasised 
disagreements over the RSDLP constitution as an important factor in this split, we 
would emphasise the rather lawless pressure of the Bund and the Economists as the 
key factor in breaking the unity of the revolutionary Marxists. However this was 
clearly not the only reason behind this all-important split, in so far as a tendency had 
previously emerged within the Iskra faction that questioned Lenin plan for the 
reconstruction of the RSDLP. This tendency started life late in 1902, in the form of a 
series of objections to Lenin's policy of including all the significant anti-Iskra 
tendencies in party institutions such as the organising committee and the party 
congress. It developed into an opposition to the policy of factional conflict with the 
Bund during period in which the organising committee did its work, in early 1903, 
and culminated in a compromising policy at the Second Congress itself. At this 
meeting, Martov articulated a series of concessions with which this new anti-Lenin 
tendency aimed to placate the rebellious and disruptive anti-Iskra factions. In all these 
episodes, we find two key assumptions which seem to frame the thinking of the anti-
Lenin Iskra supporters. The first of these is a pessimistic estimate of the balance of 
forces prevailing between Iskra and its opponents, the anti-Lenin current within Iskra 
consistently believing that Lenin's aim of winning primacy for the revolutionary 
Marxists within the RSDLP, on the basis of party democracy and pluralism was 
impossible. The second, closely related to the first is the argument that democratic 
considerations should be either bypassed or watered down in order to consolidate the 
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position first of the Iskra faction and later, folowing the split, of the anti-Lenin section 
of this grouping. The next stage of  the analysis will be to illustrate these features by 
describing the history of this new trend in Iskra from its beginnings up until the 
Second Congess, thus showing how a process of internal dissention within Iskra 
combined with the external pressure of the Bund-Economist bloc to produce a split in 
Iskra. Thus we will see how a rebellion against Lenin's democratic centralist plan of 
the RSDLP was partially successful, even though the mainstay of the original 
opposition to Lenin, the Bund and the Economists, actually left the party at the 
Second Congress. 
 
 The conflict between Martov and Lenin appears to have had its roots in the 
relations between these two men and the Russian network of Iskra agents, and it dates 
from the autumn of 1902, the period in which the organising committee was created. 
During this time, Lenin was mainly situated in London.613 Along with Krupskaya, he 
took responsibility for the production of the Iskra newspaper, whilst at the same time 
maintaining regular contact with the leading agents of the Russian Iskra 
organisation.614 Martov, who moved to Paris at the end of November, had also had a 
certain amount of contact with the agents, but following his move, his closest 
collaborators seemed to have become individuals living in western Europe who are 
perhaps best characterised as ex-agents: there is not a lot of evidence that he was 
maintaining regular contact with activists on Russian soil at this point.615 As for the 
rest of the editorial board, they appear to have had no links at all with the Russian 
underground: thus it seems most likely that the reason Martov and Lenin initially 
became the intellectual representatives of the two tendencies in Russian Marxism was 
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owed to this closer relationship with the activists.616 Specifically, their disagreement 
appears to have originated in a whole series of tensions that emerged within the Iskra 
network following the police raid on the Pskov conference, at which two of Iskra's 
most important agents, VP Krasnukha and I I Radchenko were arrested, along with 
the Kiev-based agent PN Lepeshinskii.617 These arrests left the initiative for 
continuing the work of the organising committee largely in the hands of the Iuzhnii 
Rabochii organisation, despite the apparent numerical dominance of Iskra members in 
the Pskov organising committee. The main reason for this was that most of those 
individuals from Iskra co-opted onto the organising committee, such as GM 
Krzhizhanovskii and FB Legnik, did not prove capable of performing the work of 
'flying' agents.618 In other words, they could not freely move from place to place, an 
essential qualification for any member of an effective organising committee, given 
their need to 'tour' the local committees, seeking support and assent for its actions.619 
A search was thus begun to find sufficiently experienced and mobile Iskra supporters 
to act as replacement members of the organising committee. Added to this problem, 
something of a rebellion was as this stage being raised against Iskra in both St 
Petersburg and Kiev, which was no doubt partially the result of leading local Iskra 
supporters first being detailed for work on the organising committee and then being 
arrested.620 Their withdrawal from work in these cities undoubtedly presented the local 
anti-Iskra factions with the spectacle of a weakened opponent, an opportunity they 
appeared to exploit to the full. For these reasons, the benefits accruing to the Iskra 
faction as a result of the Belostock raid increasingly seemed to be disappearing. 
 
 Faced with these strains on the Russian Iskra organisation, one can clearly 
detect a difference in response on the part of Martov and Lenin. The former appeared 
to take the view that, as a result of the disruption, the Economists would once more 
seize the initiative and dominate at any future congress of the RSDLP. As a result, he 
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spoke out against Lenin's strategy for rebuilding the RSDLP. On 1st December he 
wrote to Lenin: 
 
 Силы не подготовлены для победы на съезде, где будут все комитеты. Если дело пойдѐт 
дальше в такой степени «через пень колоду», как сейчас, то останется такой решительный шаг: 
соглашение (путем ли съезда, конференции или объезда всех «своих» комитетов: 
СП[етер]б[ург], Мос[ква], Тверь, Нижн[ий], Саратов, Киев, Харьк[ов], Юж[ный] Раб[очий], 
Сев[ерный] Союз о том, что «Искра» - центральный орган, что данные комитеты соединяются в 
одну организацию, назначают Ц[ентральный] К[омитет] и приглашают оставшиеся вне 
соглашения группы войти в соглашение с Ц[ентральным] К[омитетом]. При условии, что в 
упомянутых комитетах мы будем иметь большинство своих, такой путь останется 
единственным средством добиться скорого объединения без неизбежной - в случай спешки с 
общим съездом - необходимости вступить в компромисс с Союзом и Борьбой. Мелкие русск[ие] 
группки легко пристанут к целому, образовавшемуся  таким путем; ...621 
 
 The alternative organisational plan Martov advocates here is striking for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it seems to aim at excluding opponents from an RSDLP 
decision-making body which would have the power to appoint a central committee 
and the party newspaper, purely on the grounds of their political views. The results of 
this openly factional conference or congress would afterwards be presented to them as 
a fait accompli. Such an aggressive strategy would scarcely be perceived as legitimate 
by opponents, nor possibly by elements around Iskra, as it represented a somewhat 
worse settlement for the Economists than the revolutionary Marxists received at 
Belostock. On that occasion the latter had at least been allowed to attend the meeting. 
Consequently, Martov's policy represented a break with Lenin's notion of a united 
social-democratic party based on constitutional norms, whose structures were 
                                                        
621  Leninskii Sbornik, iv 172: 'The forces aren't prepared for victory at a congress attended by all 
committees. If business continues in such a slapdash, lazy fashion as now, then there remains just one 
decisive step: agreement (whether by means of a congress, conference or a tour of all 'our' committees: 
St Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Nizhnii, Saratov, Kiev, Kharkov, Iuzhnii Rabochii, the Northern Union 
about whether Iskra should be the central newspaper, about whether these committees should unite into 
one organisation, appoint a central committee and invite groups remaining outside the agreement to 
enter into an agreement with the Central Committee. On condition that in the aforementioned 
committees there will be a majority of ours, this way remains the only method of obtaining rapid 
unification without the inevitable - in the case of a hurried general congress - necessity of entering into 
a compromise with the Union [Abroad] and Bor'ba. Small Russian groups easily affiliate to a whole 
formed in such a manner;...' 
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constructed with the consent of all major tendencies and the most significant local 
organisations. The second notable feature in Martov's statement is his clear 
exaggeration of the Economist influence inside Russia, which is reflected in the 
remarks concerning the need for compromise with them and, even more strangely, 
with the utterly insignificant Bor'ba group, the new name of the clique around 
Riazanov.622 If it can be shown without difficulty that, during this period, pro-
Rabochee Delo elements continued to exist in the big cities such as St Petersburg, 
Kiev and Odessa, there is no evidence to suggest that they were united by a regularly 
appearing journal, with the effect that they even had to rely on Iskra for the 
publication of protests against the revolutionary Marxists' policies.623 They also lacked 
an organisation on a regional or national scale comparable to that of either the Bund 
or Iskra, a situation reflected in the fact that, on hearing of the creation of the 
organising committee, the initial response of the Economists tended towards refusing 
to recognise it, rather than demanding positions on it or, for that matter, constructing 
an alternative one.624 The final point of interest in Martov's new tactical idea is the 
potential in it for some kind of compromise with the federalism of the Bund. Though 
the Jewish organisation is not mentioned specifically, the idea that Iskra was to elect 
its own central committee, through which it would negotiate with other social-
democratic groups clearly reflected the Bund's own organisational preferences.
625
 It 
too had its own central committee and newspaper, and it too wished to negotiate as a 
bloc with other groups, refusing to tolerate external infringements on its own internal 
structures.626     
 
 In the previous chapter we discussed Lenin's preferred method of constructing 
a congress based on principles of representation which, if they clearly tended towards 
                                                        
622  Minutes of the Second RSDLP Congress, 479-82 
623  Iskra, 28 (Nov. 15, 1902) 6; Iskra, 36 (Mar. 15, 1903) 7-8; Leninskii Sbornik, viii 301-4; Minutes of 
the Second RSDLP Congress, 33  
624  Iskra, 30 (Dec. 15, 1902) 6; Iskra 36 (Mar. 15 1903) 7-8; Leninskii Sbornik, viii 301; Minutes of the 
Second RSDLP Congress, 31, 35-6  
625
  The fact that Iskra already had a factional central committee appears to have been missed by 
Martov, a circumstance reinforcing the impression that he had very little to do with the Russian Iskra 
organisation. 
626  Rabochee Delo 10 (Sep. 1901) 22-6; Bund, Piatyi S''ezd 
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penalising both federalist ideas and weakly constituted groups, did not resort to the 
exclusion of any definite point of view. As such, it seems that this post-Pskov period 
represented possibly the first time that Lenin and Martov expressed important 
political differences. Clearly the views of Martov went against the spirit of the Pskov 
conference and the entire Lenin strategy post-Belostock in so far as the organising 
committee elected as a result of Lenin's plan was to include all the main tendencies 
claiming adherence to the RSDLP. The natural implication of this was that the party 
congress would contain a similar cross-section of party opinion. Consequently, if it 
can be shown that Lenin pressed ahead with the original plans for a multi-tendency 
organising committee, even though arrests had deprived Iskra of some of its key 
agents, this would amount to demonstrating his rejection of Martov's alternative plan 
for the party congress. In fact, this is precisely what happened. On 11th December 
Lenin received a letter from one of the survivors of the Pskov raid, the Iuzhnii 
Rabochist E E Levin.627 In his reply, Lenin clearly indicates his support for the 
remnants of the committee, suggesting that it fill out its ranks by co-opting new 
members and offering advice about how to obtain the official backing of the local 
committees. He also suggested that Rabochee Delo be offered a place on the 
committee 'with full rights'.628 In this way it seems he brushed Martov's idea aside, in 
favour of far more open and inclusive practices in keeping with the notions he 
presented at the Belostock meeting.  
 
 Lenin having thus re-asserted his democratic centralist plan, the dissent within 
Iskra continued based on the belief that it was impossible for the revolutionary 
Marxists to defeat their rivals through a struggle for power in multi-tendency party 
institutions. However, from this point on Martov's idea of an exclusively factional 
congress was replaced by an attitude of compromise towards the anti-Iskra factions 
which, whilst it can appear as an entirely different policy, was in fact the reverse side 
of the same rather pessimistic coin: having failed to exclude an opponent perceived to 
be much stronger than Iskra from the forthcoming congress, the anti-Lenin group now 
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  Leninskii Sbornik, viii 296-7 
628  Ibid., viii 300. The question of 'full rights' seems to imply that their representative would have 
voting powers in the way most of those Iskra supporters co-opted would not. [PB Aksel'rod & Iu O 
Martov, Pis'ma 78] 
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believed it was necessary to make peace with it so as to prevent Iskra's defeat. 
Evidence of this new attitude is to be found in a letter from Martov to Lenin written 
on 20th December 1902. Martov writes: 
 
 Разумеется, союзовцы и борьбисты гудят на весь мир о том, что «раскол» будет во всех 
комитетах признавших «Искру». Это, конечно пустяки, а плохо то, что наши собственные 
«практики» по сему случаю повесили носы и наводят тоску, ведя себя при этом крайне 
неприлично.629 
 
 He then provides details of the mood of various Iskra supporters, among 
whom the name of Krokhmal stands out: 
 
 Но всего возмутительнее поведение Красавца [В.Н. Крохмаля] который себя показал 
при этом случай истинным рабочедельцем. «Я говорил, я предупреждал, нельзя так по 
военному». Все это он излагал Мартене [П.Г. Смидович], очень огорчившейся (вполне 
искренно, конечно) выходкой своего детища. Мартена и спрашивает, правду ли говорит 
Красавец что весь петербургский раскол создан бестактичностью петербургских искровцев, и 
что последних вдохновял «Лондон» и в частности Ленин, несмотря на предупреждения его, 
Красавца, который объяснял, что надо сначала укрепиться, не выгонять вышибайловцев и не 
спешить с «заявлением».630 
 
 Krokhmal's complaint is informed by the actual declaration of a split in the St 
Petersburg organisation on the part of the Economist wing, a split announced in the 
thirtieth issue of Iskra, dated 15th December.631 It came in the wake of a protracted 
                                                        
629  Leninskii Sbornik, iv 194: 'Of course, the Unionists and the Bor'ba-ists are droning on at everybody 
that there will be a ‗split‘ in all committees recognising Iskra. This is, of course, nonsense, but it is a 
shame that our own practical workers let their noses drop, and fall into depression about this, 
conducting themselves in a highly unseemly manner‘.  
630  Ibid., iv 194-5: 'But all the more outrageous is the behaviour of Krokhmal, who conducts himself 
like a true Rabochee Delo supporter in these circumstances. 'I said, I warned that it was impossible 
using military methods'. All this he expounded to PG Smidovich, who was very upset (quite sincerely, 
of course) by the behaviour of his protégé. And so Smidovich asks whether it is true, as Krokhmal says, 
that the whole St Petersburg split was due to the tactlessness of the St Petersburg followers of Iskra and 
whether the latter were inspired by ‗London‘, and by Lenin in particular in spite of his, Krokhmal‘s 
warnings and his explanation that it was first necessary to strengthen our forces, rather than expelling 
the ‗Bouncers‘ and hurrying with the ‗announcement‘.‘    
631  Iskra 30 (Dec. 15, 1902) 6 
  
 
 
200 
 
struggle between Iskra and the Economists which dated back to the previous June, 
when I I Radchenko was able to write to Lenin that the majority of the committee was 
prepared to declare its allegience to Iskra.632 This resulted in plans that were worked 
out by Lenin and the St Petersburg Iskra group to reorganise the social-democratic 
movement in the capital, closing down the local newspaper, Rabochaia Mysl', and 
developing a local apparatus based on a sophisticated division of labour, which 
merged seamlessly with Russian Iskra's nationwide operation.633 These changes led to 
a rebellion by the Economists during the month of September, the success of which 
appears to have been in part the result of the St Petersburg Iskra agents Radchenko 
and Krasnukha being detailed for work on the organising committee.634 The loss of 
two leading Iskra members apparently changed the balance of forces on the 
committee in so far as the replacement agents, ED Stassova VI Lavrov and IV 
Babushkin, lacked the personal authority of their predecessors.635 As a result, it seems 
a significant proportion of the St Petersburg committee decided to form a new group, 
on the basis of which it would try to build the closest possible links with the trades 
council-like Petersburg Workers' Organisation.636 The aim of the split was, therefore, 
to isolate the official committee, in the sense that the split aimed to draw a clear 
majority of the local movement away from Iskra. If it may have actually succeeded in 
this aim in the short term, in the long term this splitting policy was clearly doomed in 
so far as the new Economist splinter movement, unlike its revolutionary Marxist 
rivals, lacked connections throughout the country, most of whom could only have 
learned of the split through the Economists' announcement in Iskra. For this reason, 
Martov at this stage appears rightly sceptical about the possibility of a general split in 
the party as a result of Iskra's fusion policy. The St Petersburg scenario was the result 
of some definite factors connected to the formation of the organising committee, the 
result of Iskra fighting a factional struggle whilst at the same time committing forces 
to the construction of cross-factional RSDLP institutions. Once the organising 
committee was in operation, there was no reason to believe that the reversal of fortune 
                                                        
632  VI Lenin, Collected Works, vi 176-81 
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  Ibid., vi 179, 228, 235-52 
634  Ibid., xxxiv 116-7; PB Aksel'rod & IO Martov, Pis'ma, 80 n3 
635  VI Lenin, Collected Works, xxxiv 126-7, 129-30, 135-6 
636  Ibid., xxxiv 116-7 
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in St Petersburg should be replicated everywhere, even if a similar situation occurred 
in Kiev during the same period.637 Accordingly, a more general Economist rebellion 
failed to appear once it became clear that the overwhelming majority of local 
committees were prepared to support the organising committee formed at the Pskov 
conference.638 
     
  Krokhmal's protest that the policy of factional struggle must inevitably lead to 
a split in the RSDLP seems to rest on the view that a multi-tendency party was 
impossible. It did not seem to occur to him that the decision of the Economists to 
break with the official St Petersburg committee was not a reasonable response to a 
situation in which the Iskra majority was asserting its right to reorganise the 
committee in accordance with its own political beliefs. The Economists had 
themselves attempted similar reorganisations based on their own view, both in St 
Petersburg and in the party as a whole.639 The St Petersburg Union of Struggle, which 
later became the local committee of the RSDLP had in fact been created by Lenin in 
the winter of 1894-5, a process closely connected to his attempt to reactivate the 
Osvobozhdenie Truda group through the journal Rabotnik, but his subsequent arrest 
led to a takeover by the Economists, who seem to have introduced a policy which 
sought to separate the trade union struggle from the political struggle, the latter of 
which was to be placed exclusively in the hands of intellectuals.640 This change in the 
political character of St Petersburg probably had no little effect on the character of the 
proposed party congress of 1900, which was organised by Kopel'zon and his allies. 
This clearly Economist event, if it caused Plekhanov to lead to a rather ill-judged split 
from the Union Abroad, did not produce this kind of response in Lenin, and it seems 
that the entire Iskra project was conceived in opposition to such splitting behaviour. 
That is to say, Iskra could never accept the argument that being in a minority in an 
organisation, and being requested to submit to the decisions of the majority could in 
itself justify splitting activities. Whether in a minority or in a majority, Iskra 
                                                        
637  Ibid., xxxiv 128; Leninskii Sbornik, viii 301-2 
638
  Iskra 34 (Feb. 15, 1903) 6; Iskra 35 (Mar. 1, 1903) 8; Iskra 36 (Mar 15, 1903) 7-8 
639 NK Krupskaya, Memories  20-2; VP Akimov, ‗A Short History‘, 249-84 
640  NK Krupskaya, Memories 14; GV Plekhanov & PB Aksel'rod, Perepiska, i 269-75; VP Akimov, ‗A 
Short History‘, 239-41, 245-6, 249-84 
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considered itself part of the RSDLP, a commitment both Osvobozhdenie Truda and 
the Economist had problems making. Unlike Iskra, both of these latter groupings 
seemed to be uneasy with the idea of a multi-tendency RSDLP to which they would 
remain loyal regardless of the precise balance of factional forces. Krokhmal, in the 
wake of the St Petersburg split, seemed to forget this important principle. Instead he 
concedes a huge amount to opponents who are prepared to tolerate the idea of a multi-
tendency party only to the extent that they remained the dominant tendency in it. In 
other words, the Economists were prepared to tolerate loyal criticism from Iskra of 
the way they organised the RSDLP but they would not tolerate any attempts by Iskra 
to change the RSDLP's organisational policy. They could tolerate Iskra as the loyal 
opposition to their own faction within the RSDLP, but could not tolerate being 
defeated by them, nor could they tolerate their own preferences being changed in 
practice as opposed to being criticised in theory. Thus, victory for Iskra in St 
Petersburg meant a walkout by the Economists: the two could only coexist in the 
same party so long as the Economists held the whip hand. The moment this situation 
was reversed, the commitment of the Economists to a multi-tendency RSDLP was 
exposed as utterly superficial. Despite this, at least one Iskra supporter, Krokhmal, is 
prepared to side with them against Lenin.   
 
 The next phase of the resistance to Lenin came as a result of the work of the 
organising committee itself. As we have already noted, the arrests of leading Iskra 
personnel caused Lenin to invite a representative of Iuzhnii Rabochii to reconstitute 
the organising committee, a policy carried out with the co-option two female Iskra 
supporters, EM Alexandrova and RS Halberstadt who had connections with Martov 
and Krokhmal: the latter, apparently, was Krokhmal's wife.641 These served alongside 
the Lenin loyalist PA Krasikov, who had been involved in both the reorganisation of 
the St Petersburg committee and the Pskov meeting at which the organising 
committee had been relaunched.642 One feature of this collaboration was a definite 
tension between Alexandrova and Krasikov that mirrored the conflict between Lenin 
on the one hand and the Krokhmal tendency on the other. This was expressed most 
clearly in their contrasting attitudes to the Bund. As has already been noted, the Bund 
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wanted the Second Congress to be made up of representatives of regional and 
national, as opposed to local organisations and for it to be a founding congress. This 
naturally led to conflict in and around the organising committee which expressed 
itself in a number of different ways. First of all it seems that the Bund's absence, 
though it was always officially explained as the result of a miscommunication, did 
actually have a political content, to the extent that the Bund quietly boycotted the 
Pskov meeting on the grounds that it would be dominated by the centralising factions 
Iuzhnii Rabochii and Iskra. As is well-known, after some delay, the Bund actually 
agreed to participate in the organising committee, and it seems that this change of 
opinion was not unconnected to the arrest of the Iskra agents at Pskov.643 Once it 
became clear that Iuzhnii Rabochii was playing a more dominant role than Iskra in 
this committee, the Bund was happy to join the body, but not prior to this point. The 
result of this policy was a new round of polemic between the Bund and Iskra, which 
continued even after the Bund formally entered the committee.644 It is not necessary to 
go into the details of all these arguments, but it is important to stress that Alexandrova 
consistently opposed Krasikov's combative approach to the Bund, which she believed 
was disrupting the work of the organising committee.645 With her help, a resolution 
was passed in this committee instructing both Iskra and the Bund to end their 
polemical exchanges and shortly afterwards, Alexandrova wrote a letter to both Lenin 
and Martov in which she stated her scepticism towards the Russian Iskra organisation 
in more general terms.646 Her main arguments were that the Russian rank and file 
members of the Iskra organisation were unthinking enthusiasts with low levels of 
political understanding, and that the Russian Iskra leadership had played no 
significant role in the preparatory work towards the congress, leaving the supporters 
of Iuzhnii Rabochii to carry out the majority of the work.647   
 
 The significance of Alexandrova's criticism was that, like Krokhmal, she 
                                                        
643  JLH Keep, The Rise of Social-Democracy in Russia, 109; Minutes of the Second RSDLP Congress, 
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644  Iskra 33 (Feb 1, 1903) 4; Iskra 34 (Feb. 15, 1903) 2; Iskra 36 (Mar. 15, 1903) 2-3; Poslednie 
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opposed any policy that tended towards combining degree of inter-factional co-
operation with a struggle between the factions for influence. It seems clear that both 
the Bund and the more conventional supporters of Iskra were quite capable of 
combining these to a degree contradictory perspectives with the effect that both had, 
at different times, held back from participation in the organising committee because it 
did not appear to be in their best interests to participate in it under certain conditions. 
Despite this, both sides supported the ideas of a cross factional organising committee 
and a generally recognised party congress. Alexandrova, by contrast, appeared much 
more committed to the work of the organising committee to the exclusion of all other 
considerations. Consequently she, clearly in alliance with Iuzhnii Rabochii and RS 
Halberstadt demanded an end to an entirely legitimate exchange of views within the 
party and an end to what she no doubt saw as disruptive infighting. In fact, this 
intervention from the organising committee could equally be regarded as an attack on 
the liberties of the different groupings in the party to express their views in a vital pre-
congress period. If one of the key purposes of the congress itself was to resolve these 
debates by means of a majority decision, this was hardly the job of the committee 
organising this congress. The main function of the organising committee was to 
secure the support of a critical mass of social-democratic organisations for its plans, 
not to tell them what they could and could not say. Alexandrova seems to suggest that 
Krasikov's behaviour in the meetings were causing tensions capable of somehow 
disrupting the group's work, but fails to explain how this could actually be the case. 
By its very definition, the organising committee represented a coalition of those who 
strongly disagreed with one another on a whole series of issues, and if this 
circumstance required a certain amount of discipline in organising meetings attended 
by the representatives of the different factions, this could not reasonably amount to a 
general outlawing of disagreement, especially when the controversial articles in 
question were written by individuals such as Lenin and Martov, who were not 
themselves members of the organising committee and played no part in its work. This 
was simply to pre-empt one of the main functions of the congress itself and the results 
of the pre-congress campaigns for influence by the different factions among the local 
committees. As was noted earlier, at the time of the approval of the rules of 
representation at the congress, the majority of local committees had yet to declare 
their factional preferences and most appeared to be split, a fact reflected in the 
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decision of the organising committee to allow each organisation two delegates instead 
of one. This presupposed a sort of pre-congress election campaign among the 
committees to ensure the selection of delegates affiliated to one of the main factions: 
the Bund, Iuzhnii Rabochii, the Economists or Iskra. In 'banning polemic', the 
organising committee appeared to be taking steps to prevent this process taking on an 
excessively political character. In other words they tried to limit the degree to which 
the different groups could fight for influence, thus once again attacking Lenin's 
notions of pluralism within the party. Given the balance of forces in the organising 
committee, it is inconceivable that Alexandrova and Halberstadt did not play a role in 
this attempt to limit internal party democracy.    
  
 
iii) How the Revolutionary Marxists Split at the Second Congress  
 
 It is now possible to see how mistaken is the view that the Iskra faction split 
over the first paragraph or any other aspect of the RSDLP's constitution, as there were 
clearly factors predating the congress that had an effect on it. Menshevism, as a set of 
ideas began to emerge many months prior to Lenin's drafting of this controversial 
constitution, which took place a few weeks prior to the congress in the summer of 
1903.
648
 Moreover, in these early stages, the dissident trend expressed a series of 
general doubts towards Lenin's pre-congress organisational policy that seems to have 
had little direct relation to the provisions of Lenin's constitution, most aspects of 
which actually received the unanimous support of the Iskra faction at the Second 
Congress.
649
 Thus the conclusion is invited that the disputes over the constitution 
were but a weak reflection of, and at most a passing phase in an ongoing but 
previously hidden conflict over broader issues that divided the Iskra faction. This idea 
finds support in Lenin's own accounts of how events at the Second Congress 
unfolded.
650
 Lenin describes the first sign of conflict within the Iskra delegation as 
follows: 
 
 The first incident at the Congress to disclose that all was not well among the Iskra-ists, an 
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incident that 'set the scene' for the final drama (or tragicomedy?), was the celebrated "incident of the 
Organising Committee”. This must be dealt with at length. It occurred while the Congress was still 
engaged in constituting itself and discussing its Standing Orders (which, by the way, consumed a 
tremendous amount of time on account of the obstruction of the Bundists, who, deliberately or 
otherwise, never missed an opportunity to cause delay). The substance of the Organising Committee 
incident was that, on the one hand, that body had, even before the Congress opened, rejected the protest 
of the Bor'ba group, which demanded representation at the Congress, and had stood by this decision in 
the Credentials Committee; and, on the other hand, on the floor of the Congress this same Organising 
Committee suddenly declared that it was inviting Riazanov in a deliberative capacity.651 
 
 Thus Lenin identifies the beginning of hostilities within the Iskra delegation as 
taking place on the very first day of the Congress, towards the end of its second 
session and continuing into the third, which took place the following day. He also 
directly links it to a problem in the organising committee, thus giving a strong 
indication that the conflict at the congress was closely linked to the issues we have 
just been discussing. Further support for this idea is to be found in the way Lenin 
draws attention to the role of a 'Comrade N', who apparently plays a disruptive role by 
trying to get a representative of the three-man Bor'ba group invited to the congress, 
despite the fact that the organising committee had previously decided that this group 
was utterly insignificant and therefore not worthy of invitation.
652
 Lenin describes her 
actions as follows: 
 
 Before the sittings of the Congress began, Martov confidentially informed me that a certain 
member of the Iskra organisation and of the Organising Committee (whom we shall call N) had 
decided to insist in the Organising Committee that it invite to the Congress in a deliberative capacity a 
certain individual whom Martov himself could not describe otherwise than as a ―renegade‖. (And it 
was true that this individual had inclined at one time towards Iskra but afterwards, within a few weeks, 
in fact, had gone over to Rabochee Delo, even though the latter was already in a state of complete 
degeneration.) Martov and I discussed the matter and we were both indignant that a member of the 
Iskra organisation should do such a thing, knowing, of course (for Martov had warned Comrade N), 
that it was a direct slap in the face for Iskra, yet not considering it necessary even to consult the 
organisation.653 
 
 Lenin continues: 
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  N‘s wish to put spokes in Iskra’s wheel was further revealed in his supporting a vote of 
censure passed by the Organising Committee on the Iskra editorial board; a censure which, to be sure, 
concerned a very minor matter, but which nevertheless aroused Martov‘s profound indignation. 
Furthermore, information from Russia, also communicated to me by Martov, indicated a tendency on 
N‘s part to circulate rumours of dissension between the Iskra-ists in Russia and the Iskra-ists abroad.654 
 
 Thus can be seen the beginnings of an open rebellion by Iskra supporters on 
the organising committee against the organisation as a whole. Not only that, in these 
passages there is every reason to assume that N is Alexandrova or, possibly, two 
members of the organising committee - Alexandrova and RS Halberstadt. This 
conclusion can be drawn for the following reasons. Of the six Iskra members who had 
places on the organising committee right up until the opening of the Second Congress, 
two of them, Krzhizhanovskii and Legnik did not actually attend this meeting and 
seemed to play no role in its preparation.
655
 As a result there were seven members of 
the organising committee present at the congress, four of whom adhered to Iskra.
656
 
However, in Lenin's account there appear to be just five members of the organising 
committee in total: one Bundist, two Iuzhnii Rabochii supporters and just two Iskra 
members, who disagree over the question of Bor'ba, referred to as T and N.
657
 The 
four actually present were: Alexandrova, AM Stopani, Krasikov and RS 
Halberstadt.
658
 Of these, both Krasikov and Stopani made vocally pro-Lenin 
interventions throughout the congress, strongly giving the impression that both would 
have opposed the rebellion of an Iskra member of the organising committee.
659
 Their 
view clearly appears in Lenin's account as that of Comrade T, and as he was the vice-
chairman of the congress and member of the Iskra editorial board, we can assume that 
most of the talking was done by Krasikov.
660
 Halberstadt and Alexandrova, by 
contrast, played a very marginal role in the official congress proceedings, owing to 
the fact that neither were official delegates entitled to vote on behalf of any definite 
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organisation.
661
 Alexandrova, as has been shown, had a history of criticising Iskra and 
in this connection, Lenin refers to 'a vote of censure' on the Iskra editorial board by 
the organising committee. This of course refers to the question of Lenin and Martov's 
polemic with the Bund over the character of the Second Congress, the scheme of 
representation chosen by the organising committee and other related matters. This 
vote of censure, in a body of nine
662
 of which six were Iskra members could only 
have been passed with the support of two, not one dissident Iskra supporters. These 
two are clearly Halberstadt and Alexandrova, who thus appear to be acting in concert 
throughout this period. As has already been noted, it seems that this Halberstadt was 
the wife of the December dissident Krokhmal: consequently we get the sense that 
some kind of dissident clique within Iskra emerged during late 1902 and early 1903 
based around these three people. This is especially significant when we consider that 
in this 'organising committee incident' Martov appears to be firmly on the side of 
Lenin, hence his 'profound indignation'. The unavoidable conclusion is that, though he 
was not unconnected with the dissident trend, Martov clearly did not initiate its 
rebellion at the Second Congress.  
   
 It is now necessary to pose the question of what motivated the Iskra rebels at 
this stage and ask why they wanted to invite a representative of Bor'ba to the Second 
Congress, and why this invitation was significant. It seems that Lenin is accurate 
when he writes that this simply 'wanted to put a spoke in the wheel' of the Iskra 
leadership and that they were not motivated by a clear ideological goal. In other 
words, there does not appear to be anything in the writings of Riazanov or any of the 
other Bor'ba members that could have contributed to a principled fight against the 
dominant Iskra line. It is worth recalling that this group was essentially a continuation 
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of the group which had attempted to reconcile the Union Abroad with Sotsial-
Demokrat during the first half of 1901 and which had distinguished itself with a rather 
childish 'boycott' of Iskra as a result of Lenin's article Where To Begin? Since that 
time, it appears to have helped the Southern Union in its publishing work and one gets 
the sense it may have had links with the Rabochaia Volia splinter group in Odessa.
663
 
However, at the time of the Second Congress there is no independent evidence of its 
continued activity, which was surely smaller in scope than several other groups that 
were excluded because of their small size.
664
 On the other hand, Riazanov was quite 
capable of arguing at great length about the Iskra-Zaria draft programme and had 
already published a book-sized pamphlet on this theme.
665
 Thus the Bor'ba group 
comes across as a potentially highly disruptive but utterly unrepresentative clique, 
capable of dominating the congress yet lacking the support of a single social-
democratic organisation, and without a track record of constructive work towards 
building the party.
666
 The arguments against inviting such individuals to a party 
congress should be fairly clear, especially as they appeared to have the right to 
distribute their literature to all congress delegates and the right to petition delegates to 
speak on their behalf.
667
 For these reasons, it seems that the question of Bor'ba was 
simply a pretext for picking a fight with the Iskra editorial board on the part of some 
of the Iskra members of the organising committee. There appear to have been several 
motives for such a move. The most important of these appears to be that the 
organising committee itself was faced with being relieved of its responsibilities, 
owing to the election by congress of an official central committee. Given the balance 
of forces at the congress, it must have seemed a matter of inevitability that the core of 
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this new committee would have been three leading members of the Russian Iskra 
organisation who supported the Lenin policy: Krzhizhanovskii, Legnik and 
Noskov.
668
 Given the conflict with the émigré leaders of Iskra over the faction's 
policy towards the Bund and the conflict with Lenin over the validity of the Russian 
Iskra organisation, Alexandrova and Halberstadt may therefore have acquired the 
sense that their days as leading underground activists were numbered, on the grounds 
that there was little likelihood of their being co-opted to the central committee by this 
new leading trio. Their fears on this point were almost certainly shared by the Iuzhnii 
Rabochii representatives on the organising committee. This seems obvious if the 
whole policy of the southern group since the previous August is taken into account: it 
appears to have been motivated by the desire to re-establish their own newspaper, the 
rapprochement with Iskra and the work on the organising committee to some degree 
acting as a means to this end. Of particular interest is the rather superficial nature of 
their declaration of support for Iskra, which consists mainly in stereotyped phrases 
concerning 'strict centralisation' and ‗handicraft methods', but which does not reveal 
clear views on how the RSDLP should be organised.
669
 Against the background of 
Iuzhnii Rabochii's previous involvement in the federalist Southern Union, such a 
declaration is hard to take seriously, especially when taken in combination with the 
attempt to relaunch their own newspaper.
670
 Surely a genuine advocate of 'strict 
centralisation' would want to merge its resources with the Iskra with whom it declared 
complete solidarity, as Lenin pointed out in his correspondence with the group.
671
 The 
conclusion one naturally draws from this is that Iuzhnii Rabochii wanted to work with 
Iskra to obtain contacts in different areas, and possibly to use the Iskra network to 
distribute its own publications. Whatever the case, Iskra was happy to carry 
announcements publicising the appearance of new issues of Iuzhnii Rabochii which 
clearly helped the southerners re-establish their independent operation.
672
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 What can be said for its alliance with Iskra can also be said of Iuzhnii 
Rabochii's work on the organising committee. Like Iskra, it was quite prepared to use 
the contacts established in the course of this work, which it apparently pursued with 
praiseworthy energy, for its own factional ends.
673
 However, in following this 
strategy, it appears to have fallen into the trap Lenin slyly avoided in the period 
immediately following the Belostock conference, namely that of trying to dominate 
the work of the organising committee and, in doing so failing to devote sufficient 
energy to its own factional interests. The result was that the efforts of Iuzhnii 
Rabochii produced a brilliantly organised congress totally dominated by Iskra, rather 
than its own supporters: it only managed to get sympathetic delegates elected in 
Kharkov out of all the local committees, with the rest of the southern region opting for 
Iskra members and supporters.
674
 Thus their strategy was utterly checkmated and they 
were put in a situation were they lacked both a reasonable argument and the political 
support to justify their continued separate existence. In other words, the Second 
Congress would request that they dissolve their infrequently appearing and apparently 
not very popular newspaper and concentrate their efforts on Iskra, which by this stage 
was clearly going to be appointed as the official central RSDLP newspaper.
675
 Given 
their previous declaration of solidarity with Iskra, it would be hard to argue against 
this and to put a case to the Iskra supporting majority for Iuzhnii Rabochii's continued 
existence. For this reason, it seems that the southern organisation continued their 
previous alliance with the Iskra dissidents in the organising committee, the new aim 
of which was to develop the idea that the organising committee would, without any 
particular controversy, be appointed as the party's new central committee. Only thus 
could Iuzhnii Rabochii continue to play a leading role in the RSDLP despite not 
having much support in the local committees. It therefore seems that the 'organising 
committee incident' in fact represented an attempt to present the organising committee 
as a body which continued to exist despite the fact that its duties had been 
successfully carried out: there was seemingly no more work for them to do once the 
debate on its work at the beginning of the first session of the congress had been 
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completed.
676
 Part of this pretence involved Iuzhnii Rabochii and the Iskra dissidents 
trying to argue that the organising committee was bound by ties of collective 
discipline which obliged it to speak with one voice to congress, despite the fact that its 
own rules governing the composition of the congress forbade this kind of binding 
relationship.
677
 In this way they tried to give the impression that the organising 
committee was a officially-constituted authority in the RSDLP that was in fact above 
the laws it had  laid down to every other organisation in the party. The issue of Bor'ba 
represented an attempt to demonstrate this notion to the entire congress. As such 
behind the whole issue was a fairly crude campaign to secure leading positions in the 
party. The invitation of Riazanov was an attempt to eclipse the hitherto unchallenged 
theoretical authority of the Iskra editorial board which represented the main threat to 
the positions of the members of the organising committee through their capacity to 
persuade a critical mass of delegates to support their plans for a reconstituted central 
committee. This attempt failed in so far as the majority of the congress, following a 
lengthy procedural debate sided with the Iskra editorial board, voting dissolved the 
organising committee, a procedure which seemed to be more or less in line with 
Lenin's definition of the body at the Belostock conference.
678
  
 
 
iv)  How Martov changed his stance 
 
 From what has been shown so far, it seems that the pre-existing tensions in 
Iskra began to express themselves in an increasingly sharp form owing to a struggle 
initiated by the dissidents for places on the central committee of the party. This in 
itself is not an original observation, as this general conclusion can be fairly easily 
drawn from a study of Lenin's account of the Second Congress.
679
 Thus, in one sense, 
all we have done so far in relation to this account is to add detail and provide concrete 
proofs, checking Lenin's account against a variety of other sources. Despite this 
attempt at greater objectivity, there is still a danger of a one-sided view emerging in 
                                                        
676
  Ibid., 36 
677  Ibid., 55, 57 
678  Ibid., 63-4 
679  VI Lenin, Collected Works, vii 19-34 
  
 
 
213 
 
our account, in the sense that we are still a little over-reliant on Lenin's reports. 
Problematically, these do not appear to be entirely objective in so far as they pass over 
some important phases of the struggle which prove that factors apart from the struggle 
for places in the party leadership were involved. Indeed, the most important question 
Lenin leaves unanswered is that of why Martov who, in Lenin's account, starts the 
congress so clearly opposed to the behaviour of N, then somehow switches sides and 
supports her or they. In his account, Lenin merely describes how four informal Iskra 
caucuses took place at the Second Congress, which were initially dominated by an 
investigation into N's behaviour, but which then passed on to the question of choosing 
an Iskra slate for the central committee.
680
 We are told that the first three of these 
apparently took place prior to the debate on the party constitution, whilst the fourth, at 
which the slates were discussed, came after the disagreement on the congress floor 
between Martov and Lenin over paragraph one of the party constitution.
681
 Lenin then 
states that this disagreement was carried over into the fourth meeting, in the sense that 
Martov for some reason proposed the inclusion of both Iuzhnii Rabochii and Iskra 
dissident elements in the central committee, whilst he and his supporters retained their 
firm opposition to including individuals associated with N, owing to their 
unpredictable behaviour.
682
 However, Lenin does not attempt to answer the question 
of why Martov changed his mind at this point, merely noting the fact that his 
colleague behaved in an inconsistent manner, referring to that as ‗the Iskra-ists of the 
zigzag line‘.683 This gap in the explanation can be filled by drawing attention to the 
disruption caused by the Bund and the Economists, particularly during the programme 
debate, which had the effect of fatally slowing down the congress, and suggest that 
this had an effect on Martov. Another related influence was probably the removal of 
the congress from Brussels to London, which apparently necessitated a five day break 
after the thirteenth session. Significantly, it was shortly after this unexpected break 
that Akimov made his remarkable appeal for extended speaking rights in relation to 
the party programme debate.
684
 On this occasion Martov, replying to Akimov 
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ominously registered fears for the success of the congress should Akimov's demands 
be granted, fears that were ultimately realised in part with the agreement to remove 
almost half the items from the original agenda owing to lack of time, at the beginning 
of the twenty-fifth session.
685
 It was probably at around this point that Martov began 
to reconsider his position, the result of which was a policy of granting concessions to 
the Bund, the Economists and the Iskra dissidents. Consequently, it seems that Lenin, 
possible out of polemical motivations, under-represents the factor of the anti-Iskra 
factions' pressure and disruption in forcing a split within their opponents‘ ranks, 
which was only partially motivated by careerism. The other issues that motivated 
Martov's change were the rather more honourable ambition of completing the 
congress's agenda and of obtaining more harmonious relations between the factions 
present at the congress.   
 
  The first of Martov's proposed concessions appears to have been the 
modification of the first paragraph of Lenin's draft party constitution, the character of 
which is already sufficiently well-known even if its actual significance is less well 
understood.
686
 In fact, Martov's amendment permitted groups not happy with Lenin' 
centralising plan, which involved fusing all the diverse Russian social democratic 
organisations into a common party structure, to evade this process without placing 
themselves outside the RSDLP. At the Second Congress, Lenin's organisational 
policy was clearly expressed in the thirteenth paragraph of the draft constitution, 
which stated that only official RSDLP émigré organisation was the pro-Iskra League 
of Russian Revolutionary Social Democrats, and in the eighth item on the original 
agenda relating to 'particular groups in the party'.
687
 In this debate, many of the local 
splinter groups excluded from representation at congress on the grounds of their 
insufficient solidity were in fact declared to be dissolved, the main consequence being 
that their members would fuse with other, better established local groups. According 
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to Lenin's formula for paragraph one of the rules, this centralistic policy of creating 
just one social-democratic group in each local area where there were previously more 
than one would have to be completed for members of the dissolved groups to be 
considered once more to be party members. By contrast, Martov's looser formulation 
permitted individual members of these excluded groups to become members of the 
party, provided their personal attitudes to the official local organisations were 
sufficiently co-operative. This would apply even if the splinter groups themselves 
refused to merge with the official RSDLP organisation and as such placed themselves 
outside the party. The strange result would be non-RSDLP organisations made up in 
some cases entirely of individual RSDLP members. In this way, Economists such as 
Akimov or Krichevskii would be able to relaunch such a journal as Rabochee Delo 
without leaving the RSDLP, despite the fact that the Second Congress had declared 
the journal dissolved. The only change would be that these publications would no 
longer be allowed to place the letters RSDLP on their title pages. They would simply 
appear 'unofficially', in violation of the real meaning of the congress decision, and 
whilst doing this their editors, contributors and supporters could remain members of 
the party. This rather convoluted arrangement naturally threw a lifeline to a whole 
series of Economist groups, who would thus be able to avoid submitting to Lenin's 
centralising policy by formally withdrawing their structures and publications from the 
RSDLP, whilst keeping their members and supporters in it, in other words by means 
of a constitutional loophole. The intended result was to be a plethora of unofficial 
factional apparatuses through which different groups could continue to pursue their 
own agendas without fear of being held accountable to the official local and national 
structures Lenin was trying to create.  
 
 The concession represented by Martov's amendment to paragraph one could 
potentially have  reduced pressure coming from the Union Abroad delegates, the 
Bund and Iuzhnii Rabochii in that, regardless of the precise provisions contained in 
the remaining twelve paragraphs of the constitution, these organisations had in its first 
been granted substantial leave to ignore them in practice. This in turn could have 
potentially reduced the amount of debate on Lenin's constitution and thus helped 
achieve Martov's goal of a congress that made decisions on all the matters listed in its 
agenda. However, as we have already seen, the right of anti-Iskra organisations to 
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continue to exist was not the only issue provoking resistance to Iskra at the congress. 
This concern had no relation to the activities of N and Iuzhnii Rabochii clearly 
believed that it deserved to be more than merely tolerated in the party. Given its work 
on the organising committee it expected leading positions. Martov's response to this 
problem appears to have been to concede the point that the organising committee 
should form the basis for the new central committee, apparently in return for the 
reappointment of the old Iskra editorial board as the board of the official RSDLP 
paper without amendment by congress.
688
 This is significant in that, during the weeks 
prior to the congress, he and Lenin had worked out a scheme of elections at the 
congress of the leading bodies of the party in which a core of three individuals would 
be elected to the central committee and another three to the editorial board of the 
RSDLP newspaper. These six individuals would then together co-opt a number of 
additional members onto each body by mutual consent, thus producing a politically 
homogenous theoretical and practical leadership to the party.
689
 This did not 
necessarily mean that all members of this leadership team would have to be Iskra 
members, and Lenin claims that he envisaged an editorial board significantly 
increased in size so as to accommodate some of the most capable representatives of 
the anti-Iskra groups.
690
 However, such an inclusive plan does appear to have been 
dependent on the harmonious relations developing at the congress with the effect that, 
should the controversies with the various anti-Iskra factions be resolved, the RSDLP 
leadership would broadly reflect the balance of political forces at the congress itself. 
However, should a violent conflict emerge, Iskra would not flinch from using its 
majority to seize as many of the leading positions as it deemed necessary.
691 
Martov's 
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new policy was therefore not simply a break with the one previously agreed with 
Lenin, so much as its complete opposite: whilst Lenin intended to meet resistance to 
Iskra with a strong counteracting force in the form of a purely Iskra leadership of the 
party, Martov intended to grant the dissenting minorities a disproportionately large 
share in this leadership.  
 
 The original plan for including non-Iskra elements in the party leadership was 
based on the assumption that publications such as Iuzhnii Rabochii would not 
seriously oppose Iskra, would accept being dissolved and that it would willingly 
redirect its forces towards the new central publication of the RSDLP. It thus proved 
useless when it became ever more clear that Iuzhnii Rabochii was not actually as 
willing to fuse with Iskra as some of its public statements suggested. For this reason 
Martov, having chosen to pursue a policy of concessions, had to find a way of 
satisfying the southerners' ambitions in some other way. This naturally led to the idea 
of guaranteeing them places on the central committee, as the leading members of 
Iuzhnii Rabochii at very least had plenty of experience in this type of practical work. 
We can assume that this solution was to have been considered in combination with 
their right to publish their own newspaper 'unofficially' and for their supporters to 
play a full role in the local bodies of the RSDLP, given the modification to paragraph 
one of the constitution. In this fashion, almost all Iuzhnii Rabochii's demands could be 
satisfied, whilst Iskra supporters uneasy about such significant concessions to an 
insignificant minority could be consoled with the privilege of not having to share 
control of the RSDLP paper with any other faction. The fact that this 'privilege' 
compared badly with the original idea of electing an all-Iskra central committee and 
an all-Iskra editorial board should the congress reveal significant factional conflict, 
was clearly a weak point in Martov's plan. It required Iskra to freely give up some of 
its power when it was clear that Lenin was not inclined to support such a policy. 
Despite this, Martov sought to further weaken the revolutionary Marxists' position by 
opposing those aspects of Lenin's constitution which seemed to indicate a degree of 
control of the editorial board over the central committee.
692
 The means for doing this 
in Lenin's draft constitution was the so-called party council, which was to be made up 
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of members of both the editorial board and two from the central committee.
693
 
Formally speaking, its function was to settle disputes and to co-ordinate policy 
between two bodies one of which was necessarily situated abroad, the other of which 
worked inside Russia. However, because of the assumption that there would be a 
greater turnover of central committee members due to arrests, whereas the 
membership of the editorial board would remain constant, Martov seemed to draw the 
conclusion that it would institute the dominance of the latter over the former.
694
 The 
result was a second disagreement with Lenin over the party constitution concerning 
the precise makeup of the council and the degree of independence the central 
committee would enjoy in relation to it.
695
 Whilst all were at this stage agreed that the 
council should include two representatives from the editorial board and the central 
committee, Martov supported the idea that these four should then elect a fifth member 
who would possess the decisive vote in the event of any dispute.
696
 This was 
essentially a manoeuvre based on the assumption that the two representatives of the 
editorial board would be Martov and Lenin whilst the two from the central committee 
would be from the old organising committee - perhaps one representative of Iuzhnii 
Rabochii and one Iskra dissident. Together, these three would be able to outvote 
Lenin, thus producing a decisive fifth member sympathetic to the maximum freedom 
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of action for the central committee. Martov then demanded that the central committee 
be allowed to co-opt new members by a simple majority in the absence of more than 
one reasoned protest.
697
 This abstruse formula was tailor-made to the requirements of 
the predominant bloc on the old organising committee, in so far as they had a simple 
majority over the consistent Iskra-ist and could thus co-opt a large number of their 
own adherents, thus reducing the latter to the smallest possible minority. The point 
about two, rather than one 'reasoned protest' appears to be specifically designed to 
prevent Krasikov raising objections to this process, which he would inevitably do. In 
order to frustrate it, he would at least require the support of the other consistent Iskra-
ist, Stopani, whom Martov for some reason regarded as politically unstable.
698
 
 
 Thus we can see that Martov had a joined up strategy for rescuing the congress 
from the disruptive objections of the minority factions. Its main results were a 
significant shift in the balance of power at the congress, in the form of an outright 
split in the Iskra faction. It seems that Martov began to gather a small group of 
leading Iskra members around him who would support this strategy some time 
towards the end of the debate on the party programme.
699
 At the core of this group 
were three members of the editorial board of Iskra who, it seems, were to lose their 
positions as a result of Lenin and Martov's previous agreement to reorganise the 
newspapers' leadership, on its being converted into the RSDLP's official central 
publication.
700
 This exclusion was based on their failure to regularly contribute 
articles to the newspaper, and it is easy to see how these individuals would have a 
personal interest in Martov's plan.
701
 Added to this core were several prominent 
individuals with personal connections to these passive editors such as Trotsky, LG 
Deutsch and Krokhmal.
702
 Thus, including himself, Martov could marshal a group of 
seven supporters, though it is worth noting that of these, only three of these had votes 
at the congress, the rest being granted speaking rights only owing to the fact that they 
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had played a significant role in the party, but did not represent a definite local or 
émigré organisation.
703
 This represented a significant minority of an Iskra caucus 
which seemingly amounted to sixteen individuals, not all of whom had votes as the 
congress: those opposed to Martov's plan amounted only to nine, of whom it seems 
three - Krupskaya, Noskov and DI Ul‘ianov - only had speaking and not voting 
rights.
704
 The result was two Iskra nuclei led by Lenin and Martov, representing six 
and three congress votes respectively. Despite Martov's minority in the caucus, he 
obviously believed that he was in a stronger position owing to his policy's greater 
capacity to win the support of the anti-Iskra factions. The votes of these amounted to 
eighteen, against the thirty-three of Iskra, which meant that Martov, having already 
secured three Iskra votes, only had to secure five more to secure a majority bloc in the 
congress. Consequently, having been defeated in the not particularly representative 
Iskra caucus, he apparently began to canvass support among the Iskra supporting 
delegates in general, only around a third of whom actually attended the caucus 
meetings.
705
 This campaign initially appeared to be successful, with the effect that his 
amendments to Lenin's constitution were carried with the support of a significant 
minority of Iskra delegates voting in concert with the anti-Iskra factions.
706
 
 
 However, the fatal flaw in Martov‘s plan appeared to be a failure to effectively 
communicate his intentions to the non-Iskra factions, whose support he appeared to 
take for granted. This was clearly a mistake, and it was severely punished as a result 
of the instructions given by the Fifth Congress of the Bund to its delegates, of which 
Martov was almost certainly unaware when he made his calculations. Because of 
these instructions, in order to preserve his majority bloc against the Lenin group, 
Martov had to actually convince the Bund to break the discipline of their own 
organisation and accept his offer of compromise. This he did not appear to do. Not 
only that, there is strong evidence that his constitutional amendments were not 
properly understood by the Economists. The debate on the first paragraph of the Lenin 
constitution was utterly confused in so far as not one speaker touched on the question 
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of the anti-Iskra splinter groups: Plekhanov and Axelrod engaged in learned 
descriptions of earlier revolutionary organisations' internal structures, whilst Lenin 
introduced a comparison with the French reformists.
707
 Neither Martov nor Trotsky 
sought to direct the delegates towards the true significance of the modification, 
probably to avoid revealing their motives: we say this because after the congress 
Trotsky was capable of being perfectly frank about the matter.
708
 Owing to this rather 
sneaking, surreptitious nature of their compromise, which presumably reflected the 
fear of a backlash from the Lenin supporters, the only representative of an Economist 
splinter organisation whose status would be directly affected by the modification to 
paragraph one, LP Makhnovets of the Petersburg Workers Organisation, actually 
voted with Lenin, displaying a complete, though hardly isolated, failure to understand 
the issue at hand.
709
 The rest of the Bund-Economist bloc voted with Martov, whilst 
Iuzhnii Rabochii, who would also have benefited, were split down the middle. 
Consequently Martov's victory on the constitutional question was neither convincing 
nor decisive. As a result he was unable to prevent the Union Abroad delegates 
walking out of the congress once their organisation was declared dissolved. The fact 
that it could have continued to exist 'unofficially' did not occur to these delegates, and 
clearly the Martovites did nothing to explain this matter to them, with the effect that 
the latter's majority was undermined. The loss of eight votes from the Bund and the 
Union Abroad represented a huge, ultimately fatal blow to the compromising strategy. 
The blow consisted in the fact that Martov was unable to bring to life his plans for the 
party leadership, which were elected according to the will of the Lenin supporters.
710
 
Incapable of avoiding defeat in these elections, Martov and his supporters actually 
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boycotted these elections citing various technical and personal grounds which reveal 
no broader political principle.
711
 
 
v) Some Conclusions 
 
 Previous accounts of the Second Congress have generally tried to present the 
disputes and walkouts that characterised this meeting as the result of Lenin attempting 
to impose a centralised party structure on unwilling minorities. Such a structure, as we 
showed at the beginning of our study, is associated with political intolerance and an 
authoritarian party leadership, features which are generally used to explain the 
departure of the Union Abroad and Bund delegations. However, the present study 
shows that these allegations, though endlessly repeated, enjoy the status of half-truths, 
and involve strategic silences on a whole range of issues, the aim being to promote the 
image of the Martov supporters whilst attacking the reputation of Lenin. Perhaps the 
most important of these silences relates to the actual policy of the Bund. On the basis 
of either a general ignorance or, more likely, a politically motivated unwillingness to 
discuss this matter, a myth has gained circulation that the Bund's main demand to the 
Second Congress was organisational 'autonomy', which would grant it some form of 
relief from Lenin's implacable centralising drive. This is inaccurate. The Bund already 
enjoyed 'autonomy' in accordance with the decision of the First Congress of the 
RSDLP as did all local party organisations according to the decisions of both the First 
and the Second Congresses. This meant that they were free to start initiatives in 
matters exclusively pertaining to their own area of the country: they did not need the 
central committee's permission to respond to small, localised expressions of 
discontent among the working class, or to expose local scandals among the 
bureaucracy or the owning classes. The Bund was not demanding a similar freedom of 
local initiative in relation to its work among the Jewish population. On the contrary, it 
demanded complete racial segregation within the social-democratic and labour 
movements. Iskra refused to tolerate such damaging ideas and was prepared to use its 
majority to prevent a division in the party occurring on racial lines. However, this 
resistance to the Bund's xenophobia had very little to do with its policy of creating a 
centralised party organisation. Had the Second Congress been prepared to withdraw 
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the entire Lenin constitution in order to appease the Bund, and substituted for it the 
resolutions of the First Congress of the RSDLP, or even those federal rules drafted by 
the Kopel'zon-Lalayants group in 1900, the Bund delegates would still have walked 
out. They had been instructed to do so by their own Fifth Congress, which demanded 
that the RSDLP recognise the Bund as the 'sole representative of the Jewish 
proletariat', a totally new idea in the Russian social-democratic movement aiming at 
the creation of separate, racially specific social-democratic organisations. 
  
The idea that the split between Bolshevik and Menshevik took place as a result 
of a dispute over the RSDLP constitution has also been refuted. Several previous 
writers have noted the sheer improbability of this thesis, but this is not the same as 
identifying the real causes of the split, which we have shown to lie in differing 
attitudes within Iskra towards the non-Iskra section of the RSDLP. The most 
significant feature of Menshevism appears to be its tendency towards compromise and 
a fear of factional struggle inside the party. Initially this fear was reflected in a 
pessimistic attitude towards Lenin's organisational plan, which indviduals such as 
Krokhmal and Martov appeared to believe could not possibly work. With the 
successful relaunch of the organising committee, this same attitude re-emerged in the 
form of a small group of agents, probably Krokhmal, Alexandrova and Halberstadt, 
deciding that the Russian Iskra organisation had had its day. This came in the context 
of a sharp clash between the Bund and the Iskra newspaper over the proposed 
character of the Second Congress, a conflict which was perceived to be having 
negative effects on the work of the organising committee. The result was closer 
relations between a section of Iskra members and Iuzhnii Rabochii, who came to be 
united by the idea that the cross-factional organising committee, rather than the 
leaders of the Russian Iskra organisation, should form the basis of the party's new 
central committee. Thus a certain mood of dissent towards Lenin's factional policy 
had emerged well in advance of the Second Congress, and mood gained strength on 
the basis of some aggressively disruptive tactics on the part of the Bund and Union 
Abroad delegations to the congress. These delaying tactics once again produced a 
clamour for compromise, based on the belief that a course of concessions would 
produce peace inside the party. These concessions took the form of loopholes and 
made-to-measure amendments designed to give the anti-Iskra groups greater freedom 
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to engage in factional activities, whilst at the same time offering them some hope of 
obtaining representation on the party's leading bodies.  
 
 This policy, almost certainly devised by Martov, was flawed for several 
reasons. Firstly, it could do nothing to satisfy the Bund's demand that it be considered 
the authoritative spokesman of every Jew in the RSDLP, ignoring this crucial political 
point of honour and aiming to solve the disagreement solely by means of 
organisational formulae. The second problem as the utterly ad hoc nature of the 
modifications proposed: they were clearly an improvised response to a pressing 
problem and, as such, were poorly understood by all but the small group around 
Martov. For this reason there was no proper attempt to open negotiations with any of 
the anti-Iskra factions. Instead, in a strange imitation of the Bund's policy Martov 
appears to have attempted to 'dictate a compromise' based on terms decided by just 
one side of the disagreement. This could not succeed. The final and clearly most 
damaging mistake Martov made was to continue to pursue a separate policy from 
Lenin after both the Bund and the Union Abroad had left the RSDLP. After a variety 
of disruptive interventions at the congress itself, this eventually resulted in the 
creation of an unofficial factional apparatus of the type permitted by Martov's 
amendment to paragraph one of the RSDLP constitution. This was presumably done 
to show to the departed anti-Iskra groupings that there was still space for them in the 
RSDLP, the suggestion being that the individual members of the Union Abroad and 
the Bund did not really need to leave the party to preserve their distinct apparatuses, 
and that they should therefore rejoin the party immediately. The result of this policy 
was supremely ironic, in so far as a political tendency apparently rooted in a desire for 
an end to infighting actually initiated a new phase of this infighting in the post-
congress period. Thus the initial policy of the compromising Iskra-ists seemed to 
become its opposite, a phenomenon which invites the conclusion that the Mensheviks 
were not really the peacemakers they at first glance appear to be. Indeed, one likely 
explanation for their absurd battle with the Lenin group in the post-congress period 
could have been their ambition to adopt a strong middle ground between Economism 
and revolutionary Marxism, just as Rabochee Delo had attempted in an earlier period 
to balance revolutionary Marxism with revisionism. The failure of this policy and the 
subsequent threat of a catastrophic loss of influence could well have spurred the 
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Martov supporters to engage in a fight with the Lenin group, based on the belief that 
an effective workers' party could only be established if compromising elements were 
installed as its leaders, and if they used this leading position to reconcile the different 
contending factions in the RSDLP.  
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Chapter Six: Summary and General Conclusions  
 
 The aim of this thesis has been to define the main political developments in 
the history of the Iskra faction, from the pre-history of its foundation in the early 
months of 1900, through to its dissolution at the Second Congress of the RSDLP in 
August 1903.
712
 In the study, the following important facts have been demonstrated. 
Firstly, it has been shown that the Iskra project was developed as a response to a 
definite polarisation of opinion within the Russian social-democracy between 
revolutionary and reformist currents, and that the group around Lenin was in no sense 
responsible for the instigation of this polarisation.
713
 On the contrary, in the very early 
stages, Lenin, Martov and Potresov clearly took a conciliatory position in this 
conflict, up to the point where, during the preparations for the unsuccessful 'Second 
Congress' at Smolensk, they were prepared to collaborate in practice rather more 
closely with Rabochee Delo than with Osvobozhdenie Truda, despite always 
proclaming theoretical solidarity with the latter. Because of this, it seems that 
Rabochee Delo made a clear but clumsy and unsuccessful effort to recruit the Lenin 
group during this period. The motives behind this conciliatory position were clearly 
connected to the Lenin‘s group‘s desire to re-construct a viable RSDLP leadership, a 
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goal that was clearly more of priority for Iskra than for Osvobozhdenie Truda at this 
stage. Connected to this observation, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that the 
Iskra project would not have been brought to life were it not for the failure of the 
Smolensk 'attempt'. The support of Lenin in particular for this initiative casts serious 
doubt on the idea that he conceived of the Iskra newspaper and its supporting 
organisation in any degree of detail during his stay in Shushenskoe.
714
 Whilst it is not 
entirely impossible that detailed plans were made at this stage, a more likely 
explanation is that the idea of Iskra and its allied bodies were developed after the 
failure of the Smolensk 'Second Congress', some time during the spring of 1900. The 
'Draft Declaration of Iskra and Zaria', written by Lenin at this time seems to show 
features corresponding to a compromising position between the two main factions in 
the emigration, and as a result we are led to the conclusion that the well-known clash 
between Plekhanov and Lenin during the summer of 1900 had a political basis, 
Plekhanov taking a much more hostile position to Rabochee Delo and other reformist 
forces than Lenin.Not only that, there appears to be fairly clear evidence that it was 
Lenin who admitted to error in the wake of this meeting, one letter to Krupskaya 
strongly indicating his previous ignorance of the true character of the reformist 
trend.
715
 Lenin's objection to the reformists was not, however, simply based on a 
rejection of their political views: he had already made these differences clear in the 
period prior to Smolensk as a condition of the co-operation with the Economists. It 
was more their inconsistent character he objected to, not least the capacity of certain 
leaders of the trend to act hypocritically, proclaiming solidarity and support with the 
revolutionaries in public, whilst giving support to extremely conservative elements in 
private. Lenin's citing of Plekhanov's Vademecum at this stage is particularly notable, 
in so far as his acknowledgement that its contents might be 'true', points to the fact 
that he had earlier accepted the Rabochee Delo argument that they represented only 
the excesses of an embittered individual. In connection with this, it is also necessary 
to consider the earlier history in which Rabochee Delo in a somewhat presumptuous 
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fashion tried to drive a wedge between Lenin and Axelrod: probably it was only in the 
wake of the meeting with Plekhanov that Lenin fully realised the capacity of certain 
Rabochee Delo leaders for some rather devious manoeuvres. 
 
 The result of this realisation appears to have been a heightened level of 
cunning in Lenin's own political conduct, the main characteristic of which was a 
remarkable capacity to deal in organisational and legislative subtleties, whilst at the 
same time adopting certain hypocrisies of his own. The main example of this cunning 
in the next period was Lenin's idiosyncratic definition of the relations between 
Osvobozhdenie Truda and Iskra in so far as the Iskra editorial board, in reality, 
involved the input of the former even whilst 'officially' they had no direct involvement 
in the newspaper beyond the role of ordinary contributors. This gave the revolutionary 
tendency the possibility of pursuing two contradictory tactical lines simultaneously. 
Specifically, Iskra could continue to follow the softer Lenin line, whilst Plekhanov 
and others would not be hindered from making more direct attacks on the reformists 
where necessary. Further possibilities for the 'younger' Iskra-ites for avoiding 
responsibilities for Plekhanov's greater belligerence were naturally afforded through 
the journal Zaria, which was 'officially' entirely separate from Iskra but which was in 
reality directed by the same collective of six individuals. These, it seems intended to 
'say different things whilst wearing different hats' in different publications at different 
times. Thus the countervailing pressures of on the one hand fighting Rabochee Delo 
ideas whilst at the same time co-operating with them in the practical reconstruction of 
the RSDLP were to be managed. This said, sharp and unpredictable turns in the policy 
of Rabochee Delo, specifically its ultra-radical turn during the spring of 1901 forced 
the abandonment of this policy as Lenin publicly came out against these new views. 
Following on from this, a new, more direct attempt at finding organisational and 
political unity in the emigration was attempted based on an attempt to persuade the by 
now inconsistent Rabochee Delo to adhere to Plekhanovite priniciples. Lenin 
supported this rather more than his colleagues in Iskra, but the project failed, in that 
Rabochee Delo quickly reverted to its gradualist principles, as a result of which Lenin 
seems to have finally conceded the necessity of an open factional fight with the 
opponents of Plekhanov. The opening manouvres of this conflict involved rival 
attempts to mobilise support among the Russian underground. Iskra consolidated its 
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full-time 'agents' and supporters into a solid organisation, the Russian Iskra 
organisation, whilst Rabochee Delo made another poorly prepared and democratically 
deficient attempt to organise an RSDLP congress. On the latter occasion, Lenin took 
advantage of his opponents' failings to sketch out an alternative plan for the 
organisation of a party congress in a letter to the Belostock meeting, many of the 
proposals of which were adopted, most importantly the creation of a factionally 
inclusive organising committee. As such, despite the heightened commitment to 
factional conflict from the beginning of 1902 on the part of Lenin, he did not appear 
to abandon his belief that the RSDLP should, for the time being at least, be broad and 
ideologically inclusive. 
 
 Accordingly, the next period of the Iskra faction's existence once again 
combined the opposing prerogatives of co-operation and competition with other pro-
RSDLP groups such as the Bund, the Southern Union, Iuzhnii Rabochii and the 
remnants of the clearly failing Rabochee Delo organisation. If in the earlier period, 
Lenin had tried to use Iskra as a more conciliatory platform, whilst at the same time 
directing the more confrontational written material through the channels of Zaria, 
during the build-up to the Second Congress, the newspaper Iskra itself took on, in 
certain articles, a somewhat more polemical tone in relation to its factional rivals, 
whilst the organising committee became, in principle at least, the site of rather more 
harmonious practical work between the various RSDLP factions. In reality, this neat 
segregation of conflict from co-operation was inevitably subject to strain, in so far as 
Iskra representatives worked hard to secure a dominant position for itself on the 
committee, apparently holding up the work on at least one occasion when their forces 
were too weak. Ultimately, Lenin resolved the practical question of how to carry out 
work directed to building up the faction on the one hand, with work building up the 
party on the other, by delegating much of the latter work to the usefully enthusiastic 
representatives of Iuzhnii Rabochii on the organising committee, who in reality put in 
place the practical arrangements toward the congress whilst neglecting to build up 
their own factional forces. It seems to be for this reason that certain aspects of Lenin's 
Belostock plan were not, in the end, realised, but in compensation for this, the 
superior distribution and content of the Iskra newspaper seems to have ensured the 
capture by the revolutionaries of the great majority of non-Jewish local committees in 
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the months immediately prior to the Second Congress. Iuzhnii Rabochii, by contrast, 
was able to gain the support of just one. As for the Jewish pale, where the Bund was 
dominant, the organising committee's own rules of representation, doubtless under the 
influence of Lenin and Iskra penalised federal type structures in general, and the 
Bund's failure to either pay attention to, or effectively oppose this provision ensured 
that the main faction threat to Iskra was utterly disabled in terms of its representation 
at the Second RSDLP congress. As such, Iskra's dominance appeared at this stage to 
be complete and at the same time not without legitimacy, a state of affairs that would 
have been reflected at the Second Congress were it not for the emergence at this time 
of certain dissident forces inside the Russian Iskra organisation. The basic complaints 
of these dissident forces appears to have been that, in so far as the organising 
committee and not the Russian Iskra organisation had done the greater part of the 
preparatory work towards the Second Congress, the latter had outlived its usefulness, 
serving the purpose only of stirring up disagreement with opposing factions and 
threatening a complete split in the RSDLP through its competitive attempts to take 
over local committees. These pre-existing tensions proved damaging in the face of 
some fairly crude rearguard tactics on the part of the Bund and the Rabochee Delo 
delegation to the Second Congress which, it seems, a section of the Iskra supporters 
unfairly blamed on Lenin's intransigence. In fact the Bund representatives were 
operating in accordance with binding instructions agreed prior to the Congress, which 
made meaningful negotiations impossible. The result was the well-known split in 
Iskra between the 'majority' and the 'minority', as the latter unsuccessfully attempted 
to make concessions to the non-Iskra factions in terms of the party constitution and 
the political complexion of its leadership, and the departure of the Bund and 
Rabochee Delo delegates from the congress. 
  
 From the information presented in this thesis, a significant proportion of which 
has not been subject to previous detailed study, a number of conclusions can be drawn 
about each of the individuals, factions and institutions discussed. Starting with the 
character of Lenin, it is perhaps not altogether groundbreaking to note that he was 
clearly a wily politician, capable of at very least medium-term strategic thinking as 
well as a certain amount of hypocrisy in the face of an opponent, as the division of 
functions between Iskra and Zaria seems to indicate. Equally, there is absolutely 
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nothing to suggest that his behaviour during the period studied was grossly irregular 
or cynical. One main feature of his outlook appears to be a strongly legalistic frame of 
mind, reflected in an enthusiasm for sticking to written agreements, a strong aversion 
to those who broke them and an unusual capacity to draw fine distinctions between 
different functions and responsibilities. Apart from this, there is strong evidence that, 
at least in the period studied, Lenin supported the maximum inclusion of a broad rank 
and file in the work of the RSDLP, an attitude which shows particularly strongly in 
his communication to the Belostock meeting which, for reasons that can only be 
guessed at, fails to find a place in most previous discussions of this period, still less 
detailed analysis. In addition, the method referred to in a later period as that of the 
'united front' - co-operation in one field of work combined with competition in 
another in relation to one and the same agency - is particularly marked in Lenin's 
thinking at this stage. A final point of interest is the fact that Lenin clearly made 
tactical mistakes on more than one occasion during the period in question, 
accidentally undermining his own position, and that he subsequently corrected most 
of these errors either of his own accord, or in response to criticism, especially from 
Plekhanov. As for the other significant figures, the evidence presented here makes it 
seem likely that Martov was actually a fairly late addition to the cause of 
Menshevism, and was probably persuaded, as an authoritative figure to front the 
campaign for compromise at the Second Congress by some other less well-known 
figure or figures. This seems likely given that, prior to the split he had expressed a 
negative attitude towards both Krokhmal and Alexandrova. As for the leaders of 
Rabochee Delo and the Union Abroad, they come across in a less than flattering light, 
owing to the tendency of individuals such as Kopel‘zon to make contradictory 
alliances with incompatible individuals. Whilst there is clearly a reason for this type 
of action - he and his co-thinkers were trying to build an ideologically broad social-
democracy that included groupings to the left and to the right of Rabochee Delo - it is 
hard not to conclude that they went about this the wrong way in so far as his alliances 
were essentially false proclamations of complete solidarity, rather than the conditional 
alliances preferred by Lenin, where he honestly stated points of disagreement as well 
as interests in common. Equally one cannot but feel irritation at the manner in which 
the anonymous Rabochee Delo reviewer
716
 distorts both the views of Lenin and 
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Axelrod to his own advantage, as part of a rather defensive attempt to deny that 
problems exist in the Russian underground. Such behaviour appears to be that of 
someone searching for prestige rather than giving serious thought to the development 
of his political party and on this occasion it also involved a presumptuous attempt to 
speak for Lenin without his consent. Not only that, the discovery of this type of 
behaviour among the adherents of the Union Abroad leads to the question of whether 
some of the many negative characterisations of Plekhanov‘s activity during and 
immediately prior to the period studied in this thesis are fair. Of all the members of 
the revolutionary social-democractic tendency, Plekhanov appears to have been the 
most consistently hostile to Rabochee Delo and its allies from the Bund in the 
reformist camp, and whilst some of the background to the split of April 1900 goes 
beyond the remit of this study, one nonetheless discovers a certain justification for 
Plekhanov‘s extreme sense of grievance in relation to the supporters of Rabochee 
Delo when considering the articles connected to the conflict with Lenin and Axelrod 
in this journal.    
 
 Turning to the various factional apparatuses, the study clearly shows that the 
Iskra newspaper was much more than a repository for polemic, though it did act at 
times as a forum for debate among different tendencies.
717
 It also clearly served as a 
tool aiding the organisation of the Second Congress, in so far as it published 
declarations of support for the organizing committee, the committee‘s declaration and 
so on.
718
 Equally, it is clear that Rabochee Delo was not above exchanges of this 
sort,
719
 whilst the Bundist Poslednie Izvestiia, despite being a 'publication‘ printed on 
a single sheet of paper, frequently gave itself over entirely to the criticism of Iskra.
720
 
Similar imbalances are to be observed in some of the surviving issues of Iuzhnii 
Rabochii.
721
 Whilst the present study has, admittedly, not focused on the contents of 
the any of these publications to any great degree, one cannot but note as a general 
observation that, of all of them, it was Iskra that contained the greatest proportion of 
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and the greatest variety of genuine news stories. Reports were published in its 
columns from a great diversity of towns in Russia, including a great number that did 
not have representation at the Second Congress, and these spoke not only of the 
labour movment, but of every aspect of Tsarist oppression, taking up a variety of non-
proletarian but pro-democratic causes. It is therefore tempting to conclude that it was 
these features of the paper that made it so authoritative rather than the occasional 
polemical article, most of which were in any case kept off the front page. As a rule, 
the Iskra newspaper cannot be judged to have been narrowly intolerant in relation to 
other trends in the revolutionary movement, publishing letters and articles of criticism 
from opponents, as well as announcements produced by them in a professional 
journalistic fashion. By contrast, one should note the poor journalistic quality of some 
of the content of Iskra's rivals. Rabochee Delo and its supplement often contained 
articles of remarkably poor quality, not least the infamous 'Historic Turn‘, which 
yielded one of Lenin‘s most prominent polemical replies of this period.722 This was a 
painfully naive and pretentious production which seems to entirely justify Lenin's 
sharp and broad ranging criticism, not least for its ill-thought out glorification of 
violence. This said, the Listok‘s reporting of student disturbances during the spring of 
1901 is somewhat more detailed than that of Iskra, representing entirely credible 
reporting. The Bund‘s Poslednie Isvestia was, despite its brevity, generally lively, 
containing numerous reports from the front line of the class struggle among the 
Jewish workers. 
 
 If the role of the various émigré wings of Iskra proves to have been, by and 
large, uninteresting during the period studied in so far as they engaged in no separate 
organised campaigns but functioned instead mainly as ballast in the struggle with the 
émigré Economists, the investigation of the Russian Iskra organisation has revealed a 
whole succession of surprises. First of all, it should by now be abundantly clear that 
the organisation was in no sense ‗the party‘ in Lenin‘s world-view, though there is a 
very strong case to made for the idea that it forms the model for what he refers to as 
‗an organisation of revolutionaries‘ in What Is To Be Done?723 This too, clearly, has 
nothing to do with ‗the party‘ - the RSDLP - at this stage. Russian Iskra was clearly a 
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 i.e. 'Where to Begin?' (VI Lenin, Collected Works,  v 13-24) 
723
 Ibid., v 451-67 
  
 
 
234 
 
component part of the RSDLP which had the aim of drawing as many local 
committees of the party into its own orbit and, where possible, merging them with 
itself. As such, it had the clear aim of taking over the RSDLP from within, winning it 
broadly speaking ‗from the bottom up‘ to its own theoretical and practical views, in 
other words of reshaping the party in its own image. In relation to this campaign, it 
should be noted that Iskra was not the first RSDLP faction to attempt such a project, 
as the majority of the coalition assembled prior to the Smolensk congress attempt 
shared a similar idea, based on an abandonment of the party constitution approved by 
the First Congress and a reorganisation of it along more federal lines. The same can 
also be said for the Rabochee Delo takover of the Union Abroad, though this was 
obviously done on a slightly smaller scale. As such, there does not appear to be 
anything abnormal or grossly unfair in Russian Iskra‘s activity or aims: precedents 
had been set for its aim of seizing power and transforming the RSDLP. Apart from 
that, it is perhaps worth noting that the process of centralistic ‗fusion‘ supported by 
Iskra, and which it aimed to introduce into the RSDLP as a whole did not appear to 
imply an authoritarian leadership style or the suppression of dissent. This should seem 
obvious if we consider the numerous challenges to Lenin from with Russian Iskra 
discussed in this study. Alexandrova‘s letter to the foreign leadership of Iskra did not 
yield the least ‗disciplinary measure‘ and in general, the agents appear in practice to 
have been responsible for acting on their own initiative: without question they were 
not bound by detailed orders from abroad or from the Russian headquarters in 
Samara. Finally, it is worth reiterating the point that Russian Iskra was clearly not an 
organisation made up exclusively, or even predominantly of full-time, 'professional‘ 
revolutionaries. Of those whose names appear regularly in thus study, it seems likely, 
though it is not yet proven, that Alexandrova was paid, having been sent from abroad 
on a fairly well-defined assignment. GM Krzhizhanovskii, by contrast, despite being 
the lynchpin of the whole structure appears to have been holding down some kind of 
paid employment. Others, such as Piatnitskii and Bobrovskaia appear to have endured 
near-starvation conditions, if their memoirs are to be believed, testimony which 
illustrates just how one-sided and distorted is the popular view that the notorious 
Leninist 'professional' was a middle class intellectual. The Jewish status of a 
significant number of the agents itself demonstrates how far away most of them were, 
in reality, from a privileged position in society. 
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 As for the other RSDLP factions, the study does not go into the internal 
politics of the Bund to any great degree, but it is nonetheless clear that previous 
representations of its conduct at the Second Congress remain inadequate, failing to 
deal with the question of the Bund‘s obstruction of the procedings.724 It can now be 
considered proven that the allegation voiced by certain Iskra supporters, namely that 
the Bund acting in accordance with quite detailed orders from their organisation in 
violation of the congress standing orders, were entirely correct.
725
 Equally, we should 
note that the Bund was not demanding ‗autonomy‘ from an overbearing party 
leadership at the Second Congress, as certain authorities have argued.
726
 ‗Autonomy‘ 
had been granted to it both in the RSDLP constitution of 1898 and the new version of 
1903: indeed all subordinate parts of the new RSDLP apparatus, such as local 
committees were required to act ‗autonomously‘ in relation to the central committee, 
regardless of the rights the latter had over them. In fact, the Bund leadership was 
clearly demanding what hostile observers might term ‗racial segregation‘ in the party, 
the negative and politically divisive consequences of which are not hard to imagine. 
Having failed to convince the Iskra supporters of the virtues of this plan, owing to the 
internationalist outlook of the latter and the significant proportion of Jewish activists 
present in their ranks, all the evidence suggests the conclusion that the Bund 
delegation sought to disrupt the proceedings of the Second Congress in a fairly crude 
fashion, seemingly with the aim of either getting the meeting abandoned or its agenda 
truncated. This behaviour ultimately had its effect, in so far as the agenda was reduced 
in size and the Iskra delegation split, but ironically, it was the rigid discipline of the 
Bund (as opposed to Iskra) which prevented it from gleaning any real advantage from 
this situation: the Jewish delegates left in accordance with binding instructions from 
their own congress. As for the remaining factions, it is important to note that 
Rabochee Delo had become more or less inconsequential in terms of its organised 
support in the period following the Belostock meeting, during which time the short-
lived Southern Union-Iuzhnii Rabochii organisation also met with collapse. As such, 
the small size of these groups‘ delegations to the Second Congress is no real surprise: 
                                                        
724 i.e. Ch Panavas, Bor'ba Bol'shevikov, 1-29; HJ Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia, 207-220  
725 This in fact supports the earlier conclusion of Tobias (HJ Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia, 207) 
726 i.e. I Getzler, Martov, 76; R Service, Lenin – A Political Life, 102 
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whilst in the earlier period, Rabochee Delo could cause more serious problems to the 
revolutionary Marxists so long as the conflict was confined to the emigration, once 
their struggle spread into Russia, it was inevitably the Bund that would form the 
mainstay of the anti-Iskra forces. The power of this resistance in the later period was, 
naturally, undermined by the exclusive racial basis of the Bund, which confined its 
activities to those areas where the authorities permitted Jewish workers to live. It 
seems that the Economists did have some support in the Great Russian cities until the 
months preceding the Second Congress, but that these did not co-ordinate their 
activity with one another in the way the revolutionary Iskra had done, and nor did 
they issue a publication of any sort after Belostock. Thus they were utterly weakened 
in the struggle with Iskra for the loyalties of local committees.
727
 
 
 Turning to the RSDLP itself, one of the most significant points demonstrated 
by this thesis remains that the party did not simply disappear following the First 
Congress. It cannot be reduced to its central bodies and the great majority of 
components groups who founded the RSDLP - the Unions of Struggle, the Union 
Abroad and the Bund - continued to exist right up to 1903, considering themselves 
parts of a common, though not at all well-organised party. The idea of the Second 
Congress really being a ‗founding‘ congress appears to have originated with the Bund 
some time during the life of the organising committee, a notion firmly rejected by all 
other participants.
728
 The idea should not be taken seriously unless a political party is 
to be defined exclusively by the existence of a central apparatus. The present thesis 
has shown that during the period 1898-1903, different factions expressing different 
programmatic and organisational preference held sway at different times, and that the 
supporters of Lenin were quite capable of accepting a subordinate position in a broad 
party led by such opposing factional forces. By contrast, the history of the Second 
Congress shows that the reverse was not the case and that, having earlier enjoyed a 
period of dominance of their own, the anti-revolutionary tendencies were prepared to 
leave the party, splitting it the moment the policies and leadership of Iskra were 
endorsed. Naturally, this does not reflect well on the supposed democratic sensibilities  
or tolerance of the anti-Iskra elements or the Mensheviks, whose ‗boycott‘ of the 
                                                        
727 The evidence supporting this has been presented in chapter four, section three of the present study. 
728 See chapter four, section four. 
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leadership elected at the Second Congress seems to have been based on nothing more 
than a series of conjectures as to the nature of the party regime to come. As has 
already been noted, the evidence from the period studied in this work suggests that the 
Iskra faction was not authoritarian or rigid in its internal regime, and a result there 
seems to be few grounds for suspecting that an Iskra led RSDLP would possess such 
qualities. The nature of the ‗centralisation‘ aimed at by the Bolsheviks appears to have 
involved more than anything else a rejection of the racial attitudes of the Bund, and, 
as a secondary factor, a rejection of a situation where a multitude of tiny groups and 
infrequently-appearing newspapers operating in each location refused to have much to 
do with one another, as a result of often fairly petty splits, grudges and poorly argued 
theoretical differences.
729
 For the centralisers of Lenin‘s persuasion, this situation 
seems to have represented an inexcusable duplication of function and waste of 
resources. If we consider passages in What Is To Be Done? we can see that Lenin also 
saw them as a source of naivety and bad practice - kustarnichestvo - in which the best 
success of local groups were not publicised generally throughout the party, as a result 
of which they were not imitated on a broader scale. It is surely for this reason that the 
Lenin trend appears to have aimed at drawing all isolated local groups into the 
common work of Iskra, which was by this stage the newspaper of the RSDLP, and 
into the official RSDLP apparatus. Conversely, there is not the least evidence, if we 
consider the pages of even the factional Iskra that these minority views would be 
suppressed as a result of this admitted loss of indepedence, or that individuals would 
be unfairly treated for holding such views which, if they made up a majority in a 
previously isolated social-democratic organisation, would surely represent an 
insignificant minority in the RSDLP as a whole. 
 
 The question of the exact reasons for the split in Iskra has been subject to 
much discussion in previous studies,
730
 but few have considered the dynamics of the 
Russian Iskra organisation, as opposed to the editorial board, as the potential source 
of the disagreement. Generally speaking, one cannot doubt that there were numerous 
tensions within the Iskra editorial board throughout the period up to the Second 
Congress of the RSDLP, which have only been touched on in this thesis. It is also true 
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that these tensions have received probably excessive and one-sided attention on the 
part of those searching for the causes of the split, to the point where revisiting them in 
the current study has been judged superfluous. The main point in relation to them 
appears to be that most of them, however sharp their character, appear to have been 
resolved well in advance of the Second Congress, whereas dissonances within 
Russian Iskra appear to have been growing at this point. Not only this, the characters 
who formed the poles of the most ideologically significant feuds, Plekhanov and 
Lenin, actually showed maximum solidarity with one another at the Second Congress, 
and did not head the opposing sides of the split. This lends strength to the argument in 
favour of a ‗Russian‘ origin to the split in which figures such as Krokhmal and 
Alexandrova played more or less accidental roles, and whose views on the 
inappropriateness of Iskra‘s occasionally combative factional stance acquired 
monstrously exaggerated force in the face of the Bund‘s actions at the Congress. This 
idea that Iskra - more specifically, Leninist-Krasikovite - intransigence had driven the 
Bund and Rabochee Delo from the RSDLP may well have seemed attractive in the 
midst of the conflict itself, but the subsequent appearance of the minutes of the 
Bund‘s Fifth Congress shows this assumption to be false: it was clearly the Bund 
delegates who were bound to an inflexible course as a result of the orders they 
received at this congress, and which they executed more or less to the letter. As such, 
it is tempting to conclude that Menshevism was initially founded on entirely false 
premises and that the strategy of compromises it initiated was equally pointless. In 
their defence, one can only note that the argument frequently promoted by Lenin 
sympathisers that the Mensheviks were motivated almost exclusively by a desire to 
seize the leadership of the RSDLP for themselves in an unprincipled grab for power is 
not really justified: the followers of Martov probably did seem to want to find a way 
of reversing the departure of the Bund and there is no justification for assuming that, 
having left the RSDLP at the Second Congress, the Bund could not have been 
persuaded to return at a later stage. One crucial problem in the conduct of the 
Mensheviks would appear to be a failure to communicate their aims effectively, and a 
preference for keeping their stratagems secret, a feature which allows great scope for 
misinterpretation of their motives. 
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In concluding this study, its author would like to once more draw attention to 
the fact that it has, whilst introducing new primary material into the discussion around 
Lenin, the amount of this material available remains huge and that this study is of 
definition incomplete, even within the strict limits of the years 1899-1903. This has 
been a political history illustrating how the faction came to acquire the dominant role 
in the broader RSDLP, with particular emphasis on the way in which, under the 
leadership mainly of Lenin, the faction got the better of its opponents. As such there 
has been minimal examination of the relations within the Iskra editorial board, the 
contents of the faction's publications as a whole, the finances of the group or the 
practical matter of how literature was transferred into Russia, how clandestine 
meetings were organised, the acknowledged techniques of secrecy and so on. As such, 
the complete history of the Iskra faction is still far from written. Some of these areas, 
such as the relations within the editorial board have been dealt with elsewhere and at 
sufficient length.
731
 However, the question of finances and the detailed study of the 
social-democrats' clandestine work and financial arrangements, if there has been a 
modicum of interest in it in the Russian language, has entirely failed to capture the 
interest of English language scholars. One cannot but hope that future studies of this 
or any other period of Lenin's political life might focus a little less on the well-known 
leaders and the broad ideological distinctions that divided the Russian social-
democracy and a little more on the practical details, in any of the senses described 
above, and perhaps a little more on the work during this period of middle ranking 
activists such as Alexandrova, Piatnitskii or Krasikov which remains practically 
unknown even in Russian scholarship. At the same time, if the period is to be 
understood properly, it seems essential to study not so much the individuals as the 
bodies, groups and institutions they created, so as to prevent an all-sided view being 
obtained, one which does not simply echo the partisan views of one participant or 
another in a conflict. On the basis of the researches that have produced this study, the 
primary and secondary material for such studies should not be hard to find, even for a 
scholar who for whatever reason is unable to spend a considerable amount of time in 
Russia.  
 
                                                        
731 See I Kh Urilov, 'Iz Istorii Raskola RSDRP', 15-17 for a useful review of such studies in the Russian 
language. 
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The main consequences of the period studied in this thesis also seems to 
represent a potentially fruitful area for further research, namely the period of strife 
between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks between the Second and the Fourth 
Congresses of the RSDLP, the latter of which produced a temporary reconciliation of 
the two sides. As with the conflicts discussed in the present thesis, certain key events 
of the next period are well known. These include Lenin's withdrawal from first the 
editorial board of Iskra and then, following his co-option to this body, a second 
resignation from the central committee. This was followed by the foundation of a 
Bolshevik factional apparatus
732
 within the RSDLP, which campaigned to win over 
the local committees to the idea of a new RSDLP congress much in the fashion of the 
Iskra faction of the previous period. However, these relatively well-known events are 
intertwined with less well-known ones that usually seem to get left out of the more 
general histories of Bolshevism and Russian social-democracy or biographies of 
Lenin and his rivals. These omissions pose some intriguing questions. For example, 
few are aware that the Mensheviks actually created their own factional apparatus in 
September 1903.
733
 This development is interesting not so much from the point of 
view of 'who started it', but in the sense that Martov's modification to the RSDLP 
constitution appears to have permitted precisely such structures to be created. This 
poses the question of whether Lenin, in an attempt to put down the post-Second 
Congress rebellion felt hamstrung by this constitution, and whether this was not the 
true reason he adopted a seemingly conciliatory attitude towards the Martovites in this 
period immediately following the Second Congress.
734
 Similarly, the breach between 
Plekhanov and Lenin that took place at the November 1903 meeting of the League 
Abroad, and which undermined Lenin's position has on at least one occasion been 
connected to certain allegations made public by Martov at this stage, which exposed 
Lenin as disloyal to Plekhanov.
735
 However, closer examination of the minutes of this 
meeting appear to show that Martov's comments produced a negative reaction not 
                                                        
732  i.e. the ‗Bureau of the Committees of the Majority‘. For details of the circumstances of this 
faction‘s foundation, see VI Lenin, Collected Works, vii 491-6  
733  Leninskii Sbornik vi 246-9 
734  Ibid., vi 213-8 
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only from Lenin, but also from Plekhanov and Trotsky, with Plekhanov actually 
leading the protests against Martov.
736
 When considered alongside several further 
documents from this next period,
737
 this leads to the speculative conclusion that 
Plekhanov actually broke with Lenin not necessarily because the latter was perceived 
as disloyal, difficult to work with or inflexible in constitutional matters, so much as 
because he wanted to keep the scandal developing around the editorial board hidden 
from the eyes of the rank and file of the party, whilst Lenin wanted precisely this rank 
and file to resolve the disagreement. Thus it seems that, in the following period too, 
what at first glance appear to be egotistical squabbles actually contain a certain 
amount of logic and principle, an investigation of which could produce interesting and 
illuminating works of history. Moreover, there is a vast amount of available primary 
material connected to these and other events which remain to be properly examined, 
ranging from the contents of the Leninskii Sbornik, the polemics of Plekhanov from 
this period,
738
 the contents of the new Iskra and Vpered, the minutes of various 
congresses and committees, and so on. 
 
Richard Mullin 
February 2010 
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